The "blockade" does not exist

For more than six decades, the Cuban regime has built its political survival on a monolithic narrative: the U.S. "blockade" serves as the universal explanation for every economic failure, every shortage, and every blackout that devastates the daily lives of Cubans. This story has been repeated with such insistence that it has crystallized into an accepted truth among broad sectors of international public opinion.

The documented reality tells a radically different story. When examining the actual trade flows, verifiable financial transactions, and the real distribution of resources on the island, the regime's argumentative framework collapses. The economic consequences that Havana attributes to the embargo prove impossible to sustain against the empirical evidence.

Behind this dissonance between speech and reality lies a calculated strategy. The Castro elite has perfected over decades the art of transforming their own administrative incompetence into geopolitical victimization, their institutionalized corruption into heroic resistance, and their extractive nature into an inevitable consequence of external hostility. This narrative distortion operation has proven extraordinarily successful: while the world looks to Washington for culprits, the true architects of the Cuban tragedy govern from Havana with near-absolute impunity.

In less than a week, the United Nations General Assembly will vote again on the Cuban resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. As every year since 1992, the ritual will repeat itself: Cuba will present astronomical figures of alleged damages, dozens of countries will deliver statements of solidarity, and the resolution will be approved by an overwhelming majority. What will not be discussed in that chamber are the data and documented evidence of million-dollar trade transactions, revelations about financial reserves that surpass those of entire nations, and the real architecture of a system that has perfected the art of turning its own incompetence into geopolitical victimhood.

The vote at the UN will not determine the fate of the U.S. embargo, which will remain in effect regardless of the outcome. However, it will decide whether the international community will continue to grant legitimacy to an explanation that absolves the Cuban regime of any responsibility for the suffering of its people, while the same regime keeps hidden 18.5 billion dollars that could resolve the crises it blames on external factors.

I am writing this article because I too was once deceived by this narrative of victimization. No one who loves their country wants to see it harmed, of course. This is also exploited by the sinister rhetoric of the regime. Today, with access to information, I can dismantle the rhetoric that has challenged me for years.

The trade that supposedly cannot exist

The official records from the United States Department of Agriculture present a stark contradiction to the narrative of "total blockade." In 2024, U.S. exports to Cuba exceeded 370 million dollars in agricultural products and food. The products include frozen chicken, soybeans, corn, and wheat: precisely the basic inputs that a supposedly "blocked" country should not be able to acquire from its main geopolitical adversary.

The commercial increase has been sustained and dramatic. In February 2025, these exports reached $47 million, marking the highest level since 2014. This increase represents a jump of 75.1% compared to the same month of the previous year. Between January and June 2025, total sales reached $243.3 million, a growth of 16.6% compared to the same period in 2024. By the end of 2025, total trade flow is expected to exceed $585 million according to projections based on current trends. The total purchases made by Cuba in the United States from 2001 to date represent more than $7.679 billion based on USTEC records.

This figure takes on its true significance when one understands that the United States has become one of the five main food suppliers to the Cuban market. The paradox is impossible to ignore: the country that supposedly "blocks" Cuba to the point of causing famine regularly and increasingly sells it chicken, rice, milk, and medicines.

Commercial diversification goes far beyond just food. In the early months of 2025, Cuba imported used vehicles from the United States valued at 15.3 million dollars, motorcycles, solar panels, agricultural machinery, medical equipment, industrial chemicals, and cooling systems. The import catalog includes everything from John Deere tractors to communion wafers, as well as premium coffee, long-grain rice, fortified powdered milk, and select cuts of pork.

The legal framework that allows these transactions has existed for decades, debunking the narrative of a besieged city. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 and the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 explicitly authorize the sale of food, medicine, and humanitarian supplies to Cuba. The only condition: the Cuban government must pay in cash. There is no credit, no deferred financing, but there is also no absolute prohibition on trade. This is especially true for essential goods.

In 2023, Washington authorized medical exports to Cuba amounting to over 800 million dollars, doubling the figure from 2021. The restrictions primarily operate in the financial realm: Cuba cannot request loans from U.S. banking institutions nor access the capital markets of New York. However, purchasing basic goods with cash has never been prohibited.

This technical detail is crucial for dismantling the official Cuban narrative. The regime portrays the embargo as a blockade that hinders any commercial exchange. The reality reveals multi-million dollar transactions that are growing and diversifying.

A history of systematic non-payments

The restriction that Cuba faces in international markets has a precise name: credit distrust. For decades, the Cuban regime has built a catastrophic track record as a debtor, marked by repeated defaults, endless renegotiations, and an apparent inability—or more precisely, a deliberate unwillingness—to honor its financial commitments.

