The Russian embassy and Novikombank are fine-tuning their strategy to expand financial operations in Cuba

The Russian ambassador in Havana received executives from Novikombank to discuss financial cooperation and an upcoming seminar with Cuban banks. The state-owned Russian bank, part of the state corporation Rostec, is consolidating its influence on the island amid an ongoing economic crisis.

Russia and Cuba are preparing a new seminar to strengthen banking cooperationPhoto © Facebook/Russian Embassy in Cuba

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The Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Cuba, Víctor Koronelli, met in Havana with the chairwoman of the board of directors of Novikombank, Elena Gueórguieva, to review the progress in bilateral banking cooperation.

The meeting took place on Tuesday, October 7, and “the perspectives of Russian-Cuban cooperation in the financial and banking sector were discussed, as well as the upcoming seminar for representatives of major Cuban banks, ministries, and relevant institutions, organized in Havana by Novikombank,” the diplomatic delegation emphasized on its page on Facebook.

Facebook Capture/Russian Embassy in Cuba

The meeting reinforces a relationship that has been growing since 2024, when Novikombank opened its first branch in Havana and became the first Russian bank with an official presence in the Caribbean country.

In April 2025, both parties agreed to use the ruble in bilateral transactions, a step that further distances the island from the Western financial system.

The Russian institution, part of the state corporation Rostec, has promoted the use of the MIR card in Cuba and maintains agreements with the Central Bank and other entities to conduct operations in rubles.

Since December 2023, Russia has activated access to MIR bank cards in Cuba, the Russian alternative to Visa and Mastercard, although only its citizens can use them.

At the beginning of the month, the Cuban government had approved the use of MIR cards at ATMs and at point-of-sale (POS) terminals in the country.

Gueórguieva celebrated the progress of the ties and affirmed that "joint efforts with the main Cuban banks will be fruitful for both nations."

The strengthening of the Moscow-Havana financial axis is part of the Kremlin's strategy to expand its economic presence in Latin America and support the Cuban government in its search for alternatives to the dollar and the Western market.

The Cuban government publicly acknowledged the existence of outstanding debts to Russian companies and stated its commitment to fulfilling its financial obligations, although it conditioned the payments on a future economic recovery.

During his visit to the island in April, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Chernishenko promised that his country "will help to achieve the sovereignty, economic well-being, and prosperity” of the Island.

Furthermore, the Russian Minister of Energy, Serguéi Tsiviliov, pledged to , including the construction of a new generating unit of 200 megawatts (MW) and the repair of existing 100 MW blocks, at a time when the island is facing a severe energy crisis.

In September 2024, the Russian government announced plans to grant new lines of credit, while in March of that year, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the modification of credit agreements between Russia and Cuba.

The president Miguel Díaz-Canel has visited Russia several times, most recently in May 2025, as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral relations and seek economic support amid the Cuban crisis.

The close relationship between both governments has been criticized by civil sectors that disapprove of Havana's support for Moscow, especially following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

At the end of June, Díaz-Canel proposed creating a logistics center in Cuba to distribute goods from the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to Latin America and the Caribbean.

The EEU is composed of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Along with Uzbekistan, Cuba has participated as an observer state since December 11, 2020.

During the plenary session of the IV Eurasian Economic Forum, held in Minsk, Belarus, on June 26 and 27, Díaz-Canel suggested leveraging the capabilities of a special economic zone west of Havana as a foundation for this project.

In this regard, he stated that the Cuban capital could become a transit hub for goods between Eurasia and Latin America.

Also, at the end of June, it was reported that Russia and Cuba are advancing in a new strategic alliance to establish a joint logistics center in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM), located 45 kilometers west of Havana.

The enclave that could position the island at the center of Russian trade with Latin America, but which also raises questions about sovereignty, dependency, and the actual benefits for the Cuban population.

The announcement was confirmed by official Russian media following the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF 2025).

According to Tatyana Mashkova, president of the National Committee for Economic Cooperation of Russia with Latin America, both parties are already working "in parallel" to establish this center at Cuba's most important deep-water port.

Additionally, the Cuban government has offered 50 hectares within the ZEDM for the establishment of an industrial park aimed at the UEE. The land would be leased for 50 years, with the possibility of an extension.

Frequently Asked Questions about Financial Cooperation Between Russia and Cuba

What is Novikombank's strategy in Cuba?

Novikombank is seeking to expand its financial operations in Cuba through bilateral banking cooperation. It has established agreements to use the ruble in transactions, promoted the use of the MIR card, and is working closely with the Central Bank of Cuba and other entities to facilitate financial operations on the island.

How does the use of the ruble affect transactions between Russia and Cuba?

The use of the ruble in bilateral transactions between Russia and Cuba distances the island from the Western financial system and the dollar. This measure aims to strengthen economic cooperation between both countries and provide Cuba with alternatives to the dollar, at a time of internal financial crisis.

What does the strengthening of the Moscow-Havana financial axis entail?

The strengthening of the financial axis between Moscow and Havana is part of a Kremlin strategy to increase its economic presence in Latin America, supporting the Cuban government with economic alternatives. This strengthening includes investments, the use of the ruble and the MIR card, and other financial agreements aimed at supporting the crisis-stricken Cuban economy.

What role does the MIR card play in Russian-Cuban financial cooperation?

The MIR card is a Russian alternative to Visa and Mastercard and is being promoted in Cuba as part of Russian-Cuban financial cooperation. Although currently only Russian citizens can use it, its implementation is part of agreements to facilitate transactions in rubles and strengthen economic ties between both countries.

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CiberCuba Editorial Team

A team of journalists committed to reporting on Cuban current affairs and topics of global interest. At CiberCuba, we work to deliver truthful news and critical analysis.