In 2025, Cuba experienced an unprecedented demographic decline in its history. More than one million people have left the island since 2021, reducing the effective population from 11.3 million to an estimated between 8.6 and 8.8 million, figures comparable to those of the mid-1980s. This massive exodus not only reconfigures the migratory map of the Cuban diaspora— with Brazil, Spain, and several Latin American countries shifting the relative weight of the United States as an immediate destination— but also triggers a structural demographic crisis characterized by accelerated aging, declining birth rates, feminization of the migratory flow, and a net loss of the working-age population
The context of the exodus: scales and trends 2021–2025
The current Cuban migration crisis is part of a cycle that began after the protests on July 11, 2021 (11J), when government repression, the abrupt decline in living standards, the collapse of basic services (electricity, healthcare, food), and the closing of traditional escape routes converged to trigger a wave of migration of historic proportions. Between 2021 and mid-2024, more than 860,000 Cubans arrived in the United States alone, primarily concentrated during the 2022–2023 period, when land routes through Central America and maritime crossings in the Florida Straits reached levels not seen since the Balseros crisis of 1994.
Cuba has lost approximately 2.7 million inhabitants since 2020, reducing its population from 11.3 million to an estimated 8.6 million
However, the government of Cuba systematically refuses to publish official emigration figures, arguing that individuals retain the status of "residents" for up to two years after leaving the country, which creates a statistical lag and forces researchers to reconstruct migration flows based on data from receiving countries. In July 2024, the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) officially acknowledged that Cuba's effective population had decreased by 10.1% since December 2020, standing at 10,055,968 inhabitants by the end of 2023, indicating a net loss of more than one million people. By the end of 2024, the ONEI reported a further drop to 9,748,007 inhabitants, which is 307,961 fewer than in 2023, with a decline rate of -30.6 per one thousand inhabitants.
The Cuban demographer and economist Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos estimates that the actual resident population on the island is around 8.62 million people, which would represent an 18% reduction just between 2022 and 2023. He suggests that the total exodus since 2021 exceeds one million emigrants. This unprecedented depopulation has no parallel in Cuba's history, not even during the major migratory episodes of the 20th century (Mariel 1980, Balseros crisis 1994), and occurs in a context of a sustained negative migration balance dating back to the 1930s and 1940s
United States: From Hegemonic Destination to the Regulatory "Funnel"
For decades, the United States was the almost exclusive destination for Cuban emigration, supported by specific policies such as the Cuban Adjustment Act (1966), the lottery visa program, and more recently the humanitarian parole CHNV (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela) and the CBP One appointment system at the southern border. The cycle from 2021 to 2023 reproduced that pattern: in fiscal year 2022, over 220,000 Cubans arrived, and in 2023, the figure remained high, totaling more than 860,000 arrivals over four fiscal years
However, the fiscal year 2024 marks a turning point. The United States received 217,615 Cubans through various channels (land border, CBP One at entry ports, humanitarian parole, flights), a figure that is still high but represents a slowdown compared to the previous peak. For the fiscal year 2025 (October 2024–September 2025), data published by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) shows a dramatic drop: the total number of apprehensions at the southern border for all countries was only 237,538, the lowest level since 1970, and 76% of that flow occurred in the first four months (October 2024–January 2025), during the time the Biden administration was still in power.
Starting in February 2025, with Donald Trump's return to the presidency, immigration controls were drastically tightened: the use of the CBP One system for scheduling appointments at ports of entry was canceled, deportations intensified, and the "zero tolerance" rhetoric towards irregular migration was reinforced. In March 2025, it was reported that only 132 Cubans crossed the southern border irregularly, a minimal figure that reflects the deterrent effect of the new policies. At the same time, deportation flights increased: between January and November 2025, Cuba received 1,535 repatriated Cuban migrants on 52 flights from the United States and other countries in the region, of which at least 1,370 originated from the United States.
This regulatory "funnel" does not eliminate the United States as a pole of symbolic and economic attraction—remittances, family networks, and the U.S. labor market remain central references for Cubans emigrating—but it does significantly reduce its weight in the annual allocation of the migratory flow, forcing thousands to seek alternative routes south (to Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico) and east (to Spain)
Brazil: From an Emerging Gateway to a Central Destination for Cuban Emigration
If there is a country that symbolizes the shift in migration patterns for 2024–2025, it is Brazil. In 2024, Brazil became the country with the highest number of asylum applications from Cubans in the world, with 19,100–19,700 applications between January and November, surpassing Mexico for the first time and nearing levels comparable to the historic flows towards the United States. This qualitative leap can be explained by the combination of several factors: the gradual closure of routes to the north, the existence of established corridors from Guyana and Suriname to the Brazilian state of Roraima, the perception of a relatively accessible asylum policy, and the formation of migration networks that facilitate information, accommodation, and employment for newcomers.
