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The new exchange system announced by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) is presented by the regime as a structural reform to "organize the foreign exchange market" and "strengthen the Cuban peso."
In practice, however, it is a political maneuver to support the companies in power and simulate an openness that does not exist.
Three official exchange rates, a controlled "floating" market, and the promise of stability create a narrative that sounds like modernization, yet conceals the same old issues: centralism, inequality, and deceit.
Three cups, one direction: Control
As of December 18, 2025, Cuba operates with three official exchange rates:
- 1 CUP = 24 USD, reserved for the State for "essential" imports: energy, transportation, medicines, and food.
- 1 CUP = 120 USD, for companies with foreign income and some exporters.
- A daily floating rate, supposedly determined by supply and demand, applicable to individuals and non-state management forms.
At first glance, it seems like a technical attempt to "segment" the economy. However, as warned by the economist Mauricio de Miranda Parrondo, what the government is actually doing is consolidating an unequal and fictitious system, where the rules are tailored to serve the interests of the military-business power.
"What sense does it make to maintain two fixed rates and one floating rate? It's absurd," wrote the academic. "The only thing achieved is to favor state imports and penalize the productive sectors that generate real wealth."
The favor to GAESA
The analysis by De Miranda highlights a critical issue: the main beneficiary of this system will be GAESA, the military conglomerate that controls tourism, foreign trade, and a significant portion of the country's finances.
With a rate of 1x24, GAESA companies —which import consumer goods and operate in dollars— will be able to access cheap foreign currency for their operations, while the rest of the economy will have to do so at higher prices or directly in the informal market.
"The economist denounced, 'They want to grant special conditions to certain segments (GAESA among them) to operate with an unsustainable rate, while the rest of the actors bear the burden of the crisis.'"
The result is a deeply unjust dual market: a privileged exchange rate for state-owned enterprises and a more expensive and restrictive one for the private sector, which remains excluded from legal access to foreign currency.
A "floating" rate that doesn't float
The BCC promises that the new "floating" rate will be updated daily and will reflect the actual market conditions. However, in Cuba, there is no free foreign exchange market: the State controls all banks, CADECAs, and exchange points.
In that context, talking about "floating" is an administrative fiction. "The minister of the BCC wants to tell the market at what rate it should operate. That's not how the economy works," De Miranda explained. "A floating rate only exists if there is real supply and demand; in Cuba, what exists is an imposed rate."
The economist recalled that in normal countries, exchange rates vary slightly between banks or money exchange desks, and the central bank then publishes a representative market rate.
In Cuba, it happens the other way around: first, the political figure is imposed, and then the market is required to adapt to it.
The economic lie
The Cuban regime justifies this system with a paternalistic discourse: “Avoid abrupt devaluations to protect the population.”
But the reality is that Cubans will not be able to operate at either of the two fixed rates and will only have access to the "floating" segment, where the value of the dollar will depend on the limited flow of official currencies.
Meanwhile, domestic prices will continue to be referenced to the informal market, where the dollar reaches 440 CUP.
The gap between official fiction and the reality of people's finances will widen, along with the distrust in the Cuban peso and the impoverishment of the majority.
The measure, instead of correcting distortions, institutionalizes them. The State seeks to compete with the black market, but without offering real rates or sufficient foreign currency.
What is theoretically aimed at "stabilizing" will, in practice, only fuel informality, corruption, and discredit the financial system.
Conclusion: A market for power, not for the people
Behind the technical language and graphs of the Central Bank lies an old authoritarian recipe: to control the flow of dollars to sustain the state, not to revive the economy.
The people, small business owners, and workers will continue to be excluded from real access to foreign currency and condemned to survive in a segmented economy, with unrealistic prices and worthless wages in pesos.
Three rates, three privileges, one single lie: that the Cuban exchange system is based on economic criteria.
In reality, it responds to political criteria. And in Cuba, as always, the economy obeys power, not the market.
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