
The supposed "disillusionment" of Cubans with Donald Trump and Marco Rubio may be an appealing interpretation to explain the political fatigue of the U.S. administration, but it is inadequate to understand the full extent of the Cuban national drama.
The hopes placed in Washington did not necessarily stem from admiration for Trump, but rather from the helplessness of a society that has spent decades unable to freely determine its political destiny.
The American academic Theodore Henken recently stated in an interview with the station WSLR that the "Trump-Rubio brand" has eroded among Cubans who expected decisive action against the dictatorship. According to the researcher, the passage of time, the worsening of the crisis, and the Republican defeat in the legislative elections on November 3 have weakened the expectations for change.
His assessment is based on conversations with interlocutors both inside and outside of Cuba, not on a representative survey. But the most interesting problem is not statistical, but political: to what extent does it make sense to interpret the democratic aspirations of Cubans using the categories of popularity, party affiliation, and disenchantment that dominate U.S. politics?
A Cuban can reject Trump's crude statements, his sympathies toward certain authoritarian leaders, his transactional view of international relations, and much of his political agenda, while also hoping that his administration will help bring an end to the dictatorship in Havana.
There is no necessary contradiction. One thing is Trumpism as a political identity, and quite a different thing is the expectation that a foreign power could help to unlock a situation that citizens have no institutional means to change.
Confusing both things amounts to reducing a historical aspiration for freedom to a circumstantial preference for a U.S. president.
A disillusionment much older than Trump
The true Cuban disillusionment has much deeper roots than the unfulfilled promises of Washington.
It lies in the imposition of the single-party system, the elimination of political competition, the repression of dissent, the state monopoly on institutions, and the transformation of a revolution that promised emancipation into a system that has ultimately constitutionally secured the continuity of socialism and the supremacy of the Communist Party.
For nearly seven decades, generations of Cubans have lived without the possibility of peacefully replacing their leaders through free and competitive elections. Protests have been suppressed, the opposition persecuted, and a large portion of the citizens have ultimately found in emigration the only individual escape from a collective crisis.
The expectations placed on Trump and Rubio must also be understood in light of that historical experience. Even the willingness of some Cubans to consider foreign intervention, with its immense human and political risks, reveals just how much transforming the country from within its own institutions seems an impossible dream.
It does not mean that all Cubans desire a military intervention, nor that those who anticipate U.S. action share the same objectives or are willing to make the same sacrifices.
This means that the Cuban society is facing a dilemma that is much deeper than choosing between trusting or not trusting Trump: how to regain popular sovereignty that the political system itself prevents from being exercised.
The U.S. elections have not closed the Cuban scene
Henken also links the deterioration of expectations with the Republican defeat in the midterm elections, which left the Democrats in a position to control both chambers of Congress starting in January 2027.
However, the new correlation of forces does not automatically deactivate Trump's foreign strategy.
Congress has tools to oversee the Executive, condition budgets, block legislative initiatives, and set limits on military operations. However, the president retains broad powers to enforce sanctions, conduct diplomatic negotiations, and make specific decisions regarding national security.
In fact, just two days after the elections, Marco Rubio announced new sanctions against entities and individuals linked to the Cuban regime, a clear sign of continuity in the pressure policy.
The Republican defeat alters the political conditions in Washington and may increase the costs of military intervention, especially following the strain caused by the war with Iran. However, it does not allow us to conclude that Trump has abandoned his objectives regarding Cuba.
It also does not guarantee that you can reach them immediately, or even in the medium term. The ability to act and the possibility of triggering a democratic transition are different issues, as evidenced by the complexity of the Venezuelan scenario.
Reducing that strategic uncertainty to the image of a "wrong horse", as Henken does when referring to the expectations of some Cuban Americans, introduces an electoral interpretation that fails to explain the dimensions of the Cuban pandemonium.
Since when do states act out of philanthropy?
Another element of the interview deserves critical examination. Henken warns about the possibility that Trump aims to turn Cuba into a source of economic benefits, subordinating democratic promises to his material interests.
The risk of an intervention aimed at resource exploitation, without guarantees for the sovereignty and rights of Cubans, is a legitimate concern. But the existence of economic interests in U.S. foreign policy does not, in itself, constitute any troubling revelation.
States are not philanthropic organizations. Their international decisions are driven by interests of security, power, influence, and prosperity, although they may also incorporate democratic principles and humanitarian considerations.
The administration of Barack Obama explicitly acknowledged in its presidential directive from October 2016 regarding normalization with Cuba that the diplomatic and trade approach sought to promote U.S. national interests.
Obama favored openness, while Trump opted for pressure. Their methods and political concepts are very different, but neither acted outside the interests of the United States.
The relevant question is not whether Washington intends to gain advantages from a potential transformation in Cuba, but whether those advantages would be compatible with a democratic transition, respect for citizens' rights, and national sovereignty.
And, above all, who would be authorized to negotiate the terms of that relationship on behalf of the Cubans. The Disenchanted Crab?
The great paradox of Cuban sovereignty
For decades, the regime has portrayed its confrontation with the United States as a defense of national independence. However, this sovereignty, constantly invoked against the external enemy, does not translate into effective political sovereignty for the citizens.
The people, officially proclaimed masters of their own destiny, lack mechanisms to challenge the monopoly of the Communist Party, choose among alternative political projects, or hold their leaders accountable through competitive elections.
There lies one of the fundamental contradictions of Castroism: it has turned national sovereignty into an exclusive attribute of the State and its leaders, while depriving citizens of the ability to exercise it against power.
Henken makes a pertinent observation when he states that the Cuban leadership has specialized in resisting U.S. pressures and waiting for the political circumstances in Washington to change.
But this capacity for resilience has an institutional explanation that deserves more attention: Cuban leaders can wait for Trump to lose an election because they themselves do not have to subject their hold on power to free elections.
The survival of the dictatorship does not necessarily demonstrate strength, legitimacy, or popular support. It can, in fact, reveal the effectiveness of a system designed to prevent social discontent from translating into political change.
The eventual fall of the regime should not be confused with the automatic recovery of Cuban sovereignty. A transition that is subordinate to foreign interests, without effective participation from the citizens, could merely replace one form of dependency with another.
The real national issue is not that Trump decides Cuba's future, but that Cubans reclaim the right to decide it.
That is why, while in the United States an electoral defeat can alter the composition of Congress and shape presidential power, in Cuba, citizens still lack an equivalent mechanism to change those who govern them.
Trump may gain or lose support, change his priorities, or leave the White House. Cubans, on the other hand, remain trapped in a system that denies them the right to decide through voting whether their leaders should stay in power.
That is the drama that no circumstantial measurement of "disenchantment" with Washington can fully explain.
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