The Cuban diplomat Johana Tablada de la Torre has once again placed the current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, at the center of the official narrative against Washington.
During an interview on the Canal Catorce of the Mexican public television, the MINREX official stated that Rubio "extorted" Donald Trump in 2019 to achieve the activation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, amid the scandal over the alleged Russian interference in the U.S. elections.
"In 2019, Marcos Rubio successfully extorted Trump because he was the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and Trump was president during a scandal involving a threat of impeachment for President Trump due to the alleged interference of a third country in the U.S. elections, resulting in what seems to be a quid pro quo," stated Tablada de la Torre.
Avoiding mention of the Kremlin, the brain behind the Russian interference in those elections, the diplomat went further and described a supposed political pact:
"I remember exactly, vividly, the day they went to the White House, and upon leaving the White House, Trump said he would invoke Title 3 and did so a few days later."
According to his account, Rubio would have secured the activation of that section of the Helms-Burton in exchange for supporting other priorities of the Republican leader, such as the border wall and the recognition of Juan Guaidó in Venezuela.
The diplomat even stated that the policy towards Cuba during Trump's first term was internally known as "To Make Marcos Rubio Happy". "Trump would say, make this man happy," she asserted.
The statements provided no evidence or verifiable details regarding the alleged "extortion," but they did reaffirm a consistent pattern in the Cuban regime's narrative: personalizing U.S. policy towards the island through the figure of Marco Rubio.
For years, the senator —now the Secretary of State— has been portrayed by Havana as the "black beast" responsible for the tightening of sanctions.
The discursive obsession with Rubio serves a clear political function: to shift a bipartisan pressure policy into a supposed individual crusade, almost personal, against the Cuban regime.
The activation of Title III in 2019, which allowed lawsuits in U.S. courts against companies that "traffic" in properties confiscated in Cuba, was a decision made by the Trump administration after more than two decades of systematic suspension by previous presidents.
The regime has described that measure as an act of economic aggression. However, reducing the decision to a quid pro quo in the context of the impeachment involves a political simplification that aligns with Havana's usual rhetoric.
This is not the first time that Cuban officials have attempted to exaggerate or exploit supposed differences between Trump and Rubio. At various times, Cuban diplomacy has suggested that the president was more pragmatic and that the hardening of policy was a response to pressures from "extremist" sectors led by the Cuban-American politician.
This approach seeks to project an image of internal divisions in Washington and to present policy toward Cuba as a result of personal intrigues rather than strategic decisions.
However, the policy of pressure towards the Cuban regime did not originate in 2019, nor does it depend solely on one figure.
The Helms-Burton Act was approved in 1996 by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton. The sanctions have undergone adjustments under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The consistency of certain strategic lines undermines the notion that everything is solely influenced by the individual actions of one politician.
The statements made by Tablada de la Torre, far from providing concrete evidence, reinforce the conspiratorial tone with which the regime typically explains decisions that are unfavorable to it. By speaking of "extortion" and hidden exchanges, the diplomat introduced serious accusations without verifiable public support.
More than clarifying the facts, their words illustrated the Cuban government's communication strategy: to pinpoint a personalized adversary, insist on internal divisions in the United States, and present each pressure measure as the result of dark maneuvers.
Marco Rubio, who has become a symbol of the hardening of policies towards Havana, once again assumes the role of central antagonist in a discourse that prioritizes narrative confrontation over institutional analysis.
In that logic, the enemy is not a law passed by Congress or a policy upheld by various administrations, but a specific figure upon whom total responsibility is projected.
Such simplification may serve the internal political narrative, but it hardly replaces a serious debate on the causes and consequences of the sanctions.
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