On April 24, 2026, a young Cuban who identifies on Instagram as El Sensei 2002 posted a video seemingly recorded from an airplane.
I can leave but I will always return, he wrote on the social media alongside a Cuban flag and a heart.
In his profile, he presents himself as hailing from Cienfuegos and states that he was born on February 19, 2002. Therefore, he was 24 years old when he began the sequence of posts now analyzed by CiberCuba.
The following day, April 25, their account published another video titled "Cubans in Moscow: The Sad Reality." The images show a group of people in reflective vests clearing snow from a street, while voices with a distinct Cuban accent can be heard.
Less than seven weeks later, the scenario was radically different.
On June 10, 46 days after that post made in Moscow, the young man appeared on Instagram dressed in a military uniform, helmet, and tactical gear, carrying a long gun and ammunition, with a Russian flag on his clothing. Apparently, the young man was already training in the Russian army and was demonstrating shooting exercises with a machine gun (caliber 7.62 × 54 mm R) and grenade throwing.
The publication also included the Russian tag #сво, an acronym used by Moscow to officially refer to the invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation."
It is the first record found by CiberCuba in which the young man is unmistakably presented as a Russian fighter.
It wouldn't be the last.
A war narrated on Instagram
The later publications allow for the reconstruction of a sort of public diary of his military experience.
On June 12, he was seen again armed with a Kalashnikov-type rifle in a wooded area, accompanied by another person with a military appearance.
One of his followers warned him in the comments about the danger of using mobile phones due to the possibility of being tracked by drones. «Yeah, bro, we have to be careful», he replied.
A week later, on June 19th, he posted new images wearing a uniform and Russian symbols. His attire featured a circular patch inscribed with «Победа будет за нами», which translates to «The victory will be ours», a well-known patriotic and military slogan in Russia.
In July, his speech became even more explicit.
For many, this is madness; for me, it's simply an adrenaline rush, he wrote in Russian in a post from July 13, once again accompanied by tags related to the so-called "special military operation" and Cubans in Russia.
During August, he continued to be seen with military equipment. On the 23rd, he appeared wearing a helmet, protective glasses, camouflage, and carrying a machete, accompanied by the phrase: "Jealousy is for the insecure; I have a rifle and a machete."
On September 3, he displayed another patch featuring the Russian expression «Играю за нал», which can colloquially be interpreted as "I play for cash" or "I'm doing it for money". The design depicts a caricatured soldier and banknotes.
The patch does not show what the conditions of his eventual contract are nor does it allow us to conclude that money is his only motivation. However, it is part of the image he willingly projects on his social media.
The sequence extends to September and shows a continuous presence in a military environment, rather than an isolated photograph in uniform.
CiberCuba has been unable to independently determine to which unit it belongs, the conditions under which it was incorporated into the Russian forces, or the exact location where the images were recorded.
"Sometimes there aren't many options."
The clearest explanation of his motivations is provided by the young man himself in a video published on September 7.
Dressed again in military uniform, he speaks directly to the camera and presents the risk he has taken as a personal decision related to the well-being of his family.
"I will never blame God if He puts me to climb a mountain, do you know why? Because I was the one who asked to be at the top. And not for myself, but for the well-being of my family, seriously", he asserts.
Then he pronounces a particularly revealing phrase: «Sometimes there aren't many options, and one has to go for the first one available, even if it's the riskiest of all».
"Remember that Juan's luck is not the same as Pedro's," he concludes.
His words paint a different picture than that described by Cubans who have reported arriving in Russia lured by false job offers and later discovering they would be sent to war.
In the story that El Sensei 2002 has chosen to share publicly, risk is not hidden or rejected, but rather embraced as the price of an opportunity to enhance the welfare of his family.
This does not allow us to know how he was recruited, what was promised to him, how much money he receives, or what conditions are included in his potential contract. It also does not rule out any abuses that may occur after his incorporation.
But in the publications reviewed by CiberCuba, there are no reports of deception, coercion, regret, or desires to abandon the Russian forces.
On the contrary, for months the young man has flaunted Russian weapons and symbols, has used Moscow's terminology to refer to the war, has spoken of the "enemy" and drones, and has presented the experience as a source of adrenaline.
His own statement adds an important nuance: he believes he made a decision, but also acknowledges that he saw few alternatives.
From 17 detainees to a war that has not ended for Cubans
The journalistic interest of the story goes beyond the protagonist.
Its timeline provides recent evidence that citizens from Cuba continue to join Russian forces in 2026, nearly three years after the regime claimed to have taken action to stop precisely that phenomenon.
In September 2023, after reports began to multiply regarding Cubans being recruited by Russia, the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) claimed to have uncovered a human trafficking network operating between Russia and Cuba.
The authorities then announced the arrest of 17 individuals.