The figures from the Paris Club clearly illustrate this dynamic. Cuba carries a debt of 4.62 billion dollars with this organization, making it the second largest debtor in Latin America, surpassed only by Venezuela. The figure alone is notable, but it gains its true significance when examined within the historical context.

In 2015, the Paris Club made an extraordinary decision: to forgive 8.5 billion dollars of a total debt that reached 11.1 billion. The forgiveness eliminated more than 75% of the debt. The remaining balance was restructured under exceptionally favorable terms: minimal annual payments until 2033, with a five-year grace period without interest. Few countries have received such benevolent conditions.

The response of the Cuban regime to this international generosity has been systematic non-compliance. Since 2019, Havana has stopped paying more than 200 million dollars in the agreed installments. Renegotiations have occurred every few months: in September 2023, in January 2025, and so on. Each meeting follows the same script: Cuba requests more time, the creditors express "understanding for the difficulties," and the payment schedule is once again extended into an indefinite future.

This pattern of defaults extends beyond the Paris Club. The list of debt cancellations that Cuba has received in the past two decades is astonishing. China forgave 6 billion dollars in 2011. Mexico canceled 487 million in 2013. Russia wrote off 35 billion in 2014, eliminating 90% of a debt that had been lingering since the Soviet era. Subsequently, Moscow has granted further deferrals for the outstanding amounts.

Despite these extraordinary reductions totaling more than 54 billion dollars in forgiven debt, Cuba continues to default and accumulate new obligations. The current balance shows an external debt exceeding 40 billion dollars, including unpaid commitments with Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Spain, France, Austria, Belgium, and Japan, in addition to active litigation with private creditors.

The case of the CRF1 fund exemplifies the legal consequences of this behavior. The fund, established in the Cayman Islands, sued Cuba in London courts for over 78 million dollars related to loans granted in the 1980s. The Cuban government refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the claim.

The credit situation in Cuba has reached a critical point that even the regime can no longer hide. In July 2024, the Minister of Economy and Planning, Joaquín Alonso Vázquez, acknowledged before the National Assembly that the government's foreign currency revenues are "insufficient" and that access to external credit is "almost nonexistent". This official admission confirms what international financial markets have known for years: lending money to Cuba is akin to giving it away.

The hidden coffers of military power

The official narrative of the regime regarding the poverty caused by the "blockade" completely collapses when examining the revelations about GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.), the military conglomerate that controls the most lucrative sectors of the Cuban economy. The leak of 22 internal financial documents, analyzed by journalist Nora Gámez Torres for the Miami Herald, exposed a reality that Cuban authorities have hidden for decades.

The financial statements for 2023 and 2024 reveal that GAESA holds at least 18.5 billion dollars in liquid assets. Of this amount, 14.5 billion is deposited in its own bank accounts and financial entities, available for immediate use. To understand the magnitude of these figures, it is sufficient to compare them with the international reserves of countries like Costa Rica, Uruguay, or Panama.

In just the first quarter of 2024, the military conglomerate generated $2.1 billion in net profits. Cimex, its main company managing retail, banking, and international trade businesses, contributed half of those earnings. The tourism company Gaviota, another key subsidiary, held $4.3 billion in its bank accounts as of March 2024. This single company has almost 13 times the liquid resources compared to the $339 million the regime itself estimates is needed to supply all the pharmacies in the country for a full year.

Economist Pavel Vidal described GAESA as a "parallel central bank" that operates entirely outside the formal economic system. The conglomerate accumulates foreign currency with an ultra-conservative policy: hoarding dollars and operating in pesos, thus protecting itself from the inflation and devaluation that devastate the rest of the Cuban economy. This financial strategy ensures that resources remain concentrated in military hands while the population faces a critical shortage of all kinds of basic goods.

The organizational structure of GAESA functions, as journalist Marc Bermúdez described, like a multi-layered business matryoshka. Although formally affiliated with the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the conglomerate controls entire strategic sectors of the economy: tourism, remittances, retail, telecommunications, ports, customs, and finance. It operates through at least 25 companies identified in leaked documents, including CIMEX, Gaviota, TRD Caribe, Almacenes Universales, and the Banco Financiero Internacional.

Opacity characterizes every aspect of GAESA's operations. The conglomerate does not report to the National Assembly or any civil auditing body. The former Comptroller General Gladys Bejerano publicly confessed in 2023 that she could not audit the military conglomerate because it operated outside her jurisdiction. Shortly after, Bejerano was removed from her position without any official explanation.

