Donald Trump once again used the Venezuelan precedent to refer to the future of the Cuban regime. In an interview granted on Friday to journalist Benny Johnson, the president stated that the situation in Cuba "will not last much longer" and made a particularly significant reference: "Look at what we did with Venezuela".
The reference inevitably points to the military operation on January 3, when U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. However, it contrasts with other statements from Trump himself and high-ranking officials in his administration, who over the past few months have fluctuated between dismissing such an intervention and keeping all options open.
The most recent contradiction occurred just four days ago. On Monday, October 26, Marco Rubio stated that Cuba is "a completely different case" from Venezuela, although he avoided explaining the differences and merely pointed out that the island needs "a very drastic change."
Now, Trump reiterates what happened in Venezuela as an example of what the United States is capable of achieving and asserts that the Cuban issue will be resolved before the end of his term.
From ruling out an intervention to keeping it on the table
Presidential statements have followed a particularly changing trajectory.
In March, Trump explicitly ruled out a military operation in Cuba. “That is not going to happen,” he responded to the Washington Examiner.
However, in June, when questioned by Axios about the possibility of replicating an operation in Cuba similar to the capture of Maduro, he responded: “Possibly. It is possible.”
A month later, during an interview with Fox News, he reiterated his differences with the Venezuelan scenario: «I don't see it being like Venezuela», although he immediately added that the United States could do it and that «it wouldn't be difficult».
Ambivalence affects other members of the Government as well. In June, the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth did not rule out a capture or elimination operation against Miguel Díaz-Canel, claiming that the Pentagon has options for different scenarios.
In September, Rubio insisted that Washington preferred a negotiated solution without the use of military force, but he also did not rule out resorting to it in the face of a national security threat.
In August, Bloomberg also reported, citing sources familiar with the U.S. strategy, that the White House had set aside the military option to focus on sanctions and economic pressure.
This series of contradictory messages allows for various interpretations. One is that they reflect real adjustments in Washington's priorities. Another, is that the uncertainty is deliberate, a way to pressure the Cuban regime without letting it know how far Trump is willing to go.
Keeping the adversary caught between the expectation of negotiations and the fear of a military operation can also be part of a coercive strategy. However, there is no public evidence to definitively attribute that intention to the presidential statements.
The Venezuelan precedent goes beyond the military threat
The comparison takes on another dimension when examining how Maduro's capture occurred.
The operation on January 3 was preceded by years of investigations, criminal accusations, sanctions, negotiations, and intelligence operations.
Since 2020, Maduro has faced federal charges in the United States for narcoterrorism and drug trafficking-related offenses. In August 2025, Washington
In the Cuban case, pressure instruments that are comparable are beginning to be observed, although with significant legal and political differences.
The U.S. Department of Justice filed a federal indictment against Raúl Castro and five former military personnel for the downing of two planes from Brothers to the Rescue in 1996. On October 16, a judge in Florida signed a state arrest warrant for the former Cuban leader, which was publicly announced three days later.
These actions are accompanied by new sanctions against entities and individuals connected to Cuban power, in addition to the intensification of U.S. intelligence activities. However, no reward for Raúl Castro has been announced that matches the one offered for Maduro, nor do the charges against both correspond to the same crimes.
The CIA, led by John Ratcliffe, plays a prominent role in this strategy. According to investigations published by CBS News and reported by CiberCuba, Ratcliffe brought a participant in the operation against Maduro to Havana during his meetings with high-ranking Cuban officials in May.
More recently, the agency and Rubio himself publicly called on Cubans to collaborate discreetly with U.S. intelligence services.
Havana has not overlooked the precedent either. In September, the head of Personal Security for the regime publicly stated how their forces would respond if the United States attempted to capture or eliminate any of their top leaders. And on October 21, Chancellor Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla avoided answering directly when a journalist from Associated Press asked him whether the arrest warrant against Raúl Castro could lead to a scenario similar to that in Venezuela.
Trump's new statements come, therefore, after a series of measures that go beyond verbal threats, although none demonstrate that there is a decision to carry out a capture operation in Cuba.
The question is whether the president is anticipating a change in strategy or deliberately invoking the memory of Maduro to increase pressure on a Cuban leadership that is well aware of the consequences of that operation: 32 members of his forces died trying to protect the Venezuelan leader.
For now, Trump has still not revealed how he plans to achieve the outcome he is announcing for Cuba. However, he also does not seem interested in clarifying whether he is willing to repeat what happened in Caracas.
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