The journalist and political analyst Miguel Cossío, based in Miami, identified six simultaneous crises that are suffocating the Cuban regime in an analysis conducted from June to July 2025, in which he warns that none of them have a solution within the current political model.
Cossío presented this diagnosis during an interview in which he also identified Ramón Romero Curbelo —head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior— in the photographs from the meeting between the CIA director and Cuban officials held last Thursday in Havana.
The first crisis is the energy crisis, which Cossío divides into two inseparable dimensions: the scarcity of fuel and the structural deterioration of the National Electric System.
"Cuba has two issues regarding energy, not just one. In other words, they could have all the oil in the world, and that wouldn't solve the fundamental problem, which is the generation of electrical energy due to the situation of the national electrical system," stated the analyst.
The second crisis is the economic and financial crisis, which goes beyond mere scarcity of goods.
“They lack capital due to the scarcity of foreign investments, they lack capital because of limited access to external funding, and also because of what they could receive through avenues such as tourism,” explained Cossío, in a context where the Cuban economy has contracted by nearly 23% since 2019.
The third crisis is the healthcare: rampant unsanitary conditions and a shortage of medications affecting the entire population.
The fourth is the social crisis, which encompasses water scarcity, street violence, garbage accumulation, and a housing deficit of almost one million units.
The fifth crisis is the demographic one, and for Cossío, it is one of the most serious in the long term.
"I estimate that almost two million people left Cuba," he noted, referring to the period between mid-2022 and 2026, while more moderate estimates speak of 1.5 million emigrants.
This unprecedented migration outflow has drastically reduced the workforce between the ages of 25 and 50 and has decreased birth rates, making any substantial economic reform unfeasible: "They lacked labor," summarized the analyst.
The sixth and final crisis is the institutional and governance crisis, which includes a deep leadership crisis.
Cossío recalls that Díaz-Canel came to power almost by elimination: "Raúl Castro himself publicly stated once that Miguel Díaz-Canel was the last of a generation, meaning he was almost chosen by default."
Civil power—Díaz-Canel, Manuel Marrero, Roberto Morales O'Hara, and Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla—has, according to the analyst, a merely administrative role: "The power held by the Cuban civil political class is very limited. It is more akin to an administrative power, like that of a store manager."
Who truly holds power, claims Cossío, is Raúl Castro, whom he describes as "a sort of monarch in the North Korean style," supported by four centers of power: the family core, the military-business elite linked to GAESA, the generals of the Armed Forces, and the security forces of the Ministry of the Interior.
Regarding this last point, Cossío is emphatic: "The mission of the security forces in Cuba, in this case the Ministry of the Interior, is fundamentally repression. It is their primary task, that is, to prevent, to do whatever is possible so that the people, an ordinary citizen, are hindered from changing the regime. It has been this way since January 1, 1959, up to today."
Cossío's analysis is set against a backdrop of intense U.S. pressure on Havana: the U.S. sanctioned GAESA on May 7, and just a week later, the CIA director met in Havana with the men who, according to Cossío himself, truly hold the power in Cuba.
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