The recent reports published by the American newspaper regarding a potential economic agreement between the administration of Donald Trump and the Cuban regime have sparked an intense debate about the direction of U.S. policy toward the island.
The information points to a strategy based on economic pressure combined with selective openness to the Cuban private sector, with the possibility of agreements in areas such as ports, energy, and tourism, as well as a potential easing of travel restrictions for Americans.
One of the most striking elements of this scenario is the hypothesis of a negotiated exit of the ruler Miguel Díaz-Canel, while the Castro family would remain on the island and the political system could begin a phase of gradual economic reforms.
Some analysts have dubbed this strategy a sort of “,” in reference to the Soviet perestroika: a limited opening of the economic model within a political system that would remain essentially the same.
However, this hypothesis has raised doubts among analysts, activists, and sectors of Cuban civil society, who wonder to what extent such a formula could genuinely bring about a deep political transformation in the country.
One of the most frequently raised objections is that Díaz-Canel's departure, on its own, would have very limited political significance. Since his appointment as president in 2018, the leader has been widely perceived as an administrative figure within a system where real power does not reside in the presidency of the government, but rather in much deeper structures.
The core of political power in Cuba remains concentrated in the Communist Party, the state security apparatus, and the military-industrial complex connected to the Armed Forces, whose corporate network —conglomerates such as GAESA— controls broad sectors of the national economy, from tourism to foreign trade.
In that context, a change in the visible figure of the government would not necessarily imply a substantial alteration in the architecture of power.
For that reason, some observers believe that focusing a negotiation on Díaz-Canel’s departure could amount to a cosmetic change rather than a structural transition.
Another issue that fuels doubts is the role of the Castro family and their political and economic environment. Although Fidel Castro passed away in 2016 and Raúl Castro has formally retired from his public positions, the institutional legacy and the networks of power built over decades continue to decisively influence the political and economic system of the country.
In addition to the historical political control of the Communist Party, the business network associated with the Armed Forces has developed a dominant presence in strategic sectors of the economy.
In recent years, even with the expansion of the private sector and the emergence of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises (Mipymes), various analysts have pointed out that a significant part of this new business fabric operates in close relation with state structures or with actors connected to the military-business apparatus.
If that reality does not change, some experts argue, an economic opening could indirectly end up reinforcing the same power groups that have controlled the system for decades.
That point becomes especially relevant when examining the debate from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy.
In recent years, Washington has begun to more clearly define a strategy to reaffirm its influence in the Western Hemisphere, in the context of increasing geopolitical competition with powers such as China and Russia.
In this context, several analysts have begun to discuss a contemporary reinterpretation of the historic Monroe Doctrine, which some commentators have referred to as “Donroe Doctrine” in reference to the foreign policy approach promoted by Trump.
Under this logic, Latin America and the Caribbean are once again considered a priority strategic space for U.S. national security.
One of the central objectives of this approach is to limit or reverse the presence of rival actors in the region.
Over the last decade, both Russia and China have increased their economic, technological, and diplomatic presence in various Latin American countries. Cuba, in particular, has maintained historical political and military relations with Moscow, in addition to developing growing ties with Beijing in areas such as telecommunications (espionage) and infrastructure.
In this context, some analysts wonder whether an economic agreement that leaves the core of Castro's power intact would be compatible with Washington's strategic goals in the hemisphere.
If the goal is to reduce the influence of rival powers and consolidate a regional environment aligned with the United States, allowing the political and military structure of the regime to remain intact may not address the underlying issue.
Another element adds to that doubt: the contrast between the strategy suggested in the reports by USA Today and the image of strength that the current administration has projected in other recent international scenarios.
Washington's actions in Venezuela or in the conflict with Iran have been interpreted by many observers as signs of a foreign policy more willing to employ direct pressure instruments—economic, diplomatic, and even military—to reshape regional balances.
From this perspective, a strategy based on gradual economic reforms within the Cuban system might seem, at least on the surface, a more moderate approach than one might expect within that same geopolitical logic.
However, there are also other possible interpretations. Some experts believe that the scenarios described in the press might only represent an initial phase of a broader strategy.
Under this hypothesis, strengthening the Cuban private sector and increasing economic interaction with the United States could aim to generate gradual changes within the country's economic structure, creating internal pressures that may eventually lead to deeper political transformations.
Another possibility is that the leaks or journalistic interpretations reflect only a part of the negotiation process, without necessarily revealing the final objectives of the U.S. strategy.
Throughout recent history, political change processes in authoritarian systems have followed very different trajectories.
In some cases, gradual economic reforms have paved the way for deeper political transformations. In others, regimes have managed to adapt to the reforms without losing control of power.
The question that remains open in the Cuban case is which of those paths could come to fruition.
For now, what seems clear is that any strategy aimed at driving changes in Cuba will face a complex institutional reality, marked by decades of political centralization, state economic control, and deeply entrenched power structures.
In this context, the debate sparked by the reports from USA Today reflects a broader question: whether the transformation of the regime can occur through gradual economic reforms or if, on the contrary, it will require deeper political changes to alter the totalitarian control that has defined the country for over six decades.
The answer to that question, which remains open, will be key in assessing the coherence between the strategic objectives declared by Washington in the hemisphere and the tools it ultimately decides to use to achieve them.
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