Miguel Díaz-Canel again resorted to the rhetoric of “psychological warfare,” “subversion,” and the external enemy to describe the growing challenge posed to the Cuban regime by social media, independent media, and the flow of information outside state control.
“We are living through the most dangerous times since the October Crisis,” stated the leader, who asserted that Cuba is subjected to a “high-intensity unconventional war” through “digital subversion,” the “financing of internal mercenaries,” “media discrediting campaigns,” and “influence networks”.
Díaz-Canel also linked those accusations to recent reports from American media about an increase in CIA operations related to Cuba.
"They are not random leaks, as they present them, but rather part of the deliberate plan of the U.S. regime for psychological warfare against Cuba,” he stated.
The issue with that discourse is that it conflates under a single narrative the intelligence operations of a foreign power, independent journalism, digital activity, and the critical expression of Cuban citizens.
Media war or the loss of the information monopoly?
For decades, the Cuban state controlled nearly all the information that circulated publicly within the island.
The internet, social media, and the emergence of independent media have eroded that monopoly and allowed complaints, protests, and everyday issues to reach millions of people without going through the official filter.
International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented arbitrary arrests, interrogations, threats, movement restrictions, equipment confiscation, and other forms of harassment against journalists, activists, and dissenting voices in Cuba.
Díaz-Canel himself spoke in his speech about breaking a supposed "fascist media blockade" and called to "contest cultural hegemony" and confront what he referred to as a "disinformation machine."
The contradiction is hard to ignore: the governing party asserts its right to engage in a political and ideological battle for the narrative, yet labels as "subversion" or "mercenary" activity those who challenge its version of reality.
Why not respond to journalism with journalism? Why not allow private and independent media within Cuba? Why not acknowledge pluralism and accept that criticizing the Government does not equate to acting against the country?
And, above all, how long will the regime continue to resort to the external enemy to discredit the voices of a society that also demands the right to express itself without permission from the State?
From calling "mercenaries" to threatening with prison
The expression “internal mercenaries” used by Díaz-Canel carries a particularly serious weight in the Cuban context.
The current Penal Code indeed addresses the crime of mercenarism in its article 135, but its definition is linked to joining or collaborating with military formations or private military companies operating in another state. It does not automatically classify a journalist as a mercenary simply for working for a foreign media outlet or receiving compensation from abroad.
However, independent journalists have reported for years that State Security agents threaten them precisely by accusing them of "mercenarism". CiberCuba has documented cases like that of journalist Yoe Suárez, who reported in 2021 having received that type of threat.
The danger for independent press does not end there.
The article 143 of the Penal Code establishes penalties of four to ten years in prison for certain behaviors related to providing, receiving, or possessing funds intended for activities that the authorities consider contrary to the Cuban State and its constitutional order.
This is complemented by figures such as propaganda against the constitutional order, incitement to commit a crime, contempt, or public disorder, used in various proceedings against opponents, activists, and critical citizens.
Crimes such as assault or resistance have also emerged in cases related to protests, although they require additional behaviors and should not be confused with the practice of journalism or freedom of expression.
The result is an environment in which political labels can have very real consequences. When the country's ruler speaks of "internal mercenaries," he does so in a state where independent journalists have reported threats using that very same word and where there are criminal tools capable of leading to years in prison.
Pluralism is not "subversion."
Foreign intelligence operations can be investigated, and any government has the right to present evidence of illegal activities. However, that does not automatically turn journalists, activists, economists, content creators, or critical citizens into foreign agents.
If Díaz-Canel considers information to be false, he can present data that refutes it. If he believes that a media outlet is manipulating information, he can publicly demonstrate this. What is incompatible with a free press is systematically turning dissent into suspicion of subversion.
The Cuban regime could start with something much simpler than denouncing another "psychological war": allowing the various voices of Cuban society to express themselves, organize, and engage in journalism without fear of a summons from State Security.
After decades of "enemies," "mercenaries," "media campaigns," and foreign conspiracies, one question remains that the official discourse still does not answer: when will the regime be willing to listen to Cubans with differing opinions without treating them as a threat?
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