Can Cuba dismantle a political system that has been in place for nearly seven decades without relying, at least during the initial phase, on some of the individuals and institutions that currently uphold it?
The question addresses one of the most sensitive proposals from the recent Harvard Working Group Report on the Future of Cuba, which was created after six months of collaboration among scholars, economists, activists, and specialists convened by the Cuba Studies Program and the Afro-Latin American Research Institute at Harvard University.
After describing a country plagued by a deep economic, demographic, energy, health, and political crisis, the document asserts that there is no way out without immediate political changes and the establishment of a transitional government perceived as legitimate.
But it introduces a fundamental premise: the process would not necessarily begin after the complete disappearance of the current power apparatus.
«The Cuban authorities must take the lead in this process and become facilitators», states the report, which makes it clear that it refers to a solution through peaceful means.
The authors acknowledge that this premise is not shared by all political actors in Cuba and the diaspora. Their position, however, is that resolving the crisis requires the participation of everyone, including the current authorities.
A matter that is already on the table
The proposal comes at a particularly sensitive time. In 2026, the prospect of a transition moved beyond being solely the domain of the opposition and academic studies to also enter the debate on Washington's strategy towards Havana.
CiberCuba reported in August that the administration of Donald Trump would be exploring a strategy that would allow to seek interlocutors within the Cuban system itself to manage a potential transition, a formula described as a transformation of the regime rather than an instant demolition.
Another piece of information published by this outlet, based on a report from Bloomberg, indicated that Washington is trying to understand where real power lies in Cuba beyond Miguel Díaz-Canel, with particular focus on the Castro family, the Armed Forces, the structure of the Communist Party, and other sectors of the ruling elite.
The existence of contacts between both governments is no longer just a narrative coming from Washington. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Fernández de Cossío publicly acknowledged that Havana accepted a communication channel proposed by the United States, although he avoided defining those contacts as negotiations.
The issue lies in determining how far the regime would be willing to go. In February, Fernández de Cossío had publicly outlined his red lines: dialogue with Washington yes, but without bringing the Constitution, the socialist economy, or the system of government to the table.
Harvard proposes something very different from maintaining the status quo
The participation of the current authorities that the Working Group includes, however, does not equate to preserving the system intact.
The proposed roadmap begins with measures that would alter fundamental pillars of the repressive model: a general and unconditional amnesty for political prisoners, the decriminalization of forms of protest and expression, the repeal of decrees 349, 370, and 35, and the elimination of extralegal mechanisms such as travel restrictions imposed on those referred to as "regulated."
The report demands that every Cuban be able to leave and return to the country freely and suggests that these initial decisions should serve as unequivocal signs of the beginning of a rule of law.
Washington should respond, according to the authors, in a manner that is "immediate, positive, and forceful," starting with the removal of sanctions that impact fuel supply and providing initial resources to stabilize the economy and promote reforms.
The final stage does not involve a cosmetic reform of the current system either. In the medium and long term, the document proposes a new Constituent Assembly, a democratic and plural system, and a social market economy that recognizes different forms of property, including private ownership.
The dilemma: who will govern Cuba while Cuba changes?
The approach connects with a problem that CiberCuba recently analyzed in a study on the different roadmaps designed by independent civil society: between the fall of a regime and the birth of a democracy, there is a period where someone must keep the State functioning.
Hospitals, electricity, water, courts, public security, ports, airports, schools, territorial administration, and food distribution cannot be suspended while a new political system is being built.
Proposals examined by CiberCuba, such as the Fundamental Transition Law of the Republic of Cuba promoted by the Cuban American Bar Association, stem precisely from the need to temporarily preserve the laws and institutions that are not incompatible with democratic principles to prevent an institutional vacuum.
The Liberation Agreement promoted by opposition organizations proposes a different framework: a provisional government tasked with addressing the humanitarian emergency, ensuring fundamental rights, releasing political prisoners, maintaining the country's operations, and preparing for free and multi-party elections.
The proposals differ, therefore, on who would have the legitimacy to lead that period, but they converge on a practical problem: a transition does not end when the political leadership changes; it precisely begins then.
The paradox created by the very repression
The Harvard report also identifies a particularly grave obstacle to any negotiated formula: for years, the regime has dismantled many of the potential interlocutors it would now need for a transition.
Prison, harassment, and exile have dismantled independent movements, reduced spaces for organization, and driven numerous activists, intellectuals, and professionals out of the country.
«The emptying of the island is not just demographic», warns the document.
The result, according to its authors, is a country with a weakened independent civil society and an insufficiently organized opposition, precisely when it might need actors capable of negotiating and taking on institutional responsibilities.
This issue has also been highlighted in previous analyses by CiberCuba. A study published in August found numerous roadmaps, constitutional projects, and sector plans devised by independent organizations, but it noted the existing fragmentation between that technical knowledge and the political capacity needed to assume power during a transition.
Who really has the power to negotiate?
There is still another difficulty: determining who effectively represents the Cuban power.
The report questions the "extreme opacity" of the conversations between representatives of Cuba and the United States and mentions the presence of individuals who appear as interlocutors for the nation without having clearly defined government roles.
Among them, it explicitly mentions Colonel Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of Raúl Castro, noting that he holds no known official position and linking him to the military conglomerate GAESA.
For the Working Group, GAESA functions as a “State within the State,” controlling fundamental sectors of the economy and managing financial flows outside the ordinary institutional controls.
The matter is not trivial. If the actual power does not completely align with the positions formally established by the Constitution, any potential negotiation would first need to address who can truly commit the Cuban political, military, and economic apparatus.
Two different concepts of transition
The debate ultimately reveals two issues that are often conflated.
One is to define the destination: free elections, political pluralism, fundamental rights, and a democratic state. Another, much more complicated, is to determine how to get there without causing a power vacuum, an institutional crisis, or a prolongation of the regime under another guise.
The Cuban opposition has progressed during 2026 in its own response. Organizations united around the Liberation Agreement have proposed a sequence of liberation, stabilization, reconstruction, and democratization, with a provisional government serving as a bridge to free elections.
The Harvard Working Group now introduces another element into that discussion: it argues that those currently in positions of authority in Cuba should initiate and facilitate the process, even though the final outcome they propose is precisely to replace the existing political system with a democratic and plural one.
The question is whether, within a structure built over decades to prevent alternation, there are actors willing to facilitate their own transformation.
The Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently summarized that same dilemma from a different perspective. Washington, he stated, is willing to engage in dialogue, but those currently in power must decide if they truly want to move toward a different future for Cuba. His assessment so far has been negative: «at this moment they do not want to do so».
The Harvard report itself admits that reaching a consensus among the government, the United States, the opposition, civil society, the diaspora, and the international community will be extraordinarily difficult.
But your proposal places a concrete issue at the center of the debate about the day after: perhaps the question is not only who will replace the current Cuban power, but also which parts of the existing structures will be necessary to make possible, without chaos or violence, the transition to the system that must replace it.
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