For months, Cuban authorities have insisted that the country has virtually stopped receiving fuel from abroad. However, several recent events make it difficult to reconcile that version with everything that has happened on the island.
On July 29, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, stated that Cuba was receiving "no fuel, absolutely nothing" and explained that the country needed around eight million tons annually to sustain its economy and power generation.
In August, Miguel Díaz-Canel stated that during the previous seven months only one oil tanker had arrived: the Anatoli Kolodkin, which arrived from Russia at the end of March with around 100,000 tons of crude oil.
And on September 23, it was even more emphatic: «In this country, no fuel ships have arrived for nine months», he asserted, after stating that no fuel was arriving “from anywhere in the world”.
The problem is that the known chronology no longer aligns with those claims.
El Grace would have discharged fuel in Mariel
The M/V Grace, intercepted on September 5 by the United States Coast Guard while transporting fuel allegedly destined for Cuba, had reportedly made a previous delivery to the island.
Data from VesselFinder analyzed by energy expert Jorge Piñón indicates that the ship departed loaded from Panama and arrived at the port of Mariel on July 18. Its draft suggests that it unloaded there before leaving Cuba four days later and arriving empty in Mexico.
The date is particularly significant: that shipment would have taken place just eleven days before De la O Levy stated that Cuba was receiving "absolutely nothing" in terms of fuel and more than a month before Díaz-Canel claimed that the Anatoly Kolodkin was the only tanker received in seven months.
The Grace does not single-handedly show what the final fate of its cargo was, but its arrival in Mariel contradicts a literal interpretation that no ship with fuel had entered the country since March.
Meanwhile, imports from the United States skyrocketed
At the same time, another flow of fuel to Cuba surged to unprecedented levels.
The United States declared exports to the island of 3,222,000 barrels of petroleum products just in July, compared to 778,000 in June. Between January and July, the total reached 4,896,000 barrels. The majority of the volume in July was made up of distillates, followed by gasoline, lubricants, and aviation fuel.
In terms of value, U.S. exports of fuels and derivatives reached approximately $156.8 million between January and July.
These operations are authorized to supply the Cuban private sector and formally exclude the government, the armed forces, and certain sanctioned state entities. Therefore, the statistics do not allow one to assert that the Cuban state purchased those millions of barrels directly.
But there is also no absolute separation between private fuel and state infrastructure once the product arrives in Cuba.
When state fuel is lacking, the micro, small, and medium enterprises emerge
The very internal workings of the State provide clues to that connection.
In September, authorities in Guantánamo publicly acknowledged that, due to the lack of state supply of diesel and gasoline, they were considering purchasing fuel from small and medium-sized enterprises and other private actors to maintain essential services in health, education, transportation, communications, and water pumping.
This case demonstrates that fuel imported by private entities can, through commercial operations, become a source of supply for state activities.
There is also an even more direct indication.
Vehicles linked to the MININT supplied with U.S. fuel
An investigation by 14ymedio, reported by CiberCuba, documented that the gas station El Eficiente, located a block from Villa Marista, the headquarters of State Security in Havana, supplied vehicles linked to structures of the Ministry of the Interior.
Among them were identified vehicles from Sepsa, trucks from the special brigades known as "black berets," and Suzuki motorcycles used by State Security agents. According to that investigation, the fuel being processed at that facility came from imports made from the United States.
The case does not allow us to conclude that all the fuel imported for the small and medium-sized enterprises ends up in government hands, nor does it demonstrate the existence of a widespread diversion mechanism. It does, however, prove, at least in that documented incident, that U.S. fuel intended for the private sector ended up supplying vehicles connected to the state apparatus.
A state that continued to function despite extreme scarcity
The energy situation during those months was critical. In July, for example, the Electric Union reported as many as 106 distributed generation plants paralyzed due to a lack of fuel, deficits exceeding 2,000 MW, and blackouts lasting almost all day in numerous areas.
The country, however, did not completely cease consuming fuels. Power plants, public services, official vehicles, companies, and security forces continued to operate partially, although with significant restrictions.
Part of this continuity can be explained by the crude oil and gas produced in Cuba, renewable energies, and a drastic reduction in consumption. However, these factors alone do not clarify where all the gasoline, diesel, and other derivatives used during those months came from, when activities and logistics for propaganda continued unabated.
Here, the other details become relevant: a ship that allegedly discharged fuel in Mariel in July, millions of barrels reported as exported from the United States, and specific cases where state actors resorted to fuel from the private sector.
What does the government account for when it says that fuel is not coming in?
The central question is therefore, what do the authorities actually mean when they claim that Cuba is not receiving fuel?
If they refer exclusively to large shipments received directly by state-owned companies, the statement needs that precision. If they include any fuel entry into Cuban territory, the available data contradicts it.
The Grace is reported to have unloaded in Mariel on July 18. The United States recorded millions of barrels of petroleum products exported to Cuba. Provincial authorities have turned to small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) after the state supply was exhausted, and a journalistic investigation documented American fuel supplying vehicles linked to the MININT.
None of these facts demonstrate that the Cuban regime controls all private imports, nor do they allow for the calculation of what proportion of that fuel ultimately ends up in state structures.
But, when considered together, they do challenge the claim that for months no fuel has arrived in Cuba "from anywhere in the world" and leave an unanswered question: how much of the fuel that enters through private or unofficial channels ultimately supports the functioning of the State?
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