Transition or recycling of the regime in Cuba?

Cuba is going through one of those historical moments when it seems that something is shifting beneath the surface, but no one knows for sure where these movements are leading.

In recent weeks, evidence has multiplied that the United States is applying unprecedented pressure on the Cuban regime.

U.S. administration officials have hinted in public statements at the existence of contacts between both parties, and various media outlets have reported on possible discussions with figures close to power in Havana.

The President of the United States himself has amplified that narrative, suggesting that there are ongoing negotiations.

The Cuban regime, for its part, denies that any formal negotiation process exists. However, at the same time, it nuances its denials by recalling that there have always been various types of diplomatic contacts between the two countries.

In the midst of these statements and denials, the only thing that is truly certain is that something is happening.  What no one knows for sure is what is being negotiated, with what objectives, or where that process might lead.  

The great uncertainty for Cubans is precisely this: they do not know what Washington's real strategy regarding Cuba is.  

The roadmap is not known, nor are the conditions that the United States would be proposing to the regime, nor what the ultimate objective of the political, economic, and strategic pressure being exerted on Havana today would be.

However, when considering the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, some hypotheses begin to seem less improbable than they did just a few years ago.

The current administration has adopted a much more active hemispheric security doctrine in response to regimes deemed hostile to Washington's interests.

The principle of "peace through strength," the contemporary reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the recent interventions aimed at undermining governments allied with opposing powers indicate that the United States is willing to redefine its relationship with certain political actors on the continent.

In this context, the possibility that Washington may consider a regime change in Cuba no longer seems like a far-fetched speculation.

But if this is truly the direction in which U.S. strategy is heading, an immediate question arises that is currently on the minds of the Cuban public:  What kind of change is being prepared? 

Because the concern of many Cubans is not so much whether negotiations exist between Washington and Havana, but rather the actual content of those conversations.

Is a transition to democracy being prepared, or is it merely a political and economic agreement with the existing power in Cuba?  

Could an arrangement be reached that ensures some stability, a few economic reforms, and openness to international investment, but without substantial changes to the political system?

Could the Castro family maintain its influence within a new power structure, similar to what has happened with other political dynasties in authoritarian regimes?

Some analysts have started to even speak of a possible "Cubastroika": a controlled transition from within the system, in which former figures from the political, military, and security apparatus would reorganize power and the economy without relinquishing the fundamental political monopoly.

A scenario in which the country would partially open up to international capital while real control would remain in the hands of those who have governed for decades.

A kind of tropical version of the authoritarian post-communist models that emerged in other parts of the world following the collapse of classic socialist systems.

It is precisely this scenario that generates the greatest concern among many Cubans. Changing the ruler does not necessarily mean changing the regime. Recent political history is full of examples where authoritarian systems undergo superficial transformations without altering the real structures of power.

If the political future of Cuba is indeed being negotiated, there are some minimum conditions that should be part of any process that aims to be a democratic transition and not simply a reorganization of the existing system. 

The first of those conditions is the release of all political prisoners. No transition can begin while citizens remain imprisoned for exercising basic rights such as freedom of expression or protest. 

The second is the effective recognition of freedom of expression. In a democratic society, no one can be arrested or persecuted for expressing their political opinions. 

The third is the freedom of association. Cubans should be able to organize parties, civic movements, unions, and social organizations without interference from the State. 

And the fourth is the call for a genuinely free electoral process, internationally supervised, that allows citizens to decide the political future of the country. 

But even those basic political conditions would not be sufficient if the fundamental structures of power remain intact. 

The Cuban Armed Forces should make it clear that their role is to ensure the security of the country and its citizens, not to serve the interests of a family or a specific political elite. 

And the military business conglomerate known as GAESA should undergo a thorough audit to uncover the true extent of its assets.

That economic framework, built over decades under the opacity of the system, represents a substantial part of the national wealth and cannot become the private property of those who have managed it on behalf of the state.

Without real changes in those structures of economic and military power, any transition would run the risk of becoming a mere mutation of the regime.

At the same time, it would be naive to think that a fully-fledged democracy can emerge overnight after more than sixty years of authoritarianism.  

Cuba does not have a structured political opposition today like the one that existed in other transitional processes. It also lacks a sufficiently developed civil society after years of systematic repression.

For that reason, the change in Cuba, if it comes, will necessarily have to be a process. A complex political process that will require time, citizen participation, institutional reconstruction, and international support.

The United States, the Cuban exile community, and the international community can play an important role in creating the conditions needed to initiate that process.

But the Cuban democracy cannot be manufactured from outside. It will have to be built by the Cubans themselves through the progressive achievement of their civil and political rights. 

Ultimately, the current moment presents three fundamental messages.

For the United States, the need for greater strategic clarity. If there is indeed a roadmap towards political change in Cuba, Washington should be more transparent about its objectives and remember that the consistency between its security interests and political principles ultimately requires a free, democratic, prosperous Cuba that is allied with Western democracies. 

For Cubans, the awareness that change, if it comes, will not be an instantaneous act but a process that will require participation, responsibility, and the ability to build a new framework for political coexistence.

And for the Cuban regime, an unavoidable message: the historical time of the system they have led for more than six decades is running out. Its leaders can still choose between facilitating an orderly transition that spares the country further suffering or trying to prolong a power that no longer aligns with the nation's aspirations. 

What is at stake is not merely the future of a government. It is the possibility of Cuba finally leaving behind the totalitarian communist system that has kept it isolated, impoverished, and deprived of freedoms for generations.

The question, ultimately, is not whether Washington is in talks with the Cuban regime. The real question is for what purpose they are talking and what kind of Cuba will emerge from that process.

Because the future of the island cannot be the post-Castro administration of the same system that has brought it to this point.