A post by Sonia Hernández Camacho, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba (MINREX), once again highlighted an increasingly visible tension in the regime's discourse regarding its economic reforms: while Havana presents them as an internal and sovereign decision, part of its diplomatic narrative seems more focused on Washington's interpretation than on the perception of the Cubans themselves.
Hernández Camacho, who identifies herself as the director of Bilateral Issues at the General Directorate of the United States of MINREX, reacted on Facebook to the new U.S. measures effective from September 30 with a revealing statement: «The new measures announced by the U.S. Government [...] are the latest proof that no matter what Cuba does to try to advance, develop, diversify its economy, and economic actors, it will never be enough for the U.S.».
The phrase does not explicitly state that the reforms were designed to please the United States. However, it places the package of changes within a framework of external validation: Cuba "acts," Washington "evaluates," and, according to the official, nothing is enough. This framing shifts the focus of the debate from the concrete results for the population to the political response of the U.S. government.
Since June, the government has insisted on presenting the 176 economic and social transformations as a decision of its own.
Miguel Díaz-Canel assured that these measures were not being adopted "due to pressure from the Yankees" and later denied that they were to "please the United States". Manuel Marrero Cruz also defended the package as part of a "100% Cuban" transformation carried out "with total sovereignty", although the government itself admitted to having studied experiences from China and Vietnam.
Hernández Camacho's post introduces, however, an uncomfortable nuance. The official does not argue from the perspective of the relief that these measures have brought to the daily lives of Cubans, but rather from the alleged refusal of Washington to acknowledge them.
Power outages, inflation, scarcity, depreciated salaries, mass emigration, and public distrust are overshadowed by the claim that the United States does not value the changes announced by Havana.
That shift is not isolated. In recent months, the regime has alternated between different narratives depending on the political moment. In February, CiberCuba documented how a statement from MINREX avoided usual terms of the Castroist discourse such as "blockade," "imperialism," "aggression," or "enemy", and adopted a more technical, diplomatic language that is open to dialogue with the United States.
Something similar happened later with the Guantánamo Naval Base. A Cuban military communication shifted from the historical rhetoric of "occupied territory" to a more neutral formulation, referring to the location as a "military enclave," without burdening the message with the traditional claims of sovereignty. In both cases, the regime seemed to adjust its language to project pragmatism toward Washington.
Hernández Camacho's publication reveals the reverse of that discursive operation. When it needs to present itself as a viable interlocutor, Havana softens its vocabulary; when Washington hardens its stance or does not acknowledge its gestures, it reverts to the narrative of external grievance.
The reforms are thus caught in a dual function: internally they present themselves as sovereign; externally, they serve as evidence that the Cuban regime is attempting to change and the United States does not acknowledge this.
The U.S. measures cited by the official include additional restrictions on direct and indirect financial transactions with entities on Cuba's Restricted List, the elimination of authorization for banking operations known as U-Turn, and the revocation of the license that allowed banks under U.S. jurisdiction to maintain certain accounts of private Cuban entrepreneurs.
Hernández Camacho presented these decisions as evidence that Washington holds the Cuban private sector in "the same contempt" that, according to her, it feels for the government and the "revolutionary people". She also stated that the United States has "dropped the mask" of support for the Cuban people and the private sector.
The paradox is hard to avoid. The Cuban regime has limited the autonomy of private actors for years through authorizations, controls, import restrictions, caps, inspections, and a legal framework subordinate to the decisions of the Communist Party.
Now, when U.S. sanctions are impacting that sector, the official discourse tries to position itself as its defender, without acknowledging the burden of internal obstacles that hinder its development.
Tension escalates when considering the regime's most recent report. Marrero confirmed this week that 158 out of the 176 transformations have already been implemented, which amounts to 89% of the package. However, this supposed regulatory progress has not resulted in a noticeable improvement for the population, which continues to face a crisis characterized by shortages, inflation, and the deterioration of basic services.
In that context, the message from the MINREX official is revealing. The issue is not just that Havana blames Washington for the limits of its reforms, but rather that it seems to require a reaction from the United States to give them political significance.
The regime insists that it is not changing to please the White House, yet its representatives react as if U.S. criticism were central to assessing the extent of these changes.
Reforms, if they were truly sovereign, would need to legitimize themselves by their impact on the everyday lives of Cubans. So far, the government boasts about transformations, denounces sanctions, and adjusts its language depending on the audience, while the population continues to await results.
In that contradiction lies the essence of the problem: Havana claims to look inward, yet repeatedly turns to Washington to explain what it cannot prove in Cuba.
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