The Media Observatory of Cubadebate published an extensive analysis this Tuesday of 57,695 public mentions on the internet regarding Marco Rubio and the State Department between July 20 and August 9.
His most compelling conclusion does not limit itself to observing the increasing pressure from Washington on Havana: it asserts that the digital conversation allows us to conclude that there is an «operation of external interference».
The problem is that the data presented does not demonstrate that.
The study provides useful information for understanding how the conversation about Cuba has evolved over the past few weeks.
In this regard, it identifies two major peaks of activity, measures the presence of official U.S. accounts, analyzes the repetition of certain messages, and reconstructs the sequence between the report “Cuba: the capital of 21st-century communism”, new sanctions, and subsequent journalistic information about intelligence operations and possible transition scenarios.
So far, the data indicates a U.S. strategy of pressure, the existence of which Washington does not hide. Marco Rubio has publicly discussed increasing that pressure and the State Department has supported his statements with concrete decisions.
The methodological issue arises when Cubadebate tries to demonstrate something different: that the patterns found on the internet constitute, in themselves, evidence of an interference operation.
One of the main "findings" of the Observatory is that 52.2% of the geolocated mentions come from the United States, compared to 5.4% from Cuba.
Cubadebate concludes from that difference that "it is an operation of external interference."
The logical leap is difficult to sustain. The study precisely analyzes the U.S. government's policy towards Cuba, the statements made by the U.S. Secretary of State, and a report published by the Department of State. It is to be expected that a significant part of that conversation takes place in the United States.
The geographical origin allows us to know where the conversation takes place, but it does not, by itself, demonstrate who is coordinating it, whether there is an organized operation, or what the intentions of those participating in it are.
To substantiate a coordinated operation additional evidence would be required: relationships between accounts, unusual synchronization, automation, common instructions, funding, inauthentic behavior, or any other mechanism that allows for moving from correlation to attribution.
None of that is demonstrated in the report.
The Observatory also highlights that 47.3% of the studied posts are retweets and notes that official accounts such as @StateDept and @SecRubio coexist among the main nodes with political profiles, media outlets, and conservative users.
From this, it is stated that there is "discipline and message convergence." The convergence can be observed. Coordination, on the other hand, needs to be proven.
It is not unusual for supporters of a particular policy to share messages from the Secretary of State, or for conservative accounts to amplify content that aligns with their ideological positions, especially on a social network. The same phenomenon occurs with any highly polarized political issue.
Retweets allow for measuring amplification. They do not automatically indicate who ordered that amplification or if anyone did so.
There is also an important difference between government coordination and digital conversation coordination. The fact that the State Department and its secretary maintain consistent messages is not an anomaly: it is part of the normal functioning of an institution that communicates a specific foreign policy.
Another thing would be to demonstrate that media, journalists, and users act as coordinated components of an operation designed from Washington. The data published by Cubadebate does not go that far.
Something similar happens with the time sequence.
Cubadebate notes that first the report from the State Department appeared; then came sanctions, statements from Rubio, amplification on social media, and finally reports from POLITICO and The New York Times about a increase in U.S. intelligence capabilities related to Cuba.
The chronology is relevant and shows that Washington is developing a coherent and cumulative policy towards the Cuban regime.
But the occurrence of several events in succession that share a political direction does not prove that they are all part of the same communication operation.
Much less does it allow for the automatic inclusion of independent media coverage. That POLITICO, The New York Times, or Axios publish leaks from U.S. officials shows that journalists have obtained information from government sources. It does not demonstrate that these media outlets are participating in a strategy directed by the State Department.
The Observatory itself acknowledges, in fact, that the information regarding intelligence operations comes from anonymous sources and "does not equate to an official admission."
The main weakness of the report paradoxically lies in its own methodology.
Cubadebate explains at the end of the study that its research "describes patterns of discourse and amplification" and that it "does not independently verify the truthfulness" of the analyzed accusations.
It is a correct methodological precaution. But that same principle should be applied to the conclusion regarding the alleged interference.
The data suggests that there is an intense conversation; that Washington has placed Cuba on its national security agenda; that certain formulations are repeated; that official accounts have the capacity for amplification; and that there is a political and media community in the United States that reproduces these messages.
What they cannot demonstrate, without additional evidence, is that this conversation constitutes an "operation of external interference."
The distinction matters because measuring a narrative does not equate to proving who controls it.
The Observatory has gathered data that helps to understand how the conversation about Cuba is changing. It even offers interesting hints that the new framework promoted by Washington —Cuba viewed not only as a political and human rights issue but also as a matter of security, espionage, and influence— is gaining traction in the American debate.
That phenomenon merits study.
But precisely because the data is interesting, they do not need to be made to say more than what they can demonstrate. The pressure from Washington is a well-known fact. The existence of a digital interference operation, on the other hand, is an accusation.
And an accusation requires evidence, not just percentages, retweets, and correlations.
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