Ukrainian attacks on refineries, terminals, and fuel depots in Russian territory are reducing the energy surplus that Moscow could allocate to Cuba, whose economy relies on regular imports of oil and its derivatives to sustain electricity generation, transportation, and agriculture.
Kiev's long-range campaign reached an unprecedented scale in 2026, and has already forced several of the largest Russian refineries to suspend their operations, either totally or partially.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) documented in July attacks against facilities such as the Ilsky, Saratov, and Syzran refineries, as well as the Ust-Luga terminal, one of the main Russian complexes for processing and exporting hydrocarbons.
In Saratov, a drone damaged the only primary refining unit of the plant, leading to the suspension of its operations. The facility had already halted production earlier due to attacks that occurred in March and May.
The Syzran refinery, located about 800 kilometers from the front, has the capacity to process approximately 8.5 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, and other derivatives used by Russian forces, according to the ISW.
Russia acknowledges the supply issues
The cumulative impact of the attacks forced the Russian government itself to acknowledge difficulties in supply.
The Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Novak admitted that some refineries had partially halted their production as a result of Ukrainian drones and described the situation at the gas stations as complex.
In July, Russia temporarily banned diesel exports to increase availability within the country and announced it would begin importing fuel.
The measure came after drivers from various regions faced long lines and difficulties in obtaining gasoline and diesel. Moscow also resorted to federal reserves and deliveries from Belarus to alleviate the shortage.
Russian marine exports of diesel and gas oil fell in June to around 1.8 million tons, a decrease of 39% compared to May and 46% below the volume recorded in June 2025.
Between July 1 and 8, shipments averaged about 214,000 barrels per day, compared to the 793,000 barrels per day exported on average during July of the previous year, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters.
The Russian government later extended the restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports until January 2027, although it maintained exceptions for certain producers, intergovernmental agreements, and shipments classified as humanitarian aid.
These exceptions leave open the possibility of occasional shipments to Cuba, but do not guarantee a regular or sufficient supply.
Cuba is at the bottom of Russia's priorities
The crisis forces the Kremlin to decide how to distribute a smaller quantity of refined fuels.
First and foremost are the needs of the Russian Armed Forces and wartime logistics. Following that are the domestic market, agriculture, transportation, and the occupied regions of Ukraine.
Subsidized shipments or those granted to political allies such as Cuba are subordinated to these priorities, especially since Havana has a very limited capacity to pay for shipments at market prices.
The situation presents an additional problem for the island, which requires between 90,000 and 110,000 barrels of oil and derivatives daily, but produces about 40,000 barrels of a heavy crude that does not meet the needs of the economy or the thermal power plants on its own.
Cuba's dependency on Russia increased after the interruption of supplies from Venezuela and the suspension of deliveries from Mexico.
The Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, admitted that the country would need around eight fuel ships per month to meet its basic requirements. He also acknowledged that Cuba distributes about 800 tons of diesel daily, approximately half of the 1,600 tons required for normal operations.
The Russian shipment that barely lasted for a few days
At the end of March, the Russian tanker Anatoly Kolodkin unloaded about 100,000 tons of crude oil in Matanzas, equivalent to approximately 700,000 or 730,000 barrels.
Although it was a considerable load, it represented less than ten days of Cuba's total needs.
Cuba was supposed to process that oil to obtain fuel oil intended for electricity generation, as well as diesel, gasoline, and other derivatives. This operation takes time and depends on Cuban refineries that suffer from technological deterioration, lack of maintenance, and frequent interruptions.
For that reason, for Havana, receiving unprocessed crude oil is not equivalent to receiving diesel, gasoline, or fuel directly for power plants.
The reduction of Russian oil product production is particularly detrimental as it restricts the fuels that Cuba can use most immediately.
The attacks do not eliminate all Russian oil
Attacks on refineries do not necessarily mean that Russia will stop extracting the same amount of crude oil.
When a refinery shuts down, some of the oil that can no longer be processed could, in theory, become available for export. However, this possibility has significant limitations.
Ukraine has also attacked maritime terminals, storage facilities, pumping stations, tank trains, and ships used to transport oil and its derivatives. The ISW reported in July that Ukrainian forces had struck dozens of vessels used by Russia in the Sea of Azov to transport fuel and evade sanctions.
When refineries and export routes are damaged simultaneously, storage facilities can fill up, and oil companies are forced to temporarily reduce extraction.
Additionally, shipping crude from Russia to Cuba requires long journeys, vessels willing to take on the risk, insurance, payment mechanisms, and access to ports under international scrutiny.
The Western pressure on the so-called Russian phantom fleet adds another complication. CiberCuba reported in June about the interception by the United Kingdom of the tanker Smyrtos, as part of a European offensive against the vessels used by Moscow to circumvent sanctions.
An indirect but growing threat to Cuba
There is currently no public evidence to attribute the cancellation of a specific shipment destined for Cuba to a specific attack from Ukraine.
The relationship is broader and cumulative: less refining capacity means less gasoline and diesel available; the shortage forces Russia to restrict exports; and those restrictions reduce the margin for assisting an ally that cannot regularly pay for its imports.
Moscow can still order exceptional shipments to Cuba for political and strategic reasons. The Russian ambassador in Havana, Víktor Koronelli, assured that his country would maintain oil assistance, although he also requested that other allied governments join the effort.
But Ukrainian attacks, sanctions against tankers, Russian budgetary difficulties, and the priority given to the domestic market are making these shipments increasingly costly and uncertain operations.
For Cuba, the result is a dependence on occasional shipments that are insufficient to ensure the stability of the electric system.
As long as Ukraine maintains pressure on Russia's refineries and oil routes, Moscow will have less capacity to translate its political support for the Cuban regime into a consistent energy supply.
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