According to the official version, one of them acted as an "internal organizer," assisted by two others residing in Cuba. The recruiters were looking for individuals interested in traveling to Russia, sending their information, and the tickets were managed from that country.
The authorities themselves acknowledged that some participants had voluntarily joined due to financial incentives and the possibility of obtaining residency in Russia.
The Prosecutor's Office then warned that the actions could constitute mercenarism offenses and that those responsible would face severe penalties.
Months later, however, it was revealed that some of the detainees had been released.
Since then, the Cuban government has not publicly provided a transparent account that reveals what happened to all the accused, how many were ultimately tried and convicted, or which recruitment structures were effectively dismantled.
Havana claims it has taken measures
In June 2025, the Vice Chancellor Carlos Fernández de Cossío reiterated the Cuban government's disassociation from any responsibility in recruitment.
The official emphasized that Havana had made the phenomenon public and denounced it, had taken measures and even spoken with other governments. He also attributed the recruitment operations to external networks and reminded that Cuban laws prohibit citizens under the jurisdiction of the Island from participating in foreign wars.
The case now reconstructed by CiberCuba does not demonstrate that the Cuban authorities organized the recruitment of this young man, that they were aware of the purpose of his trip, or that they consciously facilitated his incorporation into the Russian forces.
But it puts the effectiveness of those measures in a new light.
On April 24, 2026, the young man published a video related to his departure from Cuba. The next day, he made a post from Moscow. By June 10, he was already seen armed and equipped with Russian symbols.
More than a thousand Cubans identified
The case does not appear in a vacuum either.
In May 2025, CiberCuba analyzed a dossier released by the Ukrainian project I Want to Live that contained information about 1,028 Cuban citizens recruited by Russian forces, including names, ages, documents, and dates of enlistment.
Subsequent investigations continued to uncover cases of Cubans who were killed, missing, or captured in Ukraine.
Another analysis by CiberCuba also found a striking temporal coincidence between the peak recruitment periods of Cubans and the increase in flight connections, diplomatic exchanges, and agreements between Moscow and Havana.
The case of El Sensei 2002 has an additional peculiarity: its release took place in 2026, when direct flight connections between Cuba and Russia were experiencing significant suspensions due to the aviation fuel crisis on the Island.
CiberCuba has not been able to determine what route was taken to reach Russia.
Mercenaries, deceived and a border that is not always straightforward
The known stories of Cubans in the Russian forces do not follow a single pattern.
There are testimonies from people who claim to have traveled under false job offers and ended up in military facilities. Other Cubans have acknowledged having voluntarily joined, lured by salaries, residency, or Russian citizenship.
Even the Cuban authorities admitted in 2023 that among those recruited were individuals who had voluntarily accepted the offers.
Everything observed so far in the profile of El Sensei 2002 appears more compatible with a consciously made decision than with the image of someone who suddenly discovers they have been sent to war.
But her words also reveal another reality.
«Sometimes there aren't many options», he says before explaining that he decided to go for the first one available, even if it was «the riskiest of all».
For a 24-year-old Cuban, a war thousands of kilometers away from his country seems to have become an acceptable alternative to try to ensure his family's well-being.
Economic hardship and lack of opportunities can help explain a decision of that nature. They do not eliminate the individual responsibility of someone who voluntarily chooses to participate in a war nor do they automatically turn that decision into human trafficking.
In the analyzed publications, the conflict appears almost stripped of political content. There are no visible reflections on Ukraine, the reasons for the invasion, or its human consequences.
There are family, weapons, money, risk, adrenaline, religion, and survival.
Cubans continue to arrive, and Havana still hasn't provided any figures
Despite the scale reached by the phenomenon, the Cuban regime has not provided a public account of how many citizens from the Island have ended up in Russian forces, how many remain there, how many have died, how many are missing or imprisoned, and what assistance their families receive.
Other countries affected by Russian recruitment have adopted more visible public measures.
Kenia has acknowledged the existence of hundreds of recruited citizens, driven repatriations, and investigated agencies linked to the phenomenon. Peru has made efforts with Moscow and has provided information about the citizens involved.
The Cuban response, in contrast, remains marked by opacity.
Havana announced 17 arrests in 2023 and later maintained that it had taken measures. However, it has not publicly presented results that can demonstrate the problem has been controlled.
The digital biography of El Sensei 2002 does not, by itself, demonstrate the existence of a new recruitment network within Cuba.
Demonstrate something more concrete: in 2026 new Cubans continue to appear in the forces that Russia uses in its war against Ukraine.
A young man who on April 24 posted about his departure from Cuba appeared weeks later armed and in uniform with Russian symbols. In September, he continued to display that lifestyle publicly and explained that he had taken the risk "for the well-being of my family".
Nearly three years after the Cuban regime announced that it had taken action against networks that were sending citizens from the Island to the war in Russia, one question remains unanswered:
What is Havana really doing to prevent more Cubans from following the same path?
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