The leaked documents also reveal the fate of these vast resources. Despite extraordinary revenue, GAESA spent $5 billion in just five months between March and August 2024. The majority of this budget was allocated to the construction of luxury hotels. Between 2021 and 2023, 36% of all government investments were channeled into hotel projects, while only 2.9% went to agriculture and a meager 1.9% to health programs.

The revelation of these figures provoked a furious reaction from the regime. The official portal Cubadebate launched a campaign of personal discrediting against Nora Gámez Torres, accusing her of being a "CIA agent" and questioning her academic background. Notably, the text did not discuss or refute a single figure from the investigation. If the documents were false or the figures inaccurate, the regime could have simply published its own financial statements and denied the allegations. Instead, it chose a personal attack, indirectly confirming the accuracy of the leak by remaining silent on the concrete data.

Resources exist. What is lacking is the will to use them to solve the crisis.

The question that naturally arises from this data is as obvious as it is unsettling: what could Cuba do with $18.5 billion in immediate liquidity?

Let’s start with the healthcare system, whose collapse the regime systematically attributes to the embargo. The regime estimates that it needs 339 million dollars annually to supply all the pharmacies in the country with essential medications. GAESA's liquid assets could cover this need for more than 54 consecutive years without receiving a single additional dollar in income. Currently, the healthcare system lacks 70% of these essential medications. The shortage is not due to a lack of resources, but rather to their deliberate concentration in military hands.

The energy sector presents equally revealing calculations. Keeping the national electricity grid operational, including repairs, maintenance, and fuel, requires approximately 250 million dollars annually, according to conservative technical estimates. With GAESA's resources, Cuba could ensure stable electricity for 74 years. Meanwhile, the population endures blackouts that last up to 20 hours a day, destroying perishable food, paralyzing economic activity, and plunging entire neighborhoods into darkness for entire days.

The external debt can also find an immediate solution with these resources. The $4.62 billion that Cuba owes to the Paris Club represents only 25% of GAESA's liquidity. The full payment of this debt, along with a significant reduction in other international commitments, would be covered, leaving over $13 billion remaining. The rehabilitation of Cuba's creditworthiness, which would allow access to international financial markets again, is within immediate reach with a political decision to use these funds.

Food imports represent another revealing calculation. Cuba imported food worth approximately 2 billion dollars in 2024. With the liquidity available in military coffers, the country could secure all its food import needs for more than nine years, simultaneously allowing for massive investment in agricultural recovery that would reduce external dependence. In contrast, seven out of ten Cubans stopped having at least one daily meal due to lack of money or available food.

The collapsed productive infrastructure also comes with a repair cost. Modernizing the outdated industrial plant, renewing the public transportation fleet, and reconstructing rural roads to facilitate the transport of agricultural products from the fields to urban markets: all these critical investments could easily fit within existing resources. Technical estimates suggest that a significant infrastructural transformation would require between 3 billion and 5 billion dollars over five years. GAESA has nearly four times this amount in cash readily available.

Even assuming the continuation of massive fuel imports, resources would allow for a stable energy flow while alternatives are developed. Oil and its derivatives cost Cuba approximately $3 billion annually. The $18.5 billion from GAESA would cover more than six years of full oil imports at the current consumption rate.

This dynamic transforms the official narrative of the embargo into a tool for internal political management. While the population attributes its deprivations to external factors, the elite that controls GAESA can continue to accumulate wealth without facing questions about resource distribution. The extreme poverty of 89% of the Cuban population coexists with liquid reserves greater than those of entire nations because the system is designed precisely to produce this outcome: concentration at the top, scarcity at the bottom, and a convenient external explanation that deflects all responsibility.

Victimhood as Diplomatic Engineering

The narrative of the "genocidal blockade" transcends domestic propaganda to become a tool of precise foreign policy. Every year, the UN General Assembly stages the same ritual: Cuba presents a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo and receives overwhelming support. In 2024, the vote resulted in 187 votes in favor, with only the United States and Israel opposing and one abstention from Moldova.

This annual diplomatic victory serves multiple strategic functions for the regime. First, it internationally validates the victim narrative, legitimizing the Cuban explanation of its economic problems before the global community. Second, it reinforces the political identity of the regime as David facing Goliath, a positioning that deeply resonates with the anti-imperialist sentiment of numerous governments in the Global South. Third, it allows the regime to portray itself as a victim of an international injustice that deserves solidarity and diplomatic concessions.

