The Spanish propagandist of the Cuban regime, Ana Hurtado, did not simply term the leak from CBS News regarding U.S. military preparations related to Cuba as "psychological warfare." Her publication was more elaborate and also more revealing.
What the United States doesn't want to leak, doesn't leak, he wrote on Facebook. He then added: «The kidnapping of Maduro / Cilia and the murder of the 32 Cuban heroes didn't leak, nor did the martyrdom of the Ayatollah and the massacres in Iran. They think we are naive with their damn psychological war».
Hurtado's thesis is clear: if a real operation is not leaked, then what was published by CBS can only be an intimidation maneuver. However, that conclusion mixes two different planes: operational secrecy and strategic signaling.
The final phase of a military or intelligence operation is usually kept confidential. This does not mean that prior warnings, sanctions, deployments, calculated leaks, troop movements, surveillance flights, and political messages aimed at pressuring the adversary do not exist.
Venezuela and Iran: the examples that contradict the argument
The very examples cited by Hurtado point in the opposite direction from what she suggests.
The capture of Nicolás Maduro did not come out of nowhere. There were rewards, designations, naval deployments, attacks on vessels, public warnings, and increasing pressure from Washington on chavismo beforehand. The final operation may have been kept secret, but the context leading up to it was visible for months.
Something similar happens with Iran. Hurtado mentions this to support the claim that truly sensitive actions are not leaked. However, a specific operation may remain classified while simultaneously being preceded by a public escalation: threats, military movements, political messages, diplomatic preparations, and the construction of a framework for action.
This is precisely the point that Havana should take seriously. The leak from CBS does not by itself prove an imminent operation against Cuba. However, it fits into a series of signals that Washington has been making visible for months.
What CBS revealed
CBS reported that the U.S. Army Reserve is examining whether it can provide Southern Command with military police forces, medical personnel, engineers, and other support units within 90 to 120 days.
The internal message revised by the chain does not directly mention Cuba nor does it constitute a deployment order, but several U.S. officials consulted by CBS linked those preparations to military planning regarding the island.
The network itself specified that there are no units with deployment orders. It also noted that the evaluated capabilities include logistical support units, transportation, maintenance, fuel, supplies, engineering, medical support, and military police.
Such forces are not necessarily the spearhead of a combat operation. They are capabilities for rear support, control, stabilization, and assistance. In other words, they are elements that are considered when the Pentagon contemplates more complex scenarios than a simple public statement.
The hemispheric turn of Washington
The Trump administration has made its shift in approach towards the Western Hemisphere explicit.
The 2025 National Security Strategy discusses applying a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, with the aim of preventing hostile incursions in the region, securing strategic locations, and preserving American primacy in its immediate surroundings.
The National Defense Strategy of 2026 strengthens this line from the Pentagon: after years of neglect, the Department of Defense will restore U.S. military dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
This framework helps to understand why Cuba and Venezuela are no longer treated as frozen regional crises. In the new perspective from Washington, both are now considered part of a national security agenda.
Cuba no longer appears simply as a poverty-stricken dictatorship 90 miles from Florida, but as potential platform for Russia, China, Iran, and other adversaries of the United States.
Cuba as a formal threat
On January 29, 2026, Trump signed the Executive Order 14380 and declared that the policies and actions of the Cuban government constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
The order activated a national emergency and opened the door to tariffs against countries that sell or supply oil to Cuba. This move placed the island within a legal framework of national threat and turned fuel into a direct tool of strategic pressure.
Since then, the measures against Havana have ceased to be viewed solely as economic punishment. They are part of a broader framework: isolating the regime, reducing its energy margins, limiting its external alliances, and increasing the cost of serving as a foothold for Washington's adversaries.
Fuel as a pressure front
One of the most significant factors has been the pressure on energy supply. The case of the Russian tanker Universal illustrated the extent to which fuel supply became a focal point in the strategic tension between Washington and Havana.
The vessel, loaded with diesel intended for Cuba, spent weeks without completing its arrival while being monitored by U.S. intelligence. CiberCuba reported that the Universal sailed without a confirmed destination and ended up drifting away from the island, in a context of OFAC restrictions on transactions involving Russian oil to Cuba and pressure on maritime routes.
The precedent of the Sea Horse, which diverted its cargo of Russian diesel from Cuba to Trinidad and Tobago, demonstrated how Washington's pressure can change routes without the need for direct intervention.
More than a formal naval blockade in a legal sense, what is observed is a de facto energy blockade: sanctions, pressure on shipping companies, maritime surveillance, diplomatic warnings, and military presence in the Caribbean.
For a country with chronic blackouts, deteriorating infrastructure, and a strong dependence on external fuel, that pressure has immediate political effects. Washington is not only targeting the regime's finances but also its ability to sustain basic services and internal control.
Aerial surveillance around the island
In parallel, U.S. aerial surveillance around Cuba became evident. Since February, aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon, the RC-135V Rivet Joint, and the MQ-4C Triton have amassed more than 150 hours of intelligence flights around the island, according to reports cited by CiberCuba.
Some missions approached sensitive areas of the Cuban coastline without entering national airspace. The military detail is important, but so is its visibility. When the United States wants to completely conceal an operation, it has the means to do so. The fact that part of these movements appears on public trackers suggests a willingness to make it known to Havana that it is being watched.
These are not routine flights without context. They are platforms for maritime surveillance, signal intelligence, reconnaissance, and operational space control.
Puerto Rico, Guantánamo, and the Geography of Pressure
Puerto Rico once again occupied a central role in American military architecture in the Caribbean.
The reactivation of Roosevelt Roads, the exercises involving over 8,100 soldiers, and the logistical agreements for the use of facilities like Ramey and Muñiz solidify the island as a key outpost amid the tensions with Cuba.
Guantánamo has also entered the spotlight. Pete Hegseth's visit to the naval base, his statements about being ready to act "offensively or defensively at any moment," and the meeting between officials from Southern Command and the FAR position the base in a dual role: military communication channel and constant warning.
Accumulation does not equate to ongoing operations, but it does indicate preparedness, deterrence, and the ability to respond in Cuba's immediate environment.
DASH, FLEX2026, and the Caribbean as a technological landscape
The technological component completes the scene. The recent DASH experiment, conducted by the Air Force, ABMS, and the Space Force, displayed Cuba on battle management screens, featuring maps, symbols, traces, and delineated areas.
It does not prove that Cuba was the operational target of a simulation, but it does reveal that the island appears within scenarios of advanced command and control, featuring artificial intelligence, data integration, and coordination across domains.
In April, U.S. military forces conducted exercise FLEX2026 and practiced with autonomous systems, drones, unmanned maritime platforms, and detection and interdiction capabilities from Key West.
Both exercises point to the same trend: the Caribbean is being treated as an operational laboratory for surveillance, quick decision-making, and maritime control.
Trump as the main signaler
The verbal dimension is another component of the pressure. Trump has spoken multiple times about "taking Cuba," about sending an aircraft carrier, and about how an operation would be easier than in Venezuela.
In May, CiberCuba reported that the U.S. president stated that the United States would “take Cuba almost immediately” and described a scenario in which the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier would approach the Cuban coasts to force the regime's surrender.
Trump may exaggerate, joke, or use threats as a negotiating tool. But his statements do not occur in a vacuum. When they align with sanctions, intelligence flights, energy pressure, logistical planning, strategic documents, and military movements, they become part of the coercion mechanism.
It's not about reading each statement as an operational order. It's about understanding that presidential rhetoric creates a public framework of plausibility. What once seemed unthinkable begins to be discussed, repeated, and normalized.
Rubio, Hegseth, and the message that Trump means business
Trump's environment has reinforced this perspective. Marco Rubio has insisted that the Western Hemisphere will not be a platform for adversaries of the United States and has urged reading the National Security Strategy to understand that the administration is serious.
Hegseth, from Guantánamo and other regional settings, has reiterated that all options are on the table and has linked the stance towards Cuba with the defense of U.S. strategic interests.
Cuban-American lawmakers have also warned that Havana should not underestimate Trump or assume that his threats are merely rhetoric. This chorus matters because it turns presidential statements into political lines.
Shield of the Americas and regional support
The Shield of the Americas adds a diplomatic layer. The initiative led by Trump aims to establish a regional security framework to combat drug trafficking, organized crime, irregular migration, and the presence of extra-regional actors.
In that context, Cuba emerges not only as a bilateral issue but also as part of a network of hemispheric threats alongside Venezuela and other allies of Washington's adversaries.
That regional support does not equate to authorization for a military operation, but it does create political backing, shared language, and a coordinated pressure block.
"Cuba: the capital of communism" and the construction of the case
The State Department document "Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism" is not a military plan, but rather a political and ideological reinterpretation of Cuba as a structural threat: espionage, subversion, influence, ties with adversaries of Washington, and penetration of networks within the United States.
That type of document is not published to passively describe a reality. It is published to build a case, organize arguments, and justify a tougher policy in front of public opinion, Congress, regional allies, and adversaries.
In the language of Washington, Cuba ceases to be viewed merely as a repressive and impoverished dictatorship. It is instead portrayed as an active node in a hostile network in the hemisphere.
Ana Hurtado and the Role of Mockery
Hurtado is not a neutral observer. Journalistic investigations identify her as the wife of Senén Casas Más, who is noted as an operator within the close circle of Alejandro Castro Espín.
CiberCuba, citing a report from Martí Noticias and Mario J. Pentón, reported that Casas Más may have had access to diplomatic passports from the Ministry of the Interior and a record of dozens of secret missions abroad. The investigation places him in the circle of Raúl Castro's son, a figure associated with the Cuban security and intelligence apparatus.
That context does not turn every publication by Hurtado into an official message from the regime, but it does prevent it from being read as that of a mere external commentator. His reaction aligns with a well-known defensive narrative: ridiculing the warnings, portraying the United States as a manipulator, and convincing the officialist base that nothing serious is happening.
Propaganda needs to convey control. Strategic analysis requires looking at patterns, not slogans.
The difference between hiding an operation and displaying a warning
Hurtado's statement — "what the United States does not want to be leaked, does not get leaked" — contains a certain truth and an incorrect conclusion.
It is true that Washington does not usually disclose the crucial details of a sensitive operation: the timing, entry point, specific units, objectives, internal contacts, or operational intelligence. However, that does not mean it cannot provide early signals to put pressure on the adversary.
Operations are concealed. Warnings, often, are taught.
CBS belongs to that second plane. It does not necessarily announce an intervention, but it shows that the military apparatus is assessing useful capabilities should the White House order a larger action. In coercive politics, revealing part of the board can also serve as a warning.
The miscalculation of Havana
The question is not whether each leak will eventually turn into an operation. The question is why the Cuban regime insists on mocking signals that Washington has been making increasingly visible for months.
In international politics, warnings are not always heeded. However, when a government gathers doctrine, capabilities, sanctions, intelligence, and rhetoric in a single direction, dismissing them as mere "psychological warfare" may be more than just naivety.
It could be a miscalculation.
And if the precedents cited by Hurtado made anything clear, it is that an operation can remain hidden until the end, while its signs are visible for some time.
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