
The Cuban regime has decided to transform essential aspects of the national economy and, five months after approving its program of 176 measures, invites citizens to share their opinions.
The initiative, presented as an exercise in public participation, raises a contradiction that goes much deeper than the delay of the consultation: who granted the government a democratic mandate to change the economic and social rules of the country?
The reforms approved in June modify fundamental aspects of the model defended for decades by the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). They include private banking, expansion of business ownership, influx of private capital into state enterprises, greater role of the market, and progressive replacement of universal subsidies with targeted assistance.
These are decisions that directly impact the income, wealth, employment, and living conditions of millions of Cubans. However, they did not arise from an electoral competition between alternative economic projects, nor were they subjected to a public debate with effective decision-making capacity beforehand.
The state platform Soberanía, launched at the beginning of November, is now inviting feedback on a program whose legal development is well advanced: as of November 10, 172 out of 176 transformations already had approved policies and procedures, 231 legal provisions had been drafted and 131 had been published in the Official Gazette.
The government allows for discussions about decisions it has already made, but does not offer citizens the opportunity to choose a government that proposes different ones.
Change the model without changing the rules of power
The magnitude of the economic shift has been recognized even by specialists who deem the reforms necessary.
In an analysis published on November 11 in Horizonte Cubano, from Columbia University, economist Fidel Vascos González, former minister-president of the State Committee on Statistics, identifies a paradigm shift concerning the economic conception that the Communist Party had established during the previous decade.
The transformations, it argues, pave the way for an economy where the market, private ownership, and individual initiative take on a much greater role than that allowed by the traditional centralized model.
It does not mean that these ideas were completely devoid of precedents. The PCC Guidelines for 2021-2026 already acknowledged spaces for market relationships and non-state forms of ownership. However, the breadth of the new measures surpasses restrictions that the Party itself had maintained as principles of its economic policy.
The paradox is evident: the organization that for decades imposed limits on private initiative now reserves the exclusive power to lift them, without subjecting this change in direction to democratic competition.
The leader Miguel Díaz-Canel has insisted that the transformations do not mean abandoning socialism or privatizing state-owned enterprises. The government maintains that the reform is necessary to confront an extraordinary economic crisis and to preserve the political model.
In abstract terms, that explanation may justify the urgency of adopting measures, but it does not resolve the issue of citizen representation. The economic need for reform and the democratic legitimacy of those who decide on it are different matters.
The difference between consulting and representing
In a representative democracy, a government does not need to call for elections every time it changes its economic policy. It can make decisions not explicitly included in its program, especially when it must respond to unforeseen circumstances.
But there is a fundamental condition: citizens have had the opportunity to choose between different political proposals and retain the capacity to withdraw their support from the government in the next elections.
An executive may fail to keep their promises, alter their agenda, or implement unpopular reforms. The opposition can challenge them, organize an alternative, and aim to replace them through voting.
In Cuba, that possibility does not exist under conditions of political competition.
The establishes in its Article 5 that the Communist Party, defined as the only one, is the highest leading political force of society and the State.
In the parliamentary elections of March 2023, 470 candidates stood for 470 seats. Voters could support or reject candidates, but could not choose between parties with opposing platforms. The National Assembly, formed through this system, subsequently elects the president of the Republic.
In this way, citizens were unable to vote for an economic project alternative to that of the PCC or entrust its implementation to a different political force.
The Constitution recognizes in its article 3 that sovereignty resides inalienably in the people, from whom state power emanates. Article 80 also establishes the right to participate in the formation, exercise, and control of that power.
The contradiction arises when confronting those principles with a system that reserves political leadership to a single organization and excludes the alternation between government projects.
Who is responsible for the mistakes and who decides on the reforms?
The problem is not limited to determining whether the 176 measures are appropriate or misguided. Some could help recover productive activity, attract investments, and expand opportunities for citizens. Others may generate inequalities, increase costs of services, or transfer new expenses to households.
The question is who decides among those alternatives, who bears the consequences, and to whom they are accountable.
The same Communist Party that for decades defended the superiority of centralized planning now encourages a greater presence of the market and private capital. However, it retains control over the institutions responsible for approving the reforms, implementing them, and assessing their results.
Even the transfer of state assets to new private operators raises questions that go beyond economic efficiency: who will be able to acquire them, under what conditions, with what guarantees of transparency, and who will oversee these operations.
In his study, Vascos González warns that economic transformations need to be accompanied by political changes that strengthen citizen control, parliamentary autonomy, and accountability. He also suggests introducing real competition among candidates for deputies, although he frames his reflection within a horizon of democratic socialism.
The warning highlights a known risk in economic transitions: that a market opening without effective public controls may end up benefiting the concentration of wealth and opportunities around those who already hold political influence.
In Cuba, this concern takes on special significance because the institutions that are supposed to oversee the Executive are part of a system led by the same party that establishes economic policies.
After decades of crisis, economic restrictions, and unmet promises of prosperity, Cubans are facing a new transformation whose outcomes remain uncertain. They will have to live with its consequences, whether favorable or adverse, without the mechanisms of political alternation that would allow them to hold another government accountable through elections.
The regime asks them what they think of its reforms, but does not inquire whether they wish to continue being governed by those who decided them.
Popular sovereignty is not just about allowing citizens to express their opinions on the exercise of power. It also requires that they can decide who wields that power.
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