The United States embargo against Cuba marked its 66th anniversary this Monday since the implementation of the first general trade restrictions imposed by Washington on the government of Fidel Castro.
The anniversary coincides with a new vote at the United Nations and with a humanitarian crisis characterized by blackouts, shortages of food and medicine, and the deterioration of public services.
On October 19, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower restricted U.S. exports to Cuba, with exceptions for food and medicine, in response to the expropriations of American properties without agreed compensations and Havana's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
John F. Kennedy expanded the sanctions in February 1962. Subsequently, the Torricelli Act (1992) and the Helms-Burton Act (1996) strengthened the embargo and solidified its legal framework.
For decades, the Cuban regime has turned it into its main explanation for the economic crisis and a tool for political mobilization. However, what does the embargo really prohibit, what does it allow, and what would Havana need to do to achieve its lifting?
What the embargo does not prohibit
The sanctions restrict numerous commercial and financial operations with the United States, limit investments, financing, and banking transactions, and can affect companies from third countries. Their economic consequences are real: they increase operating costs, complicate payments, and discourage business.
But Cuba is not prohibited from trading with the rest of the world, nor is there a general prohibition on acquiring food, medicine, fuel, or industrial equipment in international markets.
Not all those purchases in the United States are prohibited either.
Since 2000, Cuba can import food and U.S. agricultural products under certain conditions.
Between 2001 and 2025, these operations surpassed 7.8 billion dollars. In the fiscal year 2025 alone, U.S. agricultural and food exports to the Island reached a record of 490.1 million dollars.
The regulations also include exports of medications, supplies, and medical equipment, subject to specific requirements.
The exceptions extend to other sectors. In May 2026, Washington authorized $23.89 million in fuel exports aimed at the Cuban private sector. Shipments of vehicles, spare parts, equipment, and supplies for private activities have also been permitted.
These operations do not eliminate the financial and regulatory obstacles of the embargo, but they contradict the idea that it completely prevents trade with the United States or access to essential products.
The responsibilities that the embargo does not explain
Cuba imports around 80% of the food it consumes, despite having arable land and maintaining trade relations with numerous countries.
Economic centralization, restrictions on producers, the deterioration of infrastructure, and the state's investment priorities also explain the crisis.
The lack of maintenance of the thermoelectric plants, the construction of hotels while hospitals and public services deteriorated, and the concentration of foreign currency in military conglomerates like GAESA cannot be attributed solely to Washington.
For decades, the regime received extraordinary subsidies from the Soviet Union and, later, Venezuelan oil and financing. Those resources temporarily sustained a model whose structural problems were never resolved.
Recognizing that the embargo exacerbates economic difficulties does not mean accepting that it is the sole cause of the Cuban collapse, nor does it exempt its rulers from being held accountable for their decisions.
The law establishes conditions for its removal
The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 does not establish a legally irreversible embargo. Its sections 204 and 205 provide mechanisms for suspending and terminating it when certain conditions are met.
Among them are the release of political prisoners, the legalization of independent political activity, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the call for free and multiparty elections, with international oversight.
The legislation also requires institutional guarantees and addresses the resolution of claims for confiscated properties.
The U.S. president can initiate the suspension of sanctions when they determine that a transitional government meets the legal requirements. Their termination is linked to the establishment of a democratically elected government.
Havana rejects these conditions as an interference in its internal affairs. Its leaders state that they are willing to engage in dialogue with Washington, but they exclude the political system and the leading role of the Communist Party from any negotiations.
The negotiation that the regime refuses to confront
There lies a contradiction that takes on special significance in light of the current humanitarian crisis.
If the embargo is, as Havana claims, one of the main obstacles to providing food for the population, ensuring access to medication, and restoring essential services, why doesn't the regime make lifting it a national priority, even if it requires negotiating political changes?
U.S. conditions can be discussed or attempted to be modified through diplomacy. Washington must also be held accountable for the consequences of its sanctions. But none of that absolves the Cuban authorities from seeking a solution when millions of people are bearing the costs of the confrontation.
The problem is that the reforms capable of opening a legal pathway to lift the embargo would directly affect the monopoly of the Communist Party, enshrined in the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the embargo retains significant propaganda utility: it allows for attributing internal failures to an external enemy, mobilizing international solidarity, and shifting the debate away from the responsibilities of those in power.
The upcoming vote in the United Nations will once again gauge international opposition to sanctions, after the Cuban resolution lost 22 supporters in 2025, decreasing from 187 to 165 favorable votes. However, rejecting the embargo does not necessarily equate to supporting the regime.
At 66 years since the first restrictions, the issue is not only why Washington maintains the sanctions, but what the Cuban regime is willing to do to get them lifted.
If the authorities deem it essential to lift it in order to alleviate the suffering of the population, they have a political and moral responsibility before them: to negotiate a way out, even if it means accepting that the future of Cuba cannot continue to be subordinated to the permanence of its current rulers.
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