The figures Cuba presents at these international forums reach astronomical dimensions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports "losses of 7.556 billion in the last year" and "accumulated damages exceeding 170 billion dollars" due to the embargo. These calculations lack transparent or verifiable methodology. They include abstract concepts such as "lost profits" and projections of hypothetical earnings that Cuba could have obtained in an alternative scenario without the embargo.

The technical fragility of these figures contrasts dramatically with their political effectiveness. Few governments challenge the methodology or request empirical evidence. The condemnation of the embargo has become a diplomatic ritual that many countries perform automatically, without analyzing whether the factual premises that support it correspond to observable reality.

Here emerges a contradiction that the votes in the UN systematically ignore: how can a country that is genuinely "blocked" import hundreds of millions of dollars annually from its supposed blocker? How does this narrative explain that the United States is one of the top five suppliers of food in the Cuban market? Why does a regime that claims damages of 170 billion maintain 18.5 billion in liquid reserves without using them to alleviate the suffering of its population?

These questions rarely find space in multilateral debates. The voting format at the UN favors binary positions: to vote against the embargo or in favor of it. The complexity of examining whether the embargo truly has the effects that Cuba attributes to it, whether there are more decisive domestic factors in the Cuban crisis, or whether the ruling elite shares significant responsibility for the population's deprivation, gets lost in this forced simplification.

The governments that vote in favor of the Cuban resolution year after year operate for various reasons. Some express genuine anti-imperialist solidarity. Others seek to maintain cordial relations with Havana. Several act out of institutional inertia, continuing established positions from decades ago without critical reassessment. Few seem to have updated their analysis based on current trade data or revelations about the financial resources that the Cuban regime effectively controls.

This international acquiescence produces tangible and harmful consequences. Every vote that validates the Cuban narrative without critical examination strengthens the regime's position against its own population. When the United Nations condemns the embargo with 187 votes in favor and 2 against, the Cuban government can present this result as undeniable proof that the international community recognizes the embargo as the primary cause of the country's problems. The Cuban population, bombarded daily with this message, has less space to question whether there are domestic responsibilities for their situation.

Cuba's diplomatic strategy also skillfully leverages broader geopolitical tensions. Presenting the embargo as a manifestation of American imperialism resonates in contexts where many countries harbor their own resentments or conflicts with Washington. Cuba positions itself as a symbol of resistance, turning its annual vote at the UN into a referendum on U.S. foreign policy rather than an objective assessment of the causes of the Cuban crisis.

While this diplomatic cycle perpetuates, the Cuban regime scores symbolic victories in New York and Geneva that reinforce its international legitimacy, keeps alive a narrative that diverts responsibility for the domestic economic disaster, and avoids accountability for decisions such as holding $18.5 billion in military reserves while the population lacks basic medicines. Victimhood has ceased to be mere propaganda and has become a governance structure: a mechanism that simultaneously justifies failure externally and disciplines dissent internally through the systematic externalization of all responsibility.

The Mercenary Business

The moral contradiction of the Cuban regime finds its starkest expression in the mass recruitment of young Cubans to serve as mercenaries in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Havana travels to capitals around the world demanding solidarity against the "genocidal blockade" that condemns its people to hunger, the same regime facilitates the sending of tens of thousands of its citizens to die in a war that is not theirs.

The numbers confirmed by multiple sources are chilling. Ukrainian officials testified before the U.S. Congress that Russia has recruited approximately 20,000 Cubans, with 7,000 already deployed in active combat zones. Estimates from Western intelligence suggest that the actual figure could reach 25,000. This contingent makes Cuba the largest provider of foreign fighters for Moscow, even surpassing the 12,000 troops sent by North Korea.

The mechanics of recruitment expose the contradictions of the official discourse. The regime insists that these are "human trafficking networks" operating without government knowledge or permission. This narrative collapses under the weight of the accumulated evidence. New direct air routes from Havana to Moscow operated by Aeroflot began precisely when recruitment intensified. Military contracts are delivered translated into Spanish. Recruits undergo medical examinations coordinated at Cuban facilities. The passports of those traveling systematically lack exit stamps, a deliberate technique to avoid documentary traces of state participation.

The individual motivation of recruits emerges directly from the economic conditions created by the regime itself. Russia offers salaries of approximately 2,000 dollars per month. In Cuba, the average salary barely reaches 20 dollars. For a young person who sees their family suffering from hunger, who endures daily power outages of 20 hours, and who lacks prospects for improvement on the island, the Russian offer represents astronomical figures. One hundred times their current salary. The possibility of sending money home. Perhaps, eventually, access to Russian citizenship and a definitive escape from the system that has condemned them to poverty.

