Nicolás Maduro was warned that the United States might come for him. He didn't believe it, and six days later U.S. forces entered Caracas and captured him along with Cilia Flores.
Eight months later, the signals coming from Havana indicate that the Cuban regime does not want to make the same mistake.
The leadership would have strengthened the protection of Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel, and the head of Personal Security has just publicly raised what would happen if someone attempted to "kidnap or assassinate" one of the key leaders.
But Venezuela left another lesson for Havana: The United States not only managed to remove Maduro from power, but also found within Chavism itself a figure, Delcy Rodríguez, to manage the day after.
The administration of Donald Trump would be trying to identify a similar interlocutor within the Cuban regime. However, its own intelligence agencies would have warned that finding a "Cuban Delcy" will be considerably more difficult.
Maduro received a warning and ignored it
An intelligence report cited by Infobae revealed that Vladimir Padrino López warned Maduro on December 28, 2025, about the possibility of a U.S. military operation.
The then Minister of Defense recommended suspending Christmas leave, reinforcing military units, and increasing operational activity.
Maduro dismissed the warning. According to the report, intermediaries with contacts in the United States had assured him that Washington would not take military action against him or his family.
On January 3, U.S. forces executed the operation that resulted in his capture. During the action, 32 Cubans associated with the military and security apparatus deployed by Havana in Venezuela were killed.
Havana seems to have taken note
In August, an investigation by The New York Times, based on U.S. officials, reported that Cuba had strengthened the security of Raúl Castro and Díaz-Canel to complicate any potential operation aimed at capturing or killing them.
The possibility has not been publicly ruled out by Washington either.
In June, the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, was directly questioned about a capture or elimination operation against Díaz-Canel similar to the one carried out against Maduro.
Hegseth responded that the United States had "options for all scenarios" and assured that "all those options are on the table", although he left the eventual decision in Trump's hands.
There is no public information that the U.S. president has ordered an operation against the Cuban leadership. However, Havana seems to have factored that possibility into its calculations.
This weekend, Brigadier General Emir Mesa Corona, head of the Personal Security Directorate, recalled the 32 dead in Venezuela and asked what the FAR, the MININT, Military Counterintelligence, and "every revolutionary Cuban" would do if they attempted to "kidnap or assassinate" one of the main leaders.
Raúl Castro also called for the blood of those who died in Venezuela to "never be forgotten" and for their example to become "the guideline to follow" for Personal Security.
The men who died during the operation that could not prevent the capture of Maduro are thus turned into a model of resistance for those who would have to prevent a similar scenario in Cuba.
The other lesson from Venezuela: finding a Delcy
The U.S. operation did not end with the capture of Maduro.
Delcy Rodríguez assumed the interim presidency and became the figure within the Chavista apparatus through which Washington could manage the new phase.
According to reports collected by CiberCuba, the Trump administration has asked intelligence agencies to identify current or former officials within the Cuban regime who could serve as pragmatic interlocutors in a potential transition process.
The model would be precisely Delcy Rodríguez.
However, intelligence agencies reportedly warned the Trump administration that replicating that model in Cuba would be much more difficult.
The Cuban structure is considered to be more closed, rigid, and cohesive than the Venezuelan one, and U.S. agencies have yet to identify a figure that clearly meets the conditions to fulfill that role.
The difficulty is crucial: removing a leader from the board is only part of the problem. Washington would need to know who can keep the institutions functioning, control the military and security apparatus, and lead a transition without creating a power vacuum.
Óscar Pérez-Oliva and other names under scrutiny
Among the names that have appeared in reports and analyses concerning a hypothetical "Cuban Delcy" is Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.
CiberCuba pointed out since January its profile as a figure to watch in the event of a potential transition. Its rapid rise, family ties to the Castros, and economic profile have placed it under special scrutiny.
However, subsequent reports pointed to a paradox: Havana would be positioning Pérez-Oliva as a potential successor, while Washington would have reservations about his suitability, precisely because of his close ties to the Castro power structure.
The names of the Minister of the Interior, Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas, and Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, "El Cangrejo", grandson and trusted man of Raúl Castro, have also emerged.
Both held contacts with the CIA director, John Ratcliffe, during his visit to Havana in May. However, there are no public elements that allow us to affirm that Washington has selected either of them as a candidate to lead a transition.
The dissemination of these names can also have a particularly uncomfortable effect on a system built around loyalty: fueling suspicions within the upper echelons about who might be willing to negotiate with Washington when the time comes.
Two lessons that Havana does not want to forget
The Venezuelan experience thus presents two different challenges for the Cuban regime.
The first is external: to prevent the United States from repeating an operation aimed at capturing one of its leaders.
The second is internal: to prevent Washington from finding within the system a figure capable of taking on the role that Delcy Rodríguez assumed after Maduro's fall.
The signs from recent months indicate that Havana is paying attention to both.
Raúl and Díaz-Canel would have greater protection; Personal Security proclaims its readiness to fight; the 32 dead in Venezuela are turned into an example; and Díaz-Canel has warned of a possible military action and promised resistance “to the last drop of blood.”
At the same time, reports about the U.S. search for a "Cuban Delcy" bring into focus the movements within the elite itself.
Maduro received a warning and decided that the United States would not dare.
Havana seems to have drawn a different conclusion: the Venezuelan precedent already exists, and the danger does not lie solely in who may enter from the outside, but also in who is willing to negotiate from within.
Related videos:
Filed under: