The Florida International University (FIU) published its annual survey on Cuban-American opinion at the end of October, a study that depicts a community marked by internal tensions and seemingly contradictory positions: the same respondents who support maximum pressure against the Cuban regime also endorse direct relief measures for the people of the island.
The survey, led by Doctors Guillermo J. Grenier and Qing Lai from the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at FIU, interviewed 1,004 adult Cuban Americans residing in Miami-Dade between September 4 and 29, with a margin of error of ±3.1 percentage points.
This is the sixteenth edition of the longest-running survey on the Cuban community in South Florida, conducted continuously since 1991.
Regarding the pressure policy, 77% of respondents support the maximum pressure strategy on the Cuban government, 73% support U.S. military action to overthrow it —with a preference for clandestine CIA operations, according to 43%— and 65% support the blockade of oil imports to the island.
At the same time, that same community demonstrates a broad consensus on humanitarian measures: 73% support the unrestricted sale of medications, 70% favor the sale of food, and 74% support U.S. assistance to the Cuban private sector to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.
This duality —pressure on the regime, relief for the people— defines the collective profile of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade. The community is evenly split at 50% on whether the suffering of the Cuban people is an acceptable cost for achieving regime change: "strongly disagree" is the most common individual response, at 37%, although among Republicans, 70% accept that cost.
In the area of immigration, the opposition to deportations is one of the most widely agreed-upon points: 76% disapprove of the expulsion of Cubans without criminal records, including 63% of Republicans themselves. 87% call for the resumption of processing immigration benefits for Cubans already residing in the United States, with nearly identical support among Republicans (86%), Democrats (90%), and independents (86%).
The differences between subgroups are pronounced. Those who arrived in the United States after 2020 —4.7% of the sample— exhibit notably different positions from historical migrants: 92% strongly disapprove of deportations, 96% support economic welfare policies for Cuba, and 82% back a multiparty system in which the Communist Party can compete. In contrast, migrants who arrived before 1995 are the most favorable to a hardline stance.
The electoral context permeates the study, published days before the legislative elections this Tuesday in Florida. 68% of Cuban Americans state that they will vote for the Republican candidate in their congressional district. Among registered voters, 53% identify as Republican, 27% as independent, and 18% as Democrat.
However, the economy —not the policy towards Cuba— is at the top of the community's priorities, with a score of 4.78 out of five, followed by health (4.73) and immigration (4.35). The policy towards Cuba ranks fourth (4.18). The approval rating of the Trump administration's handling of policy towards Cuba stands at 66%, but drops to 50% regarding its management of the economy, which is the lowest rating of all the areas evaluated.
Regarding the prospects for change on the island, 29% of respondents believe that change will never come, while 22% expect it within less than a year. Those over 76 years old are the most pessimistic, with 39% choosing "never."
What do Cubans on the island think?
The results from FIU gain a broader dimension when contrasted with other independent surveys conducted in 2026, which provide insights into the opinions of thousands of Cubans residing on the island, albeit with different methodologies and levels of representativeness.
The Cuba Survey, promoted by a coalition of independent media and civil society organizations, including CiberCuba, gathered 42,263 valid responses between April and May, with 58% coming from residents in the country.
Among all participants, 60.9% supported a direct military intervention by the United States and 64.9% favored the overthrow of the regime by any means, including armed conflict. When considering exclusively the responses received from Cuba, 60.5% supported this latter option, while 23.2% preferred a negotiated transition.
Differences also emerged regarding sanctions and economic opening. Among the participants residing in Cuba, 43.8% favored maintaining the U.S. embargo as a pressure tool, 26.1% supported gradually eliminating it in exchange for reforms, and only 14.8% called for its unconditional lifting. However, respondents within the island showed a greater willingness than emigrants to accept investments from Cubans abroad without political conditions.
Other studies provide a complementary perspective. The research "FOCO Cuba: Opinion, self-censorship, and civic action," conducted by Cubadata for Diario de Cuba between May and June, surveyed 2,214 residents on the island. 60.4% deemed political change urgent, but 61.9% admitted fearing reprisals against themselves or their families for expressing critical opinions, and 58.9% stated that they almost always avoided discussing politics.
On its part, the IX Report on the State of Social Rights in Cuba, prepared by the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH) based on 1,318 face-to-face interviews, found that 95% rated the economic and social management of the Government negatively, while 77% demanded simultaneous political and economic transformations. Moreover, eight out of ten interviewees reported having skipped a meal due to lack of money or food.
These studies cannot be directly compared as if they measured identical populations. FIU used a probabilistic sample of Cuban Americans from Miami-Dade, while the Cuba Survey relied on voluntary online participation, and Cubadata employed a digital panel. Nevertheless, their results allow for the identification of commonalities in the demand for change and differences regarding the means to achieve it.
The question of who bears the consequences of pressure policies thus becomes particularly relevant. Guillermo J. Grenier, co-director of the FIU survey, warned in an analysis published on November 2 in OnCuba that the strong support from Cuban Americans for these measures does not reveal how long they are willing to maintain it if the expected political change does not occur.
Regarding the Cubans who directly bear the consequences of that strategy, Grenier summarized a fundamental limitation of the Miami survey: “Those who pay that price do not appear in it.”
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