Alejandro Betancourt López embodies one of the great paradoxes of the Venezuelan transformation: the businessman who made a fortune in the shadow of chavismo has now become a relevant player in the new oil landscape driven by the administration of Donald Trump.
The so-called "bolichico" went from securing multi-million dollar contracts during the government of Hugo Chávez and being linked to international investigations for alleged money laundering—without having been formally accused of a crime—to becoming an intermediary between Washington and Caracas.
Now your company, North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), controls the operation of Venezuelan fields with estimated reserves of over 65 billion barrels.
His story raises a question that transcends Venezuela: Can entrepreneurs emerging from the system become economic operators of its transformation?
A "Delcy" and a "Betancourt"
CiberCuba has previously analyzed the strategy of «Chavismo without oil, Castrismo without GAESA»: removing from the regime the control of the economic structure that ensures its survival.
It has also been reported that Washington is exploring within the Cuban apparatus the existence of an individual capable of playing a role similar to that of Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela: someone from within the system, possessing enough internal power to facilitate a transformation without provoking a collapse of the state.
But the Venezuelan precedent raises a second issue.
If a "Cuban Delcy" might be necessary to politically manage the transition, would a "Cuban Betancourt" also be needed to handle the economic transformation?
There is no public evidence that Washington is specifically seeking that figure. It is a hypothesis that arises from observing the Venezuelan model.
Betancourt could be valuable precisely because he understands the internal structures that now need to be transformed: he has contacts, international experience, access to capital, and knowledge of the oil sector.
The Cuban equivalent could arise from the state-owned enterprise network, from former executives or "heirs of Castroism" linked to GAESA, from the private sector connected to official structures, or even from entrepreneurs in the diaspora with economic ties within the island.
It wouldn't necessarily have to be a "bolichico" in the Venezuelan sense. What matters would be their ability to act as a bridge between the old economic power and the new model.
Who is taking GAESA?
There lies the real problem.
Dismantling GAESA as an economic instrument of the military does not mean closing hotels, ports, real estate companies, businesses, financial firms, or importers.
Those assets will need to continue operating. The question is who will manage them and under what rules.
A poorly designed transition could lead to former executives, intermediaries, or individuals connected to the elite transforming their current privileged access into private ownership.
Cuba could then transition from an economy dominated by military conglomerates to one controlled by an oligarchy born from the very Castro regime.
The Betancourt paradox serves as a warning.
What for years constituted their main concern—having thrived within chavismo—may now become an advantage: they know the system, its players, and its businesses better than any foreign entrepreneur.
The other piece of the Venezuelan model
The emerging framework in Venezuela can be summarized in three elements: Delcy Rodríguez as a political operator, oil as a strategic resource, and entrepreneurs like Betancourt as economic operators of the new phase.
Hypothetically relocated to Cuba, the triangle would take on a different shape: a "Cuban Delcy", GAESA, and an still unknown economic operator.
The first would manage the political change from within. The second represents the economic power that would need to be dismantled. The third could serve as a bridge towards an economy open to private capital.
But there is an evident risk: that transforming the system may simply mean recycling some of its elites and postponing efforts for a real democratic transition.
That’s why the formula "Chavismo without oil, Castroism without GAESA" needs a second question. It’s not enough to know how to take GAESA away from the regime.
It will also be necessary to decide who takes over what is currently controlled by GAESA.
And the dizzying rise of Alejandro Betancourt in Venezuela provides a clue —and a warning— about what could happen in Cuba.
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Opinion article: Las declaraciones y opiniones expresadas en este artículo son de exclusiva responsabilidad de su autor y no representan necesariamente el punto de vista de CiberCuba.