In May 2025, the Cuban regime promised that power outages during the summer would not exceed four hours daily per customer.
The statement made by the First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM), Argelio Jesús Abad Vigoa, was published on May 21 in Granma, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba. The intention was clear: to alleviate social discontent on the eve of the hottest period of the year.
According to that promise, the plan aimed to increase generation by 13 GWh daily, restore key thermal units —such as Felton 2, Mariel 7, Nuevitas 4, and Renté 4— and manage the growth of consumption.
Despite the fact that official data already indicated that the available generation would be insufficient (1,120 MW compared to a demand exceeding 3,000 MW even in the early morning), the narrative of a "summer with only four hours of blackout" was maintained.
However, the population was already experiencing daily blackouts that often lasted over 12 hours, affecting food preparation, damaging appliances, and forcing many families to sleep outside to escape the heat.
That, not including the total collapses of the National Electric System (SEN) and the imbalance between provinces, which affected the majority of Cubans, except for those in Havana, with daily blackouts of much longer duration.
The lack of liquefied gas has pushed thousands of households to use electric stoves, further exacerbating peak demand when electricity returned, according to the official narrative. The reality is that thousands of Cuban families have been compelled to use charcoal for cooking food due to the absence of electricity and liquefied gas.
May (second half): The regime contradicts itself before completing a month
On May 27, just six days after the promise, the government began to tone down its rhetoric.
The official newspaper Trabajadores published a note acknowledging that blackouts would continue during the months of July and August, due to a structural deficit that could not be corrected in time.
Lázaro Guerra Hernández, director of Electricity at MINEM, explained that the estimated availability would be just 1,935 MW compared to a potential demand of 3,500 MW. The deficit would exceed 1,500 MW, making it unavoidable that the blackouts would be more extensive than initially announced.
That early admission hinted that the promise of "four hours a day" was unsustainable from the start. Nevertheless, for weeks, the official discourse continued to speak of "improvements," "gradual strategies," and "intensive work."
Julio: The government acknowledges the failure
On July 19, during a plenary session of the National Assembly of People's Power, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, publicly confirmed what was already evident to millions of Cubans: the goal of reducing blackouts in the summer had not been met.
“We will return to the levels of impact prior to the shutdown of the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant,” he stated. The plant, which had recently been synchronized to the SEN, had created expectations that quickly faded.
The minister justified the failure to meet obligations by citing a shortage of fuel, high international costs, and accumulated technical problems. However, he did not provide specific dates for a potential recovery nor accepted any responsibility for the broken promises.
In June, power outages of up to 20 hours a day were reported in some areas. “I know that yesterday many families here endured more than 20 hours without power... but we won’t give up,” said the leader Miguel Díaz-Canel at the end of that month during a visit to the municipalities of Granma and Camagüey.
In mid-July, the average dropped to 11, according to official figures. However, in practice, the multiple daily outages, nighttime blackouts, and evident lack of planning continued to impact the quality of life for millions.
August: No structural solution in sight
By early August, the situation remained largely unchanged. Some plants like Guiteras, Felton 1, or Carlos Manuel de Céspedes (Cienfuegos) were operational, but others were still out of service or required urgent maintenance.
Thermal generation remained below the required levels, distributed generation had not yet met its objectives, and solar parks—although growing—did not provide enough stability to support the system.
Meanwhile, the regime insisted on communication strategies that called for "popular understanding" and promoted saving, without mentioning accountability mechanisms or deep-rooted solutions.
The "gradual recovery strategy" that the regime has been announcing since August 2022 was fading away without providing any real relief to a crisis that experts consider insurmountable without a significant influx of public investment.
Where is the money to fix the crisis? GAESA and the 18 billion in the shadows
Amid this prolonged crisis, public outrage is growing over the use of the country's resources.
Various journalistic investigations and leaked documents have revealed that the military conglomerate GAESA —Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.— controls over 18 billion dollars, resources that are not being invested in energy infrastructure or in relief for the population.
With that money, 12 modern 500 MW combined cycle plants could be constructed, which would more than adequately meet the country's electricity demand. Alternatively, it could finance the purchase of enough fuel to ensure over 15 years of generation at the current rate.
With just a fraction of those funds —about 250 million annually— it would be possible to stabilize the electrical grid and drastically reduce blackouts, as stated by the commander and Deputy Prime Minister Ramiro Valdés Menéndez in October 2021.
But the money is immobilized or allocated for other purposes. In February 2025, while Cubans endured prolonged daily blackouts, the regime inaugurated the K23 Tower in Havana, a luxury hotel financed by GAESA that consumes nearly 2 MW continuously. Its cost, estimated between 226 and 565 million dollars, could have funded the repair of several thermoelectric plants.
Economists like Pavel Vidal have denounced that GAESA operates as a parallel central bank, receiving state funding but not paying taxes, does not provide accountability and acts outside of civilian control. Instead of investing in energy, health, or food, its funds are allocated to mega tourism projects that have no real impact on the lives of ordinary citizens.
A political blackout, not just an electrical one
The timeline makes it clear: the regime made a promise on May 21, began to backtrack on the 27th, and acknowledged its failure on July 19. This is not just a technical crisis, but a structural collapse worsened by political decisions that prioritize the interests of the military and tourism apparatus over social well-being.
As long as there is hidden capital without control or redistribution, blackouts will not only be an energy problem. They will also be a symptom of a policy that dims the hope of the Cuban people every day.
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