The capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3 did not begin with the entry of U.S. special forces into Caracas.
It had started months earlier, when the CIA managed to infiltrate the environment of the Venezuelan ruler, reconstruct his routines, and obtain precise information about his movements and protection systems.
The operation demonstrated just how much human intelligence, combined with technological surveillance and military capability, can surpass the security devices surrounding an authoritarian leader.
It also exposed the limitations of the Cuban apparatus that had contributed to protecting Maduro for years.
Nine months later, while Washington publicly requests collaborators within Cuba and strengthens its intelligence resources around the island, that precedent raises a question: Can the United States replicate a similar strategy against the regime in Havana?
The answer depends on factors that go far beyond the military capability of the United States. Among them are the level of penetration of Cuban intelligence, the possibility of obtaining sources within the ruling circle, and the existence of interlocutors capable of leading a subsequent political scenario.
How the operation against Maduro was constructed
According to a report by Reuters published on January 3, the CIA had deployed a small covert team in Venezuela since August 2025 that was gathering information about Maduro's daily life.
The agency also had a source close to the president who monitored his movements and was prepared to communicate his exact location when the operation began.
The New York Times specified that the CIA had an informant within the Venezuelan government and was using stealth drones to maintain almost constant surveillance over the movements of the leader.
General Dan Caine, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, later explained that intelligence services had studied where Maduro lived, how he moved around, which places he frequented, what he ate, and even seemingly insignificant aspects of his personal habits.
That tracking allowed for the creation of what specialists call a pattern of life: a detailed reconstruction of a target's routines to anticipate their movements and identify their vulnerabilities.
The difference between knowing Maduro's residence and knowing exactly where he would be during a capture operation proved to be crucial.
The CIA was able to provide information that allowed U.S. special forces to locate the leader and carry out a rescue that had been planned for months.
But intelligence alone would not have been sufficient.
Delta Force repeatedly practiced the assault using a replica of Maduro's fortified residence. Simultaneously, the Pentagon amassed over 15,000 troops in the Caribbean, along with an aircraft carrier, numerous warships, and combat aircraft.
The operation combined a human source close to the target, technological surveillance, and a substantial military force, ready to intervene at the chosen moment.
The failure of the Cuban security apparatus
One of the most significant aspects for Havana was the failure of the protection apparatus that Cuba had helped to build around Maduro.
For years, Cuban services played a crucial role in the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security of the Venezuelan leadership. The presidential protection included agents sent by the Cuban regime, whose role went beyond the physical surveillance of the leader.
On January 3, however, that device was unable to prevent the United States from knowing Maduro's location, infiltrating the military complex where he was located, and capturing him along with his wife, Cilia Flores.
Havana later acknowledged the deaths of 32 members of its military and security forces during the operation.
An analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS
The operation did not aim to destroy the entire Venezuelan military apparatus, but rather to temporarily neutralize the capabilities that could hinder the capture.
The study also pointed out deficiencies in the deployment of Venezuelan air defenses and in their ability to respond to U.S. electronic warfare operations.
Maduro's vulnerability was not solely an issue of information leaks. It also stemmed from the inability of his security forces to react effectively when that information was used.
Rewards, accusations, and pressure: a multi-front strategy
The clandestine operation took place while Washington intensified other pressure mechanisms against Maduro.
Since March 2020, the Venezuelan ruler has faced U.S. federal charges for narcotrafficking, conspiracy to import cocaine, and related weapons offenses.
In August 2025, the State Department, led by Marco Rubio,
The initiative expanded the incentives for providing information to U.S. authorities, although there is no public confirmation that the source used by the CIA received that money. Additionally, the program's conditions excluded government officials and employees from the possibility of receiving rewards.
Washington also sought a negotiated exit.
According to Reuters, Trump spoke with Maduro on November 21, 2025, and offered him the opportunity to leave Venezuela. The leader demanded guarantees of amnesty and other conditions that were rejected.
The agreement did not materialize, and weeks later, the United States carried out the military operation.
The judicial proceedings continued to advance following the arrest. On October 8th, the Department of Justice filed new charges against Maduro and Flores for conspiracy to commit torture, adding to the previous allegations. Both maintain the presumption of innocence.
The Venezuelan experience illustrates how Washington combined legal procedures, economic incentives, negotiations, clandestine information gathering, and military pressure: a strategy that is starting to sound increasingly familiar in Havana.
Cuba: a different adversary
The U.S. success against Maduro does not mean that replicating the operation in Cuba is equally feasible.
The first difference lies in the security structure.
While Venezuela partially relied on Cuban intelligence cooperation, the regime on the island directly controls its counterintelligence, military security, and leader protection agencies, developed over decades under the supervision of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior.
The CIA is aware of the difficulties of operating against those structures.
A report by The New York Times published in August revealed that the agency had created a task force specifically dedicated to Cuba, with officers specialized in source recruitment, intelligence analysis, cyber operations, and covert influence.
Its objective is to identify divisions within the ruling elite and promote the emergence of more pragmatic leaders willing to negotiate the transformations demanded by Trump.
Washington has additionally elevated Cuba to the category of "Priority 1" within its national intelligence priorities, alongside countries such as China, Russia, and Iran.
Other U.S. agencies began to allocate more satellite and surveillance resources to Cuban territory. According to information published by Politico, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft had logged over 150 hours of missions around the island since February.
The increase in these activities indicates that Washington seeks to gain a more accurate picture of the defenses, military capabilities, communications, and internal workings of the regime.
But it also reveals a limitation: according to The New York Times, U.S. military and intelligence officials had expressed concern about having outdated information on Cuba.
The CIA has demonstrated that it managed to penetrate Maduro's inner circle. There is no equivalent public information suggesting that it has achieved a similar level of access to the Cuban leadership.
The campaign launched on October 23 and 24 by Marco Rubio and the CIA, which publicly invites Cubans to discreetly collaborate with the agency, can be interpreted as an attempt to broaden the available sources while simultaneously sending a message of pressure to the governing apparatus.
By becoming public, the invitation also introduces uncertainty within Cuban institutions: the regime must consider the possibility that individuals with access to sensitive information may decide to reach out to Washington.
However, this potential effect does not demonstrate that high-level collaborators already exist or that the campaign has succeeded in recruiting them.
The problem of who would govern afterward
The second major difference between Venezuela and Cuba is not military, but political.
The capture of Maduro ended his time in power, but did not lead to the disappearance of the Chavista state apparatus. Delcy Rodríguez took on the interim presidency and allowed Washington to engage with someone from the very system.
That outcome became a reference point for the U.S. strategy towards Cuba.
According to research from The New York Times, the Trump administration has requested its intelligence agencies to identify current or former officials who could play a similar role to Rodríguez.
But the known evaluations pose significant difficulties.
U.S. services believe that the Cuban succession presents greater obstacles than the Venezuelan one, because there are few clearly identified figures who combine influence within the regime, the ability to control its institutions, and the willingness to negotiate deep changes.
The Cuban political apparatus, structured around the Communist Party, the FAR, the MININT, and the economic networks tied to the ruling elite, also does not present a straightforward separation between political power, military control, and economic management.
The concentration of those functions serves as a survival mechanism for the regime, but it also complicates any attempts to promote a transition from within.
Even if Washington managed to neutralize or displace certain leaders, the question of who would control the armed forces, security services, and the main economic resources of the state would still remain.
The available information indicates that the CIA continues to seek answers to that question.
The military threat and its limits
The Venezuelan precedent has also influenced the defensive decisions of the Cuban regime.
According to The New York Times in August, Havana had increased the security of Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel in light of the possibility of a U.S. operation aimed at capturing or eliminating them.
The newspaper did not detail the measures taken nor stated that Trump had ordered such an action.
On its part, CBS News reported in September that the U.S. Army Reserve was assessing its capacity to provide logistical, medical, and military police units to Southern Command, as part of a planning effort that official sources linked to Cuba.
The chain specified that the document examined did not include deployment orders.
The CIA task force dedicated to Cuba also did not have, according to the investigation published in August, authorization to facilitate lethal operations, although its powers could be modified by presidential decision.
The collection of intelligence can be used to negotiate from a position of greater knowledge, identify vulnerabilities of the regime, exert political pressure, or update military plans. It does not necessarily imply that Washington has decided to utilize all of those capabilities in an intervention.
The Venezuelan lesson and the Cuban enigma
The capture of Maduro left three lessons for intelligence services and governments studying that precedent.
The first is that a leader's protection can be compromised when an opponent gathers precise information from their surroundings.
The second is that a military operation with limited objectives requires exceptional conditions of intelligence, preparation, surprise, and operational superiority.
And the third, possibly the most difficult to replicate, is that displacing a ruler does not guarantee control over what happens afterward.
In Venezuela, the United States gathered those capabilities and found a counterpart within chavismo to manage the subsequent scenario.
In Cuba, Washington is trying to enhance its understanding of the ruling apparatus and to identify potential interlocutors, but comparable results are still not known.
The critical question is not only whether the CIA can infiltrate the security circles of Raúl Castro and Díaz-Canel, but also whether the United States has a viable political strategy for the day after a potential change of power.
So far, the information regarding the CIA task force, the search for a "Cuban Delcy," and U.S. military planning indicates that both matters are still under work and evaluation by Washington.
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