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The tightening of digital control in Russia has taken a new leap in 2026. According to a report by El Mundo, authored by Xavier Colás, the Kremlin has begun to implement mobile internet shutdowns in Moscow, restrict applications such as Telegram and WhatsApp, and move towards a model where only state-authorized services function.
The measure, presented as a response to security threats, is impacting payments, banks, maps, and daily communications, in what experts describe as an attempt to isolate the population and limit their capacity for organization.
Colás's analysis points to a paradigm shift: from blocking specific pages to allowing only a "whitelist" of services. Furthermore, Russia is promoting state platforms such as the messaging app Max, which, according to specialists cited in the report, could enable direct surveillance of users and detect practices like the use of VPNs.
This model of control is not unfamiliar to Cubans. Despite differences in scale, internet access on the island is also entirely centralized under the state monopoly of ETECSA, which allows for the rapid and effective implementation of restrictions.
Organizations like Access Now and NetBlocks documented mass internet shutdowns in Cuba during the protests on July 11, 2021, as well as selective blocking of social media and messaging services.
The Kremlin's bet on the Max app is reminiscent of similar attempts in Cuba with platforms like Todus, promoted by ETECSA as a national messaging alternative.
However, while its use on the island has been limited, in Russia the State combines these tools with restrictions on foreign services, moving toward a digital ecosystem where communication increasingly passes through monitored channels.
The similarity is not coincidental. In recent years, Cuba and Russia have strengthened their cooperation in technological and telecommunications sectors, with official agreements for digital modernization and information security.
Although these agreements are presented as development projects, experts and organizations like Freedom House have warned that both countries are moving towards increasingly sophisticated models of control over the flow of information.
In Cuba, in addition to occasional blackouts, digital surveillance practices and the use of social media content as evidence in legal proceedings against activists and critical citizens have been documented. This reflects a strategy similar to the one described by Colás in Russia: it is not just about censorship, but about deterring and controlling behavior.
What is happening today in Moscow confirms a trend: allied regimes share and refine mechanisms to keep the population connected just enough to sustain the economy, but limited enough to hinder protest and the free flow of ideas.
The digital machinery of the Kremlin: internal control and external propaganda with Cuba as a key ally
The tightening of digital control within Russia not only has internal implications but also extends outward, particularly to allied countries like Cuba.
While the Kremlin advances in a model of surveillance and internet restriction —as described by El Mundo— it simultaneously develops a strategy of informational influence in Latin America that strengthens that same control ecosystem.
A report by the Digital News Association (DNA) reveals that Russia has trained more than 1,000 influencers in the region, including Cubans, to spread pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation tailored to each national context.
This digital offensive aligns with the alliance between Moscow and Havana in the media and technology sectors. The presence of RT as the only foreign channel broadcasting 24 hours a day on Cuban television, along with agreements in artificial intelligence and telecommunications, demonstrates a coordination that extends beyond mere information sharing.
While within its borders Russia restricts access to the internet and promotes state-controlled platforms, outside of them it supports content and actors that replicate its narrative.
In the Cuban case, this framework is complemented by legal tools such as Decree-Law 35, which penalizes dissent on social media, along with documented practices of censorship and surveillance.
The result is a hybrid model: internal control of information and external expansion of propaganda, with Cuba as one of its main allies in the region.
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