The chief of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of Cuba, General Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, is currently in Belarus on an official visit to discuss new forms of military cooperation between both regimes, as confirmed by sources from the Belarusian Ministry of Defense and the agency EFE.
Valeri Revenko, head of the International Cooperation Department of the ministry, announced on the social network X that the purpose of the visit is to discuss “practical measures” for implementing training activities for Cuban troops, using “the experience of contemporary armed conflicts” as a reference, a phrase that in military circles is interpreted as a direct allusion to the war in Ukraine.
The arrival of Legrá Sotolongo in Minsk comes at a time of increasing rapprochement between Havana and the regime of Alexander Lukashenko, the Kremlin's main ally in Eastern Europe and a key player in the Russian military apparatus facing Ukraine.
In August 2025, the Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Army, General Pavel Muraveiko, made an official visit to Havana as part of the military cooperation agenda between the two countries.
During his stay, he held meetings with high-ranking officials of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), led by General Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, with whom he discussed the implementation of programs for the modernization of Cuban military equipment and the strengthening of joint training.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense described the visit as "a key stage in the development of the strategic partnership with Cuba," and emphasized that the collaboration between Minsk and Havana is part of a broader framework of military coordination with Moscow, thereby consolidating a trilateral cooperation axis under Kremlin influence.
Since 2023, Cuba and Belarus have signed several cooperation agreements that include weapon modernization, specialized training, and technical assistance in the maintenance of air defense systems.
In 2024, both governments signed a plan for bilateral military cooperation that included the modernization of the S-125 Pechora missiles of the FAR, carried out by engineers from the Belarusian state company ALEVKURP, and the possibility that Cuba would acquire Polonez medium-range missile launchers.
That program was presented as part of the "technological upgrade" of the Cuban army, although analysts interpreted it as an attempt to reposition Cuba within the military network of Kremlin allies.
The visit of the Cuban high command coincides with accusations from the United States government regarding the alleged involvement of thousands of Cuban nationals in the Russian offensive in Ukraine.
In 2023, Kiev presented a list of 253 passports of Cubans who were allegedly recruited to fight on the side of Moscow. Although the Cuban regime denied any official involvement, it acknowledged the existence of a "human trafficking network" related to this phenomenon.
In recent months, Ukrainian authorities have intensified their claims regarding the participation of Cuban citizens in the war, noting a sustained increase in recruitment organized by Russia since 2023.
According to a report published by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, a significant increase in Cuban mercenaries integrated into Russian units deployed on the front lines of Donetsk and Lugansk was detected in May 2025. They were recruited under temporary contracts and promises of residency or financial compensation.
Kiev claims that these fighters mainly arrive through Belarus and the Russian region of Ryazan, where they receive military training before being sent to the front.
A more recent report, published on September 19, 2025, raises the number to over 20,000 Cubans recruited by Russia since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, many of them through trafficking networks or agreements signed under false pretenses.
According to the cited Ukrainian sources, part of those contingents would be composed of retired military personnel from the FAR, suggesting a direct link between the training programs agreed upon with Belarus and the subsequent mobilization of Cuban forces in support of the Russian army.
Havana has officially denied any involvement, but has not provided verifiable details regarding the fate of those recruited or the measures taken to prevent the departure of new contingents.
An alliance under the shadow of Moscow
Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Moscow–Minsk–Havana alliance has been strengthened in the political, economic, and military realms.
In this context, Belarus has served as a war laboratory and tactical training ground for Russia's strategic allies, while Cuba provides diplomatic legitimacy in Latin America and a historical platform for Kremlin influence in the Caribbean.
According to European military analysts, Cuban-Belarusian cooperation goes beyond training: it is part of a framework of technological transfer, combat doctrine, and air defense advisory, all supervised by Russian specialists.
Belarus, which has allowed the deployment of Russian tactical missiles on its territory, acts as an intermediary and technical provider for allied countries that, like Cuba, seek to modernize their forces without directly resorting to Moscow and circumventing international sanctions.
The presence of Legrá Sotolongo in Minsk reinforces this trend. According to regional media, the agenda for the visit includes updating the military cooperation plan for 2026, strengthening the electronic defense capabilities of the FAR, and assessing the training of Cuban officers in Belarusian academies.
Havana's interest in absorbing recent war experiences—especially those gained in Ukraine—suggests that the regime seeks to adapt its military structures to scenarios of asymmetric conflict and cyber defense, two areas where Belarus has acted as a key partner of the Russian army.
The Kremlin's strategy
The strengthening of the alliance between Cuba and Belarus is part of the Kremlin's global strategy to maintain a bloc of political and military allies against the West.
For Moscow, maintaining an operational network of cooperation in Latin America—with Cuba as the spearhead—allows it to project influence, gain diplomatic support, and eventually create corridors for military and logistical exchange beyond the direct reach of European and American sanctions.
On a symbolic level, the Cuban military presence in Belarus represents a return to a Cold War logic, in which Havana is again aligning itself with Moscow in a context of geopolitical confrontation.
However, the actual extent of that cooperation will depend on the economic resources of the Cuban regime, which is currently immersed in an internal crisis that limits its military investment capacity. Other allies that might be working behind the scenes, such as Venezuela and Nicaragua, are experiencing a tense moment in their relations with the United States.
Despite this, the coordination of training, the modernization of air defense systems, and the presence of Belarusian technicians on the island indicate a relationship that is no longer merely political, but operational, evolving under the protection and strategic oversight of Russia.
With this visit, Cuba reaffirms its alignment with the regimes of Moscow and Minsk, consolidating a military triangle that strengthens the Kremlin's influence in both Eastern Europe and the Caribbean.
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