In 2025, the flow to Brazil dramatically accelerates. According to data from the Migration Observatory (Obmigra), between January and October 2025, there were 34,909 asylum applications from Cubans, nearly doubling the total for all of 2024. In the first quarter of the year, Cuban applications (9,467) surpassed those from Venezuelans (5,794) for the first time, marking a historical milestone given the context of the Venezuelan crisis and the massive displacement of over 8 million Venezuelans throughout Latin America
Acceleration of the Cuban migration flow to Brazil in 2025: over 4,000 applications per month in September and October
The monthly trend shows a steady acceleration: in September 2025, there were 4,084 asylum applications from Cubans, and in October, the number rose to 4,178, implying an average of over 4,000 monthly applications in the last quarter of the year, levels comparable to the monthly flows to the United States in previous years. This explosive growth reflects not only a shift in traditional routes but also the consolidation of Brazil as a "second border" for Cuban emigration, with cities like Curitiba, Manaus, São Paulo, and Brasília serving as hubs for settlement and regional redistribution
The Brazilian government maintains a humanitarian reception policy without a special category for Cubans, processing each case individually through the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE), with recognition rates averaging over 60% for all applicants. However, organizations such as UNHCR have warned about the necessity to strengthen integration, housing, and employment mechanisms to accommodate the increasing flow, especially in border states like Roraima and Amapá, where the reception infrastructure is overwhelmed
Spain: the second major structural hub of the diaspora
In the last decade, Spain has established itself as the second major destination for Cuban emigration, trailing only the United States in terms of the accumulated number of residents. As of January 2023, the Cuban-origin community in Spain has reached nearly 200,000 people, and official data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) confirm a steady flow of new arrivals year after year
Between 2023 and 2024, a total of 53,100 Cubans arrived in Spain: 28,900 in 2023 and 24,200 in the first three quarters of 2024, with data pending for the last quarter of the year that will likely raise the annual figure above 30,000. In 2025, at least 27,000 Cubans registered in Spain, consolidating an average of around 2,000–2,500 arrivals per month and increasing the total stock of Cuban residents to over 160,000.
This constant flow is influenced by several structural factors. Firstly, the Democratic Memory Law (commonly referred to as the "Grandchildren's Law") facilitates the acquisition of Spanish nationality for descendants of Spanish citizens, allowing thousands of Cubans with Galician, Asturian, Canary Islander, or Andalusian heritage to obtain European passports in relatively short periods. Secondly, Spain offers an accessible labor market in sectors such as services, hospitality, construction, care, and commerce, where a common language and community networks ease initial integration, although often under precarious conditions. Thirdly, access to Spanish citizenship opens the door to free movement within the Schengen area and, eventually, mobility to other countries in the European Union, making Spain a "platform" for broader migratory projects.
Within Spain, the main concentrations of the Cuban population are found in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, the Canary Islands, and the Mediterranean coast, where networks of mutual support, immigrant associations, and enclave economies have formed to facilitate the arrival of new migrants. However, the increase in this influx also creates tensions regarding access to housing, employment, and public services, placing Latin American migration at the center of the Spanish political debate
Mexico: Between Transit and Settlement
Mexico holds an ambivalent position on the map of Cuban emigration: it is simultaneously one of the main destinations for asylum applications and one of the primary transit countries to the southern border of the United States. According to data from the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), in 2024 Mexico received 17,884 asylum applications from Cubans, making Cuba the second-largest source of applicants after Honduras (27,888).
