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The recent reports published by the American newspaper regarding a possible economic agreement between the administration of Donald Trump and the Cuban regime have sparked an intense debate about the direction of U.S. policy towards the island.
The information suggests a strategy based on economic pressure combined with a selective opening to the Cuban private sector, with the possibility of agreements in areas such as ports, energy, and tourism, as well as a potential easing of travel restrictions for Americans.
One of the most striking elements of this scenario is the hypothesis of a negotiated exit for the ruler Miguel Díaz-Canel, while the Castro family would remain on the island and the political system could begin a phase of gradual economic reforms.
Some analysts have dubbed this strategy a sort of “,” referencing the Soviet perestroika: a limited opening of the economic model within a political system that would essentially remain unchanged.
However, this hypothesis has raised doubts among analysts, activists, and sectors of Cuban civil society, who wonder to what extent such a formula could actually bring about a profound political transformation in the country.
One of the most frequently raised objections is that Díaz-Canel's departure, on its own, would have very limited political significance. Since his appointment as president in 2018, the leader has been widely perceived as an administrative figure within a system where real power does not reside in the presidency of the government, but rather in much deeper structures.
The core of political power in Cuba remains concentrated in the Communist Party, the state security apparatus, and the military-business complex associated with the Armed Forces, whose corporate network—conglomerates like GAESA—controls vast sectors of the national economy, from tourism to foreign trade.
In that context, a change in the visible figure of the government would not necessarily imply a substantial alteration in the architecture of power.
For that reason, some observers believe that focusing a negotiation on Díaz-Canel's exit could amount to a cosmetic change rather than a structural transition.
Another issue that fuels doubts is the role of the Castro family and its political and economic environment. Although Fidel Castro died in 2016 and Raúl Castro formally stepped down from his public positions, the institutional legacy and power networks built over decades continue to exert a decisive influence on the political and economic system of the country.
In addition to the historical political control of the Communist Party, the business network linked to the Armed Forces has established a dominant presence in strategic sectors of the economy.
In recent years, even with the expansion of the private sector and the emergence of thousands of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), various analysts have pointed out that a significant portion of this new business fabric operates in close relation with state structures or with actors linked to the military-business apparatus.
If this reality does not change, some experts argue, an economic opening could ultimately strengthen, albeit indirectly, the same power groups that have controlled the system for decades.
That point is particularly relevant when examining the debate from the perspective of American foreign policy.
In recent years, Washington has begun to clearly define a strategy to reaffirm its influence in the Western Hemisphere, against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical competition with powers such as China and Russia.
In this context, several analysts have begun to discuss a contemporary reinterpretation of the historic Monroe Doctrine, which some commentators have referred to as “Donroe Doctrine” in reference to the foreign policy approach promoted by Trump.
Under this logic, Latin America and the Caribbean are once again regarded as a priority strategic area for U.S. national security.
One of the main objectives of this approach is to limit or reverse the presence of rival actors in the region.
Over the past decade, both Russia and China have increased their economic, technological, and diplomatic presence in several Latin American countries. Cuba, in particular, has maintained longstanding political and military ties with Moscow, in addition to developing growing links with Beijing in areas such as telecommunications (espionage) and infrastructure.
In that context, some analysts wonder if an economic agreement that leaves the core of Castro's power intact would be compatible with Washington's strategic objectives in the hemisphere.
If the goal is to reduce the influence of rival powers and consolidate a regional environment aligned with the United States, allowing the political and military structure of the regime to remain intact may not resolve the underlying issue.
This doubt is compounded by another element: the contrast between the strategy suggested in the articles from USA Today and the image of determination that the current administration has projected in other recent international scenarios.
Washington's actions in Venezuela or in the conflict with Iran have been interpreted by many observers as signs of a foreign policy more willing to employ instruments of direct pressure—economic, diplomatic, and even military—to reshape regional balances.
From that perspective, a strategy based on gradual economic reforms within the Cuban system might appear, at least on the surface, to be a more moderate approach than one might expect within that same geopolitical logic.
However, there are also other possible interpretations. Some experts believe that the scenarios described in the media might only represent an initial phase of a broader strategy.
Under this hypothesis, the strengthening of the Cuban private sector and the increase in economic interaction with the United States could aim to generate gradual changes within the country's economic structure, creating internal pressures that may eventually lead to deeper political transformations.
Another possibility is that the leaks or journalistic interpretations reflect only a part of the negotiation process, without necessarily revealing the ultimate goals of the U.S. strategy.
Throughout recent history, the processes of political change in authoritarian systems have followed very different trajectories.
In some cases, gradual economic reforms have paved the way for deeper political transformations. In others, regimes have managed to adapt to the reforms without losing control of power.
The question that remains open in the Cuban case is which of those paths might materialize.
For now, what seems clear is that any strategy aimed at driving changes in Cuba will face a complex institutional reality, characterized by decades of political centralization, state economic control, and deeply entrenched power structures.
In this context, the debate sparked by the reports from USA Today reflects a broader question: whether the transformation of the regime can occur through gradual economic reforms, or if, on the contrary, it will require deeper political changes to alter the totalitarian control that has defined the country for more than six decades.
The answer to that question, which remains open, will be crucial for assessing the coherence between the strategic objectives declared by Washington in the hemisphere and the tools it ultimately decides to use to achieve them.
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