The new memorandum from the United States Department of Defense to accelerate the use of anti-drone systems includes a detail of high strategic value: the defense of a military installation does not have to be limited to the physical perimeter of the base.
The document, signed by the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, orders the elimination of bureaucratic obstacles that delay the deployment of capabilities against unmanned aerial vehicles, known as c-UAS. Its formal objective is to protect forces, facilities, assets, and U.S. airspace from a threat that Washington increasingly considers to be faster, cheaper, and more widespread.
In this context, Hegseth mentions a previous guide, dated December 8, 2025, which clarified that the "fence line" did not have to be a limitation and broadened the decision-making margin for commanders to protect covered facilities and assets.
The memorandum does not mention Cuba or Guantánamo in that passage. However, the reference takes on a particular meaning in the case of the Naval Base at Guantánamo, located on Cuban territory, surrounded by areas under the control of the Havana regime, and recently transformed into a key element of the U.S. strategy for drones and autonomous warfare in the Caribbean.
Defend before the drone arrives
The logic of the document is straightforward: an unmanned threat can originate outside a base, approach from civilian, coastal, or maritime areas, and require a response before breaching the perimeter. In the drone warfare, waiting for direct contact with the perimeter may be too late.
For this reason, the Department of Defense orders that delays in the approval of anti-drone systems be treated as an operational risk. Hegseth encapsulates this idea with a key phrase: a drone solution that cannot be deployed is not a capability.
The directive aims to shorten the approval timelines for tested and validated c-UAS systems from months to days or weeks. It also requires that any refusal to use a counter-drone capability be documented and reported to the Joint Interagency Task Force-401 (JIATF-401), which will serve as the central coordination point.
Each obstacle must have a responsible party, a deadline, and an escalation path. If an authority does not respond within 30 days, the applicant must notify the office of the Secretary of War.
Lasers, frequencies, and quick reviews
The memorandum identifies four bottlenecks: authorizations to operate and connect systems, spectrum and frequency certification, weapons security reviews, and legal analyses.
In legal terms, it orders the acceleration of the required reviews for weaponry and anti-drone systems, generally within a period of 10 days upon receiving the necessary information. The text clarifies that this measure does not alter existing regulations regarding the operational use of c-UAS nor does it authorize violations of the law or compromises to public and military safety.
The document also mentions joint tests between the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Defense that validated the safe use of certain high-energy laser systems in national airspace.
Additionally, it supports the Project Spectrum Strike, an automated tool powered by artificial intelligence from the Defense Innovation Unit to coordinate, authorize, and prevent interference in the use of the radio spectrum by anti-drone systems.
Guantánamo at the Center of Cuban Reading
The detail regarding the perimeter becomes significant because Guantánamo is increasingly connected to the new U.S. military doctrine.
SOUTHCOM recently announced that the base will host the first training and mission support site of the SOUTHCOM Autonomous Warfare Command (SAWC), a regional structure dedicated to integrating drones, autonomous systems, data, and communications.
The facility, leased to Cuba since 1903 and denounced by the Cuban regime as an illegal occupation, had already been defined by Southern Command as a “vital operational and logistical center” for U.S. operations in the hemisphere. With the SAWC, it also gains a technological dimension related to autonomous warfare.
The new memorandum indirectly places her in another discussion: how to defend sensitive bases against drones that could approach from outside their physical perimeter.
Reports on drones from Cuba
The Cuban reading of the document is marked by recent developments. CiberCuba reported in May, citing information from Axios based on classified U.S. intelligence, that the Cuban regime had allegedly acquired more than 300 military attack drones from Russia and Iran since 2023.
According to these reports, Cuban military officials allegedly discussed scenarios for using drones against the Guantanamo Naval Base, U.S. warships, and even Key West, Florida. Havana dismissed the accusations and characterized them as part of a supposed fabricated dossier intended to justify an aggression.
There is no public evidence that Cuba possesses operational Shahed or Geran drones, nor that there is any attack order against U.S. facilities. However, the combination of intelligence reports, military cooperation with Russia and Iran, proximity to Florida, and the renewed prominence of Guantánamo has heightened sensitivity around the issue in Washington.
This context adds to other recent movements, such as the FLEX2026 exercise in Key West, which integrated artificial intelligence, long-range drones, and unmanned maritime vehicles about 90 miles off the coast of Cuba, and the DASH experiment, where the island appeared on official screens as the visible scenario for battle management applications using artificial intelligence.
A technical detail with strategic implications
The memo does not accuse Cuba, does not announce an operation against the island, and does not establish specific rules for Guantánamo. Its declared purpose is to expedite the legal, secure, and effective use of anti-drone systems to protect U.S. facilities, forces, assets, and airspace.
But the reference that the fence of a base should not limit defense changes the perspective in scenarios like Guantánamo.
In a facility surrounded by Cuban territory, any discussion about drones, perimeters, and the decision-making latitude of the commanders takes on a particular political and military dimension.
For the Cuban regime, the underlying message is uncomfortable: Washington is not only reinforcing the role of Guantánamo in the regional autonomous war, but it is also accelerating the mechanisms to defend it against uncrewed threats before they reach its perimeter.
In the drone war, the fence no longer necessarily marks the beginning of defense. And in Guantánamo, that idea has direct implications.
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