Although the number of applications decreased slightly compared to 2022 (18,181) and 2023 (18,452), the resolution and approval rates improved significantly: in 2024, 5,499 cases from Cubans were resolved, with a recognition rate of 55% (3,038 cases approved), compared to rates of 63% in 2023 and 48% in 2022, but with significantly lower volumes processed in those years. Between 2013 and 2024, Mexico has resolved 18,376 asylum applications from Cubans, approving 9,489 and denying 7,746
In 2025, the flow into Mexico intensified again: between January and September, there were 28,700 new asylum applications from Cubans, which places Cuba once more as the second or third highest source of applicants, depending on the month and the evolution of the flow from Honduras and Haiti. This increase is partly due to the closure of the U.S. border and the use of Mexico as a "waiting room" for those looking for an opportunity to cross north, but it also reflects a more permanent settlement of Cubans in cities such as Mexico City, Monterrey, Guadalajara, Cancun, and other urban centers where they find employment in the service, tourism, and trade sectors
The 2020 Population Census recorded over 26,000 Cubans living in Mexico, a figure that has likely doubled or tripled in recent years when including pending asylum seekers and individuals in irregular situations. On the other hand, the transit of Cubans through Mexico to the United States remains highly significant: in 2024, 60,007 Cubans crossed Honduras heading north, making them the second largest national group (after Venezuela) on that Central American migration route
Uruguay: a niche destination with a steady flow
Uruguay has established itself as one of the preferred Latin American destinations for Cubans seeking an alternative to the United States and Brazil, due to its institutional stability, legal security, and migration regularization programs. Between 2012 and 2023, Uruguay received 12,400 Cubans (20% of the total immigrants during that period), positioning itself as the second largest nationality after Venezuela.
In the biennium of 2022–2024, Uruguay granted residency to 6,608 Cubans: 1,580 in 2023 and 2,724 in 2024, representing a 72% year-on-year increase. The total number of residencies granted to foreigners in 2024 reached 16,870, a historic record that reflects both the regional migration boom and the effectiveness of the regularization programs implemented by the Uruguayan government, including the Residency by Rooting Decree (May 2024), which allows undocumented migrants to access permanent residency for labor, family, or educational reasons
In the first quarter of 2025, Uruguay recorded 1,700 asylum applications from Cubans, marking a significant increase compared to previous quarters and confirming the upward trend in the flow. By the end of 2023, the Refugee Commission (CORE) had over 24,000 pending applications, the majority from Cubans and other nationals who require a visa to enter the country, creating a "migratory limbo" in which thousands of people were unable to work formally or access services. The extension of deadlines for the residency program and the opening of new processing offices in 2024-2025 aim to alleviate this situation
The impact of Cuban migration in Uruguay is evident in multiple indicators: the number of Cuban children enrolled in public schools has increased sevenfold since 2018, reaching 1,541 students in 2024 (making them the second largest nationality after Venezuela, which has 1,776). Additionally, the modification of the Uruguayan passport to include the "URY" code for both natural citizens and naturalized foreigners allows new Uruguayans to travel visa-free to over 150 countries, including Spain, making naturalization a highly valued strategic asset for Cuban migrants
Dominican Republic and other Latin American destinations
Dominican Republic has emerged as a new destination for Cuban emigration in recent years. Since 2018, the Caribbean country has granted residency to 14,664 Cubans, with a notable increase in 2024-2025 that reflects both the use of the Dominican Republic as a long-term tourist destination (months-long stays with locally renewed tourist visas) and projects for more permanent settlement in the service, commerce, and tourism sectors.
Other Latin American countries complete the mosaic of Cuban destinations in 2025:
Chile: has received moderate but steady flows of Cubans, many of whom are professionals and technicians attracted by the Chilean labor market and the opportunity to obtain temporary residency through employment contracts.
Colombia: serves both as a final destination (especially Bogotá, Medellín, and Cartagena) and as a transit country on the route to Panama and Central America.
Panama: it is home to a small but dynamic Cuban community, connected to sectors such as financial services, logistics, and tourism.
Guyana and Suriname: they are less final destinations and more gateways for the route to Brazil and, to a lesser extent, to the English-speaking Caribbean. Thousands of Cubans cross these borders each year in irregular conditions, paying traffickers for transportation to Roraima.
Demographic profile of emigrants: feminization, youth, and qualifications
Recent Cuban immigration exhibits distinctive demographic characteristics that exacerbate the impact on the island's population structure. Firstly, the flow is strongly feminized: according to United Nations figures, for every 100 men who emigrate, 133 women leave, which means that 56–57% of emigrants are women. This pattern contrasts with previous irregular migration crises (Mariel 1980, Balseros 1994), where men predominated. The feminization is linked to the fact that between 2021 and 2025, a significant portion of emigration employs legal or semi-regular routes (commercial flights, humanitarian parole, tourist visas converted into asylum requests), which are safer for women and allow entire families to leave.