Ukrainian authorities have captured several Cuban mercenaries during military operations. The testimonies of these prisoners converge on key aspects: many believed they were going to construction jobs in Russia, only discovering upon arrival that they would be sent to the front lines. Their passports were confiscated. They were threatened with imprisonment or deportation if they refused to sign military contracts. They received minimal training, often just a week, before being dispatched to areas of intense combat.

At least 40 Cubans have died on the Ukrainian front, according to figures confirmed by passports recovered by Ukrainian forces. The actual number is likely several times higher than this figure. Andrey Kartapolov, head of the Defense Committee of the Duma of Russia, publicly confirmed in October 2025 the plans for mass recruitment. "A true Cuban patriot cannot be forbidden to love Russia," he stated, adding that Moscow welcomes those who wish to join the Russian Armed Forces in their "just fight against global fascism." This official confirmation from Moscow occurred without any diplomatic protest from Havana, revealing the complicity of the Cuban regime.

The geopolitical dimension of this recruitment goes beyond the immediate humanitarian horror. Cuba is part of an increasing military axis that links Russia with North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. The deployment of Cuban fighters to Ukraine is part of this global authoritarian realignment. For Moscow, using foreign mercenaries minimizes the internal political cost of Russian casualties, which according to British intelligence exceed one million. For Havana, it represents access to modern military training and strengthens the strategic alliance with Putin.

The price of perpetuating the lie of the embargo

89% of Cuban families live in extreme poverty, according to the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights. Seven out of ten people have stopped having at least one meal a day due to lack of money or food. Power outages last up to 20 continuous hours. The healthcare system, once a source of pride for the regime, lacks 70% of essential medications. People search for food in the trash.

All of this occurs while GAESA amasses 18.5 billion dollars, builds empty luxury hotels, and maintains international reserves that exceed those of entire nations. This poverty is the deliberate result of a system that prioritizes the accumulation of power and capital in the hands of a military elite over the basic needs of the population. The Cuban regime has built its political survival on a narrative that evidence shows to be false in its fundamental premises. The "genocidal blockade" that supposedly explains every aspect of the Cuban tragedy crumbles when examining the actual trade flows, the documented financial capabilities of the state, and the effective distribution of resources within the country.

Cuba maintains active trade relations with the United States and the rest of the world. It imports hundreds of millions of dollars annually in food, medicine, machinery, and technology from U.S. territory. It freely purchases goods from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The restrictions it faces do not apply to immediate commercial transactions, where it can virtually buy any product by paying in cash.

Resources exist. The money is there. The humanitarian tragedy devastating Cubans does not stem from deliberate political decisions on how to distribute abundant resources. The regime chooses to build empty luxury hotels while hospitals lack basic antibiotics. It prefers to amass millions in opaque accounts while seven out of ten families skip daily meals due to hunger. It maintains 18.5 billion in bank deposits while the population searches for food in the trash.

The international community facilitates this operation every time it mechanically votes against the embargo without examining the factual premises that support the Cuban position. Each resolution in the UN that ignores the actual trade figures, overlooks the existence of GAESA and its billions, and uncritically accepts the regime's unmethodical calculations reinforces the narrative. Every government that expresses solidarity with Cuba based on this distorted version of reality contributes to perpetuating the system that keeps Cubans in misery.

The consequences of this complicity are tangible. While the world condemns the embargo that is supposedly causing famine in Cuba, 25,000 young Cubans are recruited as mercenaries to die in Ukraine, driven by the economic desperation that the regime creates and maintains. As nations vote in solidarity with the "blocked Cuba," GAESA invests billions in hotels that no one will occupy.

The unmasking of this farce is not an abstract academic exercise. It matters because as long as it remains unchallenged with data and evidence, the Cuban people will continue to pay the price. Each day that the world accepts the narrative of the "blockade" as a sufficient explanation for the Cuban crisis is another day that the regime avoids accountability for its decisions. Every vote at the UN that validates this version without scrutiny is tacit permission for the concentration of resources in military hands while the population suffers from preventable deprivations.

As long as this operation of narrative distortion continues to function in international forums, as long as governments keep voting based on ideological solidarity rather than empirical assessment, and as long as critical analysis of the domestic responsibilities of the Cuban regime is deemed politically incorrect, the current system will remain intact. And with it, the suffering of a people held hostage by an elite that has shown a preference for the accumulation of power and capital at the expense of collective well-being will also persist.