The economist Elías Amor poses a question that divides observers of the Cuban reality: the 176 economic measures approved by the National Assembly on June 19, are they a genuine sign of transition or merely a diplomatic maneuver in front of Washington?
"These measures are the card that has been placed on the negotiation table with the United States to see if this shifts anything or is useful for something," Amor stated in the fourth and final program of his analysis series on the reform package, alongside journalist Tania Costa.
After analyzing the speeches of Díaz-Canel and Marrero related to the package of 176 measures, the economist identified an internal fracture within the regime that has become apparent since the reforms were published.
"Within the unity of the communist regime, reformist sensitivity and reactionary sensitivity have emerged. These are the ones who do not want to change and maintain that these reforms are only valid to the extent that they respect the Constitution, the communist system, the socialist nature of Cuba, blah, blah, blah," he explained.
This internal tension is clearly reflected in the analysis of thematic axis 15, dedicated to foreign trade and encompassing measures 127 to 130.
Amor positively assesses the stated objective—boosting Cuban exports— but warns that the logical sequence is reversed. "To export, the first thing a national economy must do is feed its inhabitants, addressing the needs of the population first."
Although the measures eliminate mandatory state intermediaries and allow private entities to export directly, the economist points out that the progress is partial: direct exports still require prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.
"In Cuba, you need authorization from Fidel Castro's nephew at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. They open doors, but that criterion of discretion always remains," Amor quipped.
For the analyst, the difference between authorization and license is not a minor technical detail, but rather the core of the Cuban structural problem.
"It would be ideal if authorization were not needed, but rather a license, which is what exists, for example, in Spain, France, and Germany. In Spain, you are not authorized; you export, but to be able to export, you need to have an export license," he pointed out.
In his opinion, this criterion of state discretion is the underlying reason why the Cuban economy cannot function, beyond the absence of private property.
The analysis takes place in a context of severe crisis: CEPAL projects a 6.5% decline in GDP for Cuba in 2026, the worst in Latin America, while the fiscal deficit exceeds 12% of GDP and is financed through monetary issuance.
Love does not hold back in its assessment of the Díaz-Canel government: "This government is not only useless, it does nothing. They only complain about the blockade and the embargo. Come on, work, do something."
Regarding the real viability of the reform package, the economist remains skeptical. "If these measures were implemented, they would take up a lot of time. Let's see if they are capable of doing it."
Love, who predicted in April 2026 that Cuba would be free before the summer, remains optimistic about an imminent transition, although he acknowledges that the regime will only implement measures that do not threaten the communist structure, and that a genuine change would require reforming the constitutional articles that uphold the state model.
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