Carlos Manuel Rodríguez Arechavaleta, a researcher at the Ibero-American University of Mexico and a doctor in Political Science specializing in transition processes in Latin America, presented in a live program with CiberCuba the five possible scenarios for the political future of the island.
The analysis is based on an article about the scenarios the country faces. It was written in early 2026, but it has become particularly relevant now that Cuba is experiencing its worst economic crisis in decades and has seen five consecutive nights of protests.
"The issue of transition is a complex one. Transitions are processes where the fundamental factor is high uncertainty," he stated.
The first scenario is reinforced authoritarian continuity: political and military elites maintain cohesion, the State applies selective repression, and economic reforms are minimal.
Rodríguez considers it increasingly less viable: "The first scenario that I saw, which seems more difficult each day but has predominated until now, is one of reinforced authoritarian continuity."
The second scenario —and the one the professor considers most likely in the current context— is that of negotiated partial reforms, which he prefers to refer to as "transaction" rather than transition. It involves controlled economic liberalization, limited opening, and flexibility in civil rights, without immediate political democratization.
"This would be roughly what Venezuela has now," he pointed out, warning that GAESA controls 70% of the dollarized Cuban economy and that the agreement could preferentially benefit large American and Cuban-American capital over local entrepreneurs.
This scenario gains momentum in light of reports of secret negotiations between the Trump administration and associates of the Castros, specifically Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of Raúl Castro, bypassing Díaz-Canel. The agreement would involve control of ports, energy, and tourism, as well as the negotiated exit of the current Cuban president.
The third scenario is the authoritarian rupture and social crisis: protests that escalate under extreme survival conditions. In this scenario, the regime avoids mass repression because "the cost of repression is increasing. A crackdown could trigger a large-scale response across multiple provinces," in line with what happened after July 11.
The Cuban streets are already reflecting that tension: shouts of 'Down with the Revolution and the dictatorship!' can be heard during street protests as demonstrations increase due to daily blackouts lasting more than 20 hours.
The fourth scenario is a total collapse and radical reconfiguration: disintegration of central power, territorial fragmentation, and social chaos comparable to the Haitian case.
Rodríguez acknowledges that, although he initially viewed it as unlikely, his colleagues consider it entirely feasible if the crisis continues. The collapse of the thermal power plant Antonio Guiteras on March 5, which left 68% of the island without electricity, fuels that possibility.
The fifth scenario is the democratic transition, "the one we have all dreamed of," according to the very academic, but the least likely in the short term, because it not only requires the erosion of the regime, but also credible political alternatives and a call for plural elections.
"Without opposition, there is no transition. A project cannot monopolize the situation," he emphasized, adding that "the core of the transition is the call for plural, participatory, and inclusive elections. That is the first step of the political transition. Until we achieve that, there is no political transition in Cuba."
In this regard, figures such as Rosa María Payá are working on a common roadmap for democratic transition, while the debate over negotiations generates controversy within the Cuban exile community about whether an agreement with the Castros would betray that objective.
About Miguel Díaz-Canel, the professor was emphatic. "He will not be a significant figure in the Cuban change. We will have this Cuban change this year, we will have it before summer, we will have it already."
Coinciding analyses suggest that Trump pressures for a shift in Havana and that Díaz-Canel could fall before 2027. Rodríguez concluded with a statement that encapsulates his reading of the moment: "I am absolutely convinced that this is a great moment for change in Cuba and that it should be seized."
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