On April 24, 2026, a young Cuban who identifies on Instagram as El Sensei 2002 published a video apparently recorded from an airplane. “I can leave but I will always return,” he wrote on the social network along with a Cuban flag and a heart.
In his profile, he presents himself as originating from Cienfuegos and states that he was born on February 19, 2002. Therefore, he was 24 years old when he began the sequence of posts now being analyzed by CiberCuba.
The next day, on April 25, their account published another video titled "Cubans in Moscow: the sad reality." The images show a group of people in reflective vests clearing snow from a street, while voices with a distinct Cuban accent can be heard.
Less than seven weeks later, the scenario was radically different.
On June 10, 46 days after that post made in Moscow, the young man appeared on Instagram dressed in military uniform, helmet, and tactical gear, carrying a long gun and ammunition, with a Russian flag featured on his attire. Apparently, the young man was already training in the Russian army and was demonstrating shooting exercises with a machine gun (caliber 7.62 × 54 mm R) and grenade throwing.
The post also included the Russian tag #сво, an acronym used by Moscow to officially refer to the invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation."
It is the first record found by CiberCuba in which the young man is clearly identified as a Russian combatant.
It wouldn't be the last.
A war told on Instagram
The subsequent publications allow for the reconstruction of a sort of public diary of his military experience.
On June 12, he reappeared armed with a Kalashnikov-type rifle in a wooded area, accompanied by another individual with a military appearance.
One of its followers warned him in the comments about the danger of using mobile phones due to the possibility of being tracked by drones. “Yes, man, we have to be careful,” he replied.
A week later, on June 19, he posted new images in uniform with Russian symbols. His outfit featured a circular patch with the inscription that can be read as «Победа будет за нами», equivalent to «Victory will be ours», a well-known patriotic and military slogan in Russia.
In July, his speech became even more explicit. «For many this is madness; for me it's just an adrenaline rush», he wrote in Russian in a post on July 13, once again accompanied by tags related to the so-called "special military operation" and Cubans in Russia.
During August, he continued to be seen with military equipment. On the 23rd, he appeared wearing a helmet, protective goggles, camouflage, and a machete, accompanied by the phrase: "Jealousy is for the insecure, I have a rifle and a machete."
On September 3rd, it showcased another patch featuring the Russian expression «Играю за нал», which can colloquially be interpreted as "I play for cash" or "I do it for money". The design depicts a caricatured soldier and banknotes.
The post does not reveal the conditions of his potential contract nor allows us to conclude that money is his only motivation. However, it is part of the image he willingly projects on his social media.
The sequence extends to September and shows a continued presence in a military environment, not an isolated photograph with a uniform.
CiberCuba has been unable to independently determine to which unit it belongs, the conditions under which it joined the Russian forces, or the exact location where the images were recorded.
"Sometimes there aren't many options."
The clearest explanation of his motivations comes from the young man himself in a video posted on September 7.
Dressed again in military uniform, he speaks directly to the camera and presents the risk he has undertaken as a personal decision related to the well-being of his family.
"I'm never going to blame God if He has me climbing a mountain, you know why? Because I was the one who asked to be at the top. And not for me, but for the well-being of my family, seriously", he states.
Afterward, he utters a particularly revealing phrase: «Sometimes there aren't many options, and you have to go for the first one available, even if it's the riskiest of them all».
"Remember that Juan's luck is not the same as Pedro's," he concludes.
His words paint a different picture than that described by Cubans who have reported arriving in Russia lured by false job offers only to later find out they would be sent to war.
In the story that El Sensei 2002 has chosen to share publicly, risk is not hidden or denied, but rather embraced as the price of an opportunity to improve his family's well-being.
This does not allow us to know how he was recruited, what was promised to him, how much money he receives, or what conditions are outlined in his eventual contract. It also does not rule out the possibility of abuses occurring after his incorporation.
But in the publications reviewed by CiberCuba, there are no reports of deception, coercion, regret, or desires to abandon the Russian forces.
On the contrary, for months the young man has displayed Russian weapons and symbols, used Moscow's terminology to refer to the war, talked about the "enemy" and drones, and presented the experience as a source of adrenaline.
His own statement also adds an important nuance: he believes he made a decision, but he also acknowledges that he saw few alternatives.
From 17 detainees to a war that hasn't ended for Cubans
The journalistic interest in the story transcends the protagonist. Its chronology provides recent evidence that citizens from Cuba continue to join the Russian forces in 2026, almost three years after the regime claimed to have acted to stop precisely that phenomenon.
In September 2023, after testimonies from Cubans recruited by Russia began to multiply, the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) claimed to have uncovered a trafficking network that operated between Russia and Cuba.
The authorities announced the detention of 17 individuals.
According to the official version, one of them acted as an "internal organizer," assisted by two others residing in Cuba. The recruiters sought individuals interested in traveling to Russia, sent their details, and flight tickets were arranged from that country.
The authorities themselves acknowledged that some participants had voluntarily joined, drawn by financial compensation and the possibility of obtaining residency in Russia.
The Prosecutor's Office then warned that the actions could constitute mercenarism and that those responsible would face severe penalties.
Months later, however, it was reported that some of the detainees had been released.
Since then, the Cuban government has not publicly provided a transparent report that reveals what happened to all those accused, how many were ultimately tried and sentenced, or which recruitment structures were effectively dismantled.
Havana assures that it has taken measures
In June 2025, the Deputy Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío once again distanced the Cuban government from any responsibility in recruitment.
The official assured that Havana had made the phenomenon public and denounced it, had taken measures and even spoken with other governments. He also attributed the recruitment operations to external networks and reminded that Cuban laws prohibit citizens under the jurisdiction of the Island from participating in foreign wars.
The case now reconstructed by CiberCuba does not demonstrate that the Cuban authorities organized the recruitment of this young man, that they were aware of the purpose of his trip, or that they consciously facilitated his incorporation into the Russian forces. However, it sheds new light on the effectiveness of those measures.
On April 24, 2026, the young man published a video related to his departure from Cuba. The following day, he made a post in Moscow. By June 10, he was already seen armed and equipped with Russian symbols.
More than a thousand Cubans identified
The case also does not appear empty. In May 2025, CiberCuba analyzed a dossier released by the Ukrainian project I Want to Live that contained information about 1,028 Cuban citizens recruited by Russian forces, including names, ages, documents, and dates of enlistment.
Subsequent investigations continued to reveal cases of Cubans killed, missing, or captured in Ukraine.
Another analysis by CiberCuba also found a striking temporal coincidence between the peaks of Cuban recruitment and the increase in air connections, diplomatic exchanges, and agreements between Moscow and Havana.
The case of El Sensei 2002 has an additional peculiarity: its release occurred in 2026, when direct air connections between Cuba and Russia were facing significant suspensions due to the aviation fuel crisis on the Island.
CiberCuba has not been able to determine which route was taken to reach Russia.
Mercenaries, deceived, and a border that is not always straightforward
The known stories of Cubans in the Russian forces do not follow a single pattern.
There are testimonies from individuals who claim to have traveled under false offers of civilian employment and ended up in military facilities. Other Cubans have acknowledged voluntarily joining, lured by salaries, residency, or Russian citizenship.
In fact, the Cuban authorities admitted in 2023 that among those recruited, there were individuals who had voluntarily accepted the offers.
Everything observed so far in the profile of El Sensei 2002 appears more compatible with a decision made consciously than with the image of someone who suddenly realizes they have been sent to a war.
But her words also reveal another reality. “Sometimes there are not many options,” she says before explaining that she chose to go for the first one available, even though it was “the riskiest of all.”
For a 24-year-old Cuban, a war thousands of kilometers away from his country seems to have become an acceptable alternative to trying to ensure the well-being of his family.
Economic hardship and the lack of opportunities may help explain a decision of this nature. They do not eliminate the individual responsibility of those who choose to participate voluntarily in a war nor do they automatically turn that decision into human trafficking.
In the analyzed publications, the conflict appears almost stripped of political content. There are no visible reflections on Ukraine, the reasons for the invasion, or its human consequences.
There is family, weapons, money, risk, adrenaline, religion, and survival.
Cubans continue to arrive, and Havana still isn't providing numbers
Despite the magnitude of the phenomenon, the Cuban regime has not provided a public report on how many citizens from the Island have ended up in the Russian forces, how many remain there, how many have died, how many are missing or imprisoned, and what assistance their families are receiving.
Other countries affected by Russian recruitment have adopted more visible public measures.
Kenia has acknowledged the existence of hundreds of recruited citizens, initiated repatriations, and investigated agencies linked to this phenomenon. Peru has reached out to Moscow and provided information about involved citizens.
The Cuban response, in contrast, continues to be characterized by opacity.
Havana announced 17 arrests in 2023 and later asserted that it had taken measures. However, it has not publicly presented results that can demonstrate that the problem has been controlled.
The digital biography of El Sensei 2002 does not, on its own, demonstrate the existence of a new recruitment network within Cuba.
Demonstrate something more concrete: in 2026, new Cubans continue to appear in the forces that Russia uses in its war against Ukraine.
A young man who on April 24 posted about his departure from Cuba appeared weeks later armed and in uniform with Russian symbols. In September, he continues to publicly display that life and claims that he has taken the risk "for the well-being of my family".
Almost three years after the Cuban regime announced that it had taken action against the networks that were sending citizens from the Island to the war in Russia, one question remains unanswered: What is Havana really doing to prevent more Cubans from following the same path?
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