Secondly, emigration is predominantly youthful: the age range most represented is between 20 and 40 years, with a significant proportion of individuals between 25 and 35 years, which is the peak reproductive and productive age. This has direct consequences on fertility and the workforce in Cuba: in 2023, the total number of women of childbearing age (15–49 years) decreased by 304,717, with more than 70% in the most reproductive ages (15–39 years). The massive outflow of young women contributes to the decline in the total fertility rate, which reached 1.29 children per woman in 2024, the lowest recorded in Cuba's history and well below the replacement level of 2.1.
Thirdly, emigration presents a relatively high level of education and qualification: studies on recent migratory composition indicate that a significant percentage of emigrants have completed pre-university or university education, and many come from professional sectors such as health, education, engineering, and information technologies. This "brain drain" undermines Cuba's productive capacity and hampers any medium-term economic recovery strategy
Finally, emigration has an urban bias: while all provinces are experiencing population loss, Havana accounts for the largest absolute number of emigrants (over 100,000 between 2023 and 2024), followed by Camagüey, Cienfuegos, and Santiago de Cuba. This phenomenon can be explained by the greater international connectivity of the cities, access to information about routes and procedures, and the presence of existing migration networks that facilitate departure
Demographic impact: aging, declining birth rates, and labor force collapse
The migration exodus of 2021–2025 coincides with an advanced demographic transition that Cuba has been experiencing since the 1970s. With a total fertility rate below the replacement level since 1978, a high life expectancy (76 years for men, 80 for women), and a population structure dominated by the 15 to 64 age group (71.1%), Cuba already exhibited characteristics of an "aging country" prior to the current crisis
In 2024, 25.7% of the Cuban population is 60 years or older, making Cuba the most aged country in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is the only age group that is growing in absolute terms, while all other segments (children, teenagers, working-age adults) are decreasing year after year. The median age in Cuba is 42.2 years, the highest on the American continent
The combination of massive youth emigration and declining birth rates creates a "perfect demographic storm." In 2024, Cuba recorded 71,374 births compared to 130,645 deaths, meaning there were almost double the number of deaths than births. The natural growth rate has been negative since 2020, and the external migration balance rate was -25.4 per thousand inhabitants in 2024, indicating that around 25 people for every 1,000 inhabitants left the country that year
This scenario presents multiple structural challenges:
Collapse of the labor force: the departure of hundreds of thousands of working-age individuals reduces the tax base, domestic consumption, and the State's ability to finance public services. Moreover, those who remain in Cuba must take on additional responsibilities for caring for the elderly, which drives many women out of the formal labor market.
Pressure on pension and health systems: with an aging population representing more than a quarter of the total, the Cuban social security system faces an unsustainable dependency ratio, with fewer and fewer active workers for each retiree.
Disarticulation of fertility indicators: the emigration of women of childbearing age artificially increases the total fertility rate and, above all, the relative weight of adolescent fertility, creating statistical distortions that mask the true level of reproduction of the population.
Depopulation and Rural Aging: internal migration from rural areas to Havana and other cities, combined with the international emigration of young people from all regions, is leaving the Cuban countryside severely depopulated and aged, which jeopardizes agricultural production and food security.
Conclusion: a country that is emptying and a diaspora that is being redistributed
Cuban emigration in 2025 is not a short-term phenomenon, but rather the manifestation of a multidimensional systemic crisis that combines economic collapse, political repression, deterioration of basic services, demographic aging, and a lack of short- and medium-term improvement prospects. Each year, Cuba loses between 250,000 and 350,000 inhabitants due to the combined effects of negative net migration and negative natural balance (more deaths than births), which projects a population of between 6 and 8 million people by 2050-2100 in the most conservative scenarios
The geographical redistribution of migration flows—where Brazil, Spain, Mexico, and Uruguay are emerging as alternative poles to the United States—reflects both the adaptation of migrants to a more restrictive geopolitical environment and the formation of new transnational networks connecting the island to multiple diaspora nodes. However, this diversification does not alleviate the demographic impact on Cuba: the country is losing young people, women of childbearing age, skilled labor, and reproductive capacity, creating an unprecedented "demographic storm" scenario in Latin America
For the host countries, the challenge lies in managing increasing flows of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in a regional context already marked by multiple migration crises (Venezuela, Haiti, Central America), with limited resources and institutional frameworks that require adaptation and strengthening.
For Cuba, the exodus represents a demographic hemorrhage that undermines any development strategy and raises structural questions about the viability of the current economic and political model.
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