For months, Cuban authorities have maintained that the country has practically stopped receiving fuel from abroad. However, several recently reported events make it difficult to reconcile that narrative with everything that has happened on the island.
On July 29, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, stated that Cuba was not receiving "fuel, absolutely nothing" and explained that the country needed around eight million tons annually to sustain its economy and electricity generation.
In August, Miguel Díaz-Canel stated that during the previous seven months, only one oil tanker had arrived: the Anatoli Kolodkin, which arrived from Russia at the end of March with about 100,000 tons of crude oil.
And on September 23, he was even more emphatic: «In this country, no fuel ship has arrived in nine months», he stated, after claiming that fuel was not arriving «from anywhere in the world».
The problem is that the established timeline no longer aligns with those claims.
The Grace would have offloaded fuel in Mariel
The M/V Grace, intercepted on September 5 by the United States Coast Guard while transporting fuel allegedly intended for Cuba, is said to have made a previous delivery to the island.
Data from VesselFinder analyzed by energy expert Jorge Piñón indicates that the ship departed loaded from Panama and arrived at the port of Mariel on July 18. Its draft suggests that it unloaded there before leaving Cuba four days later and arriving empty in Mexico.
The date is particularly relevant: this discharge would have occurred just eleven days before De la O Levy stated that Cuba was not receiving "absolutely anything" in terms of fuel and more than a month before Díaz-Canel claimed that the Anatoly Kolodkin had been the only tanker received in seven months.
The Grace does not itself indicate the final fate of its cargo, but its arrival in Mariel contradicts a literal interpretation that no fuel ship had entered the country since March.
Meanwhile, imports from the United States soared
At the same time, another flow of fuel to Cuba surged to unprecedented levels.
The United States declared exports to the island of 3,222,000 barrels of petroleum products just in July, compared to 778,000 in June. From January to July, the total reached 4,896,000 barrels. The majority of the volume in July consisted of distillates, followed by gasoline, lubricants, and aviation fuel.
In terms of value, U.S. exports of fuels and derivatives reached approximately $156.8 million between January and July.
These operations are authorized to supply the Cuban private sector and formally exclude the government, the armed forces, and certain sanctioned state entities. Therefore, the statistics do not allow us to assert that the Cuban state directly purchased those millions of barrels.
But there is no absolute separation between private fuel and state infrastructure once the product arrives in Cuba.
When state fuel runs low, the mipymes emerge
The very internal functioning of the state provides hints of that connection.
In September, authorities in Guantánamo publicly acknowledged that, due to the lack of state supply of diesel and gasoline, they were considering purchasing fuel from small and medium-sized enterprises and other private actors to maintain essential services in health, education, transportation, communications, and water pumping.
This case demonstrates that fuel imported by private entities can become, through commercial operations, a supply source for state activities.
There is also an even more direct indication.
Vehicles linked to the MININT supplied with American fuel
A report by 14ymedio, featured by CiberCuba, documented that the service station El Eficiente, located a block away from Villa Marista, the headquarters of State Security in Havana, supplied vehicles connected to structures of the Ministry of the Interior.
Among those identified were vehicles from Sepsa, trucks from the special brigades known as "black berets," and Suzuki motorcycles used by State Security agents. According to that investigation, the fuel dispatched from that facility came from imports made from the United States.
The case does not allow for the conclusion that all the imported fuel for the micro, small, and medium enterprises ends up in state hands, nor does it demonstrate the existence of a widespread diversion mechanism. It does prove, at least in that documented episode, that U.S. fuel intended for the private sector ended up supplying vehicles linked to the state apparatus.
A state that continued to function despite extreme scarcity
The energy situation during those months was critical. In July, for example, the Electric Union reported 106 distributed generation plants shut down due to a lack of fuel, deficits exceeding 2,000 MW, and blackouts occurring for practically the entire day in numerous areas.
The country, however, did not completely stop consuming fuels. Electric plants, public services, official vehicles, companies, and security forces continued to operate partially, albeit with significant restrictions.
Part of that continuity is explained by the crude oil and gas produced in Cuba, renewable energy sources, and a drastic reduction in consumption. However, these factors alone do not account for where all the gasoline, diesel, and other derivatives used during those months came from, when activities and logistics for propaganda continued unabated.
Here, the other data becomes relevant: a ship that allegedly unloaded fuel in Mariel in July, millions of barrels reported as exported from the United States, and specific cases where state actors turned to fuel from the private sector.
What does the government account for when it says that no fuel is coming in?
The central question is, therefore, what exactly the authorities mean when they claim that Cuba does not receive fuel.
If they are referring exclusively to large shipments received directly by state companies, the statement requires that precision. If they include any fuel entry into Cuban territory, the available data contradicts it.
El Grace is reported to have unloaded in Mariel on July 18. The United States recorded millions of barrels of petroleum products exported to Cuba. Provincial authorities have turned to small and medium-sized enterprises when state supply was exhausted, and a journalistic investigation documented U.S. fuel supplying vehicles linked to the MININT.
None of these facts demonstrate that the Cuban regime controls all private imports, nor do they allow for an estimate of what proportion of that fuel ultimately ends up in state structures.
However, when considered together, they call into question the claim that for months no fuel has arrived in Cuba "from anywhere in the world" and leave an unanswered question: how much of the fuel that enters through private or unofficial channels ends up supporting the operations of the State?
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