The Cuban regime, which for decades defended state control of banking as a triumph of socialism, now wants to transform the financial sector into a driver of its economic transformation. But behind this change emerges an uncomfortable question: who in Cuba has the necessary funds to create private banks?
The designated leader Miguel Díaz-Canel revisited the matter during a recent meeting with banking executives and workers, reported by Granma, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba.
The president of the Central Bank, Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, identified among the priorities the opening and capitalization of the financial system, credit, exchange operations, and remittances.
Díaz-Canel insisted on regaining customer trust and strengthening the banking sector, but he also demanded to strengthen the political and ideological leadership of the sector. He even referenced Che Guevara and the creation of the "new man".
The Communist Party thus reaffirms its ideological orthodoxy while opening the doors to private banks, financial businesses, and new forms of capital accumulation.
The contradiction becomes more significant when examining who could benefit from those opportunities.
Who will be the new bankers of Cuba?
In June 2026, the regime announced 176 economic measures that include the authorization of private banks and other financial institutions, as well as formulas to allow the participation of private investors in state-owned enterprises.
The opening does not imply a general privatization of the existing banks, but it introduces business opportunities that were previously reserved for the State.
In theory, Cuban entrepreneurs and foreign investors will be able to participate. In practice, establishing a bank requires significant financial resources, access to foreign currency, experience, and international relations.
In a country where the majority of the population barely manages to meet their basic needs, the number of entrepreneurs who can fulfill those conditions is necessarily limited.
Meanwhile, a considerable portion of national economic resources remains concentrated in state and military structures, especially in the GAESA conglomerate, which has controlled significant tourism, commercial, and financial ventures for decades.
An investigation by El Nuevo Herald, based on leaked internal documents, attributed approximately 18 billion dollars in current assets to GAESA in March 2024. Although the interpretation of these figures has been questioned due to potential monetary conversion issues, the investigation once again highlighted the opacity of the military conglomerate and the lack of independent public audits.
The concentration of resources presents an obvious problem: independent entrepreneurs rarely start on equal footing with those who already control capital, infrastructure, and business relationships.
The risk of a "Russian piñata."
The economist Emilio Morales, from Cuba Siglo 21, has been warning for years about a possible transformation of the ruling elite into a new class of large private owners.
In his study on GAESA from January 2023, Morales described the concentration of economic power around the military conglomerate and the Castro family.
Later, in the report "Entrepreneurship in Cuba Stifled by GAESA", it was suggested that small and medium-sized enterprises could facilitate a future transfer of businesses and state assets to individuals connected to those in power.
The hypothesis recalls what happened in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when entrepreneurs and former members of the Soviet apparatus acquired significant public assets through privatizations that favored the emergence of powerful oligarchs.
There is, however, a fundamental difference: in Cuba, this eventual process would be unfolding without the Communist Party having lost power.
The ruling elite could convert some of their control over the economy into private ownership, maintaining the political and administrative institutions that determine who can conduct business.
The current reforms provide reasons to examine that risk.
In October, the economist Pedro Monreal warned about the transfer of state assets to private control, following CIMEX announcements to lease establishments and conduct business with private entrepreneurs.
Monreal questioned the transparency of the processes and pointed out the danger of officials, family members, or related companies gaining advantages in the awarding of business opportunities.
On his part, in a report published on November 3rd, Morales stated that GAESA uses intermediaries and private companies in the fuel business while maintaining control over essential infrastructure and financial mechanisms.
These studies do not demonstrate that all private activity in Cuba is subordinate to the regime. There are independent entrepreneurs, and economic opening could offer them real opportunities. But they also highlight the risks of selective privatization, where political connections may prove to be more important than business competition.
Economic capitalism under communist control
The financial opening introduces a particularly delicate dimension to this process. Private currency exchange operators and foreign capital entities have already been authorized, while the Central Bank retains the authority to issue licenses and oversee their operations.
The identity of the ultimate beneficiaries, the source of the capital, and possible connections with political or military leaders are essential for understanding who is profiting from the reforms.
However, the lack of transparency in the Cuban system makes it difficult to access that information. The same institutions that authorize businesses control a significant portion of the data needed to investigate their owners.
Opacity does not demonstrate the existence of front men or irregular transfers of public assets, but it creates favorable conditions for concealing potential conflicts of interest.
The problem is not limited to banks either. New licenses, leasing of state facilities, and business partnerships can allow certain groups to accumulate profits and economic control without the need to formally acquire all the properties.
In that scenario, the opening could help revive productive activities while simultaneously consolidating a business elite dependent on political power.
The paradox is reflected in Díaz-Canel's discourse: while he promotes financial instruments typical of a market economy, he insists that the banking system must remain subject to the ideological principles of the Party, in order to "build socialism the Cuban way".
The regime is increasingly allowing capitalist mechanisms to manage the economy, but it does not foresee an equivalent opening of the political system.
This underscores the importance of knowing who the owners of the new banks will be, what capital they will manage, and how they will obtain their licenses.
The Russian experience shows that privatization does not necessarily mean democratization or wealth distribution. And the investigations into GAESA raise the possibility that a transformation even more unique may be occurring in Cuba: that some of those who already control the national economy may end up becoming its private owners, without relinquishing the political power that enabled that